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ABSTRACT 
The use of military force to suppress internal unrest has been an integral part of South African 
history.  The European colonisation of South Africa from 1652 was facilitated by the use of force.  
Boer commandos and British military regiments and volunteer units enforced the peace in outlying 
areas and fought against the indigenous population as did other colonial powers such as France in 
North Africa and Germany in German South West Africa, to name but a few.  The period 1912 to 
1945 is no exception, but with the difference that military force was used to suppress uprisings of 
white citizens as well.  White industrial workers experienced this military suppression in 1907, 
1913, 1914 and 1922 when they went on strike.  Job insecurity and wages were the main causes 
of the strikes and militant actions from the strikers forced the government to use military force 
when the police failed to maintain law and order.  Public reaction to the use of force was strong 
and the government, particularly Gen. J.C. Smuts, was severely criticised resulting in a defeat in 
the 1924 election.  Over the period 1921 to 1932 indigenous populations in South Africa and South 
West Africa such as the Israelites (1921), the Bondelswarts (1922), the Rehoboth Basters (1925) 
and the Ukuambi (1932), were suppressed through punitive expeditions by the police and military 
forces of the Union of South Africa.  The indigenous populations were a.o. grieved by the 
government’s implementation of branding laws, enforced indentured labour, dog and hut tax.  The 
government’s prevailing racial policy of that time, manifested in a master and servant attitude 
towards the indigenous populations, exacerbated an existing grievance of restrictive political rights.  
The government reacted quickly and economically in suppressing any indigenous population’s 
protests involving militant action.  Although the use of aeroplanes was criticised, it was a force 
multiplier and greatly assisted the small number of police and military forces deployed in 
minimising casualties on both sides.  The government also had to suppress militant Afrikaner 
uprisings during the First and Second World Wars.  In 1914 and 1915, prominent Afrikaner leaders 
and veterans of the Anglo-Boer War reacted militantly against the government’s participation in the 
First World War.  Gen. L. Botha and Gen. Smuts were the architects of their suppression through 
quick mobilisation of the Active Citizen Force, using mostly Afrikaans speaking volunteers.  The 
period between the two world wars saw the growth of the Afrikaners on a political, social and 
limited economical level.  This gave rise to further dispute on political and social levels when the 
government once again opted to fight alongside Britain in the Second World War.  Old animosities 
between the Afrikaners and British were relived and militant elements within Afrikaner society 
mobilised to impede this participation.  The government resorted to using the Union Defence 
Forces and SA Police to facilitate internment, for spying and to guard strategic objectives in an 
effort to prevent sabotage and other serious damage to the war effort.  Smuts received severe 
criticism from mostly Afrikaners who were against participation in the war, and the general public 
who had to suffer under the conditions of martial law.  
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OPSOMMING 
Die gebruik van militêre mag in die onderdrukking van interne onrus is ‘n algemene verskynsel in 
die geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika.  Sedert 1652 het die Europese koloniale besetting van Suid-Afrika 
gepaard gegaan met geweld.  Boerekommando’s en Britse militêre regimente en 
vrywilligereenhede het die vrede in verafgeleë gebiede gehandhaaf en die plaaslike bevolkings 
onderwerp, net soos ander koloniale moondhede, byvoorbeeld, Frankryk in Noord-Afrika en 
Duitsland in Duits-Suidwes-Afrika gedoen het.  Die periode van 1912 tot 1945 was geen 
uitsondering nie, maar met die verskil dat opstande ook onder die blanke bevolking onderdruk is.  
In 1907, 1913, 1914 en 1922 het die blanke industriële werkers sodanige onderdrukking ervaar.  
Werksonsekerheid en loongeskille was die dryfkrag agter die stakings en die stakers se militante 
optrede het die regering gedwing om militêre mag te gebruik om die opstande te onderdruk, nadat 
die polisie se pogings om wet en orde te handhaaf, misluk het.  Die publiek was sterk gekant teen 
sulke hardhandige optrede en Genl. J.C. Smuts het veral onder kritiek deurgeloop, wat tot sy 
politieke nederlaag gelei het.  Opstandige inheemse bevolkings in Suid-Afrika en Suidwes-Afrika 
soos die Israeliete (1921), die Bondelswarts (1922), die Rehoboth Basters (1925) en die Ukuambi 
(1932) het deurgeloop onder strafekspidisies van elemente van die Unie van Suid-Afrika se polisie 
en weermag.  Die inheemse bevolking is gegrief deur die regering se implimentering van 
brandmerkwette, geforseerde kontrakarbeid, hut- en hondebelasting.  Die regering se rassebeleid 
van die tyd het ‘n meester-en-onderdaan-houding teenoor die inheemse bevolkings geskep, wat 
die teer kwessie van beperkte politieke regte vererger het.  Opstande deur inheemse bevolkings 
wat militant van aard was, is op ‘n vinnige en ekonomiese manier onderdruk, dog het skerp kritiek 
uitgelok.  Die benutting van vliegtuie om die opstande te onderdruk was ‘n magsvermenigvuldiger 
wat die klein polisie- en weermag gehelp het om verliese tydens die onderdukking van opstande 
aan beide kante te beperk.  Die regering het ook opstande van Afrikanergroepe tydens die Eerste 
en Tweede Wêreldoorlog onderdruk.  In 1914-1915 het prominente Afrikanerleiers en veterane van 
die Anglo-Boereoorlog militant opgeruk teen die regering in verset oor die regering se deelname 
aan die Eerste Wêreldoorlog.  Genl. L. Botha en Genl. Smuts was die argitekte van die vinnige 
onderdrukking van die opstande deur die Aktiewe Burgermag op te roep en hoofsaaklik 
Afrikaanssprekende vrywilligers te gebruik.  Die periode tussen die twee Wêreldoorloë is 
gekenmerk deur die groei van die Afrikaner op politieke, sosiale en in ‘n beperkte mate, ook 
ekonomiese gebied.  Hieruit het verdere onenigheid op politieke en sosiale vlak onstaan toe die 
regering weer besluit het aand die kant van  Brittanje tot die Tweede Wêreldoorlog toe te tree.  Ou 
vyandighede tussen Afrikaans- en Engelssprekendes het herleef en militante elemente binne die 
Afrikanersamelewing het gemobiliseer om die deelname te belemmer.  Die regering het die 
Unieverdedigingsmag en die SA Polisie gebruik vir internering, spioenering en die beveiliging van 
strategiese doelwitte teen sabotasie en ander aktiwiteite wat die oorlogsdeelname sou belemmer.  
Smuts het die meeste kritiek ontvang van Afrikaners wat gekant was teen die oorlog, asook die 
publiek in die algemeen wat gebuk gegaan het onder krygswet. 
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PREFACE 
 
The national objectives of a state are determined by a country’s civil authorities, such as 
parliament, and defence objectives are derived accordingly.  Along these lines a defence force 
is bound to formulate a defence policy that is subservient to the national objectives.  A defence 
force is an extension of the ruling government relating to situations that may threaten state 
structures.  Defending these structures is paramount to the survival of the ruling government 
and the continued safeguarding of its citizens.  A national defence force is obligated to protect 
the sovereign borders and vital interests of the state against foreign and domestic threats.   
 
Threats can be divided into external threats from foreign entities and internal threats from 
groups within the state.  Insurrection, rebellion and unrest are all activities that can occur within 
a state and threaten a ruling government.  A state’s police force is the first line of defence 
against these activities, but if the police force is unable to suppress these activities, government 
utilises its defence force to reinforce the police in order to restore law and order.  If this support 
is unable to restore law and order effectively, martial law is proclaimed and the defence force is 
mobilised.  The defence force assumes command under martial law and restores order with the 
police in a supporting role.  The former Union Defence Force (UDF) of the Union of South 
Africa, 1910-1957, was involved in two World Wars and the Korean War, as well as in protecting 
the state against domestic threats. 
 
This dissertation investigates the utilisation of the UDF against domestic threats.  The history of 
the UDF will be briefly discussed to show how it came about and what major issues were 
relevant at the time of its establishment.  This is followed by an overview of the Union Defence 
Act (no 13 of 1912) to highlight the birth of a Defence Force from two diverse cultures, British 
and Afrikaner.  This will place the newly established UDF within the political context of the early 
twentieth century and in particular the second decade of that century. 
 
The foreign role of the UDF will be discussed briefly, followed by its domestic role where the 
emphasis will be placed on the internal policing role of the UDF during and between the two 
World Wars.  The focus will be on three categories to serve as examples of its utilisation in an 
internal policing role.  These three categories are white industrial unrest, indigenous (black) 
unrest and Afrikaner unrest.  Each category will contain an analysis of the tactical deployment of 
forces, particularly the UDF, in the context of the socio-political environment.  The study is not a 
social or political history per se, but a military history of the UDF’s deployment to suppress 
internal unrest within the Union as well as South West Africa (SWA) as a mandated territory of 
the Union from 1912 to 1945. 
 
 
 
 
xii 
The nature and practice of colonial policing and early policing in South Africa are covered in 
published sources, such as A. Clayton and D. Killingray’s Khaki and Blue:  Military and Police 
in British Colonial Africa (1989), D.E. Omissi’s Air Power and Colonial Control.  The Royal 
Air Force 1919-1939 (1990), M. Lacey’s Platskiet Politiek in War and Society, the 
Militarisation of South Africa (1989), edited by L. Nathan, and J.D. Brewer’s Black and Blue, 
Policing in South Africa (1994), to name but a few.  The background and conception of the 
UDF is documented by articles in Militaria, such as, Hoofstukke uit die Voor- en Vroeë 
Geskiedenis van die SAW (1969) by J. Ploeger, Voorgeskiedenis tot die Stigting van ‘n 
Unieverdedigingsmag (1982) by E.M. Meyers and ‘n Kort Kroniek van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Weermag (1987) by W.A. Dorning. 
 
White industrial unrest enjoyed attention in K.L. Thorpe’s extensive unpublished MA thesis, 
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Witwatersrand, 1913-1914 (1970), C.J. Jacobs’s article in Militaria, Die Rol van die 
Unieverdedigingsmag in die Onderdrukking van die Nywerheidsonluste van Januarie 1914 
(1988), N. Herd’s 1922, The Revolt on the Rand (1966), G.R. Kent’s Through the Red Revolt 
on the Rand, A Pictorial Review of events.  January, February, March, 1922 (n.d.), A.G. 
Oberholtser’s Die Mynwerkerstaking 1922 (1982) and J. Krikler’s The Rand Revolt.  The 
1922 Insurrection and Racial Killing in South Africa (2005).  These sources provide political 
and socio-economic background, but, with the exception of Jacobs and Krikler, include very little 
information on the tactical deployment of the UDF.  This information was found in government 
publications, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) Archives and the National 
Archives of South Africa. 
 
The Bondelswarts, Rehoboth and Ukuambi uprisings occurred in South West Africa (now 
Namibia) and valuable background information was found in literature pertaining to Namibian 
history.  These sources include Namibia: the Violent Heritage (1986) by D. Soggot, A History 
of Resistance in Namibia (1988) by P.H Katjavivi and A.B. Emmett’s book, Popular 
Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915-1966 (1999).  Literature on 
indigenous uprisings in the period from 1921 to 1932 is informative and provides insight into 
social structures and the political background of the uprisings, but lack detail regarding tactical 
deployments.  D.H. Makhobe published three articles in Militaria on the 1921 Bulhoek 
‘Massacre’ (1996) and R. Edgar wrote a book on the Israelites called, Because they Chose the 
Plan of God, the Story of the Bulhoek Massacre (1988).  The uprising of the Bondelswarts in 
1922 received attention in R. Freislich’s The Last Tribal Stand, A History of the Bondelswart 
Uprising (1964), A.M. Davey’s The Bondelswarts Affair (1961) and G.L.M. Lewis’s 
unpublished MA thesis, The Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922 (1977).  There are useful 
 
 
 
xiii 
sources available on the Rehoboth ‘Basters’ such as P. Pearson’s The History and Social 
Structure of the Rehoboth Baster Community of Namibia(1985), R.G. Britz’s A Concise 
History of the Rehoboth Basters Until 1990 (1999) and an unpublished D Litt thesis by G.J.J. 
Oosthuizen, Die Rehoboth-Basters binne die Konteks van die Staatkundige verhoudinge tussen 
Suidwes-Afrika en Suid-Afrika, 1915-1939 (1993).  The uprising and suppression of the 
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briefly revisited to indicate the military suppression thereof and to set the stage for Afrikaner 
politics and culture before and during the Second World War.  H.W. Wilson and J.A. 
Hammerton covered the Rebellion in The Great War, The Standard History of the All-Europe 
Conflict, Vol 3. (1915)  H. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, Biography of a People (2003), T.R.H. 
Davenport, South Africa, A Modern History (1991), S.B. Spies:  Unie en Onenigheid, 1910-
1924 (1986), L. Thompson, A History of South Africa (1990) and E. Walker, A History of 
South Africa (1957) cover a broad spectrum of information, but lack tactical detail of military 
deployments.  The blue book publications are Union of South Africa, Report on the Outbreak 
of the Rebellion and the Policy of the Government with Regard to its Suppression (1915) 
and Union of South Africa, Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Causes of 
and Circumstances Relating to the Recent Rebellion in South Africa (1915) and provide 
valuable information on government policy and the execution thereof during the rebellion.  G.D. 
Scholtz, Die Rebellie, 1914-15 (1942) and P.J. Sampson, The Capture of De Wet, The South 
African Rebellion 1914 (1915) were invaluable sources of information that enabled a study of 
the Rebel’s attitudes and underlying frustrations at the time.   
 
Information about Afrikaner unrest during the Second World War was found in various literary 
sources and archival material.  P.J. Furlong’s, Between Crown and Swastika.  The impact of 
the Radical Right on the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement in the Fascist Era (1991) 
investigated the influence of National Socialism and the accompanying political and economic 
growth of the Afrikaners.  Information on Afrikaner resistance against participation in the Second 
World War, in particular the Ossewa-Brandwag, was found in Die Ossewa-Brandwag en 
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Afrikanereenheid (1987) by L.M. Fourie, the research project Die Ossewa-Brandwag en die 
Tweede Wêreld Oorlog (1983) by P.F. van der Schyff, John Vorster, OB-Generaal en 
Afrikanervegter (1983) by H.O. Terblanche, OB, Traitors or Patriots (1976) by G.C. Visser, 
For Volk and Führer (1982) by H. Strydom and Their Paths Crossed Mine, Memoirs of the 
Commandant-General of the Ossewa-Brandwag (1956) by H. van Rensburg.  Journals such 
as Koers and STET published articles by P.J.J. Prinsloo, Die Kentering in die Kultuurbeeld van 
die Ossewa-Brandwag (1996) and S. Louw, “Discourse Theory, Afrikaner Nationalism and the 
Ossewa-Brandwag” (1990), respectively.  The Ossewa-Brandwag collection at the Ferdinand 
Postma Library, University of Potchefstroom has reports and personal correspondence between 
members.  H.J. Martin and N.D. Orpen cover home defence during the Second World War in 
South African Forces World War II Vol II:  South Africa at War:  Military and Industrial 
Organisation and Operations in Connection with the Conduct of the War, 1939–1945 
(1979).  Regimental histories such as N. Orpen, The Cape Town Highlanders, 1885-1970 
(1970), W.S. Douglas, Regimental History of the Cape Town Highlanders (1944), C. Birkby, 
The Saga of the Transvaal Scottish Regiment, 1932-1950 (1950) and G.E. Visser, Die 
Geskiedenis van die Middelandse Regiment, 1934-1943 (1983) also provide useful information 
on the internal deployments of the UDF during the Second World War especially, regarding 
deployments for guard duties at internment camps.   
* * * 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE THEORY OF MILITARY POLICING AND ITS MANIFESTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The South African White Paper on Defence, as approved by Parliament in May 1996, lists the 
provisional role and functions of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) as stipulated 
by the Constitution.  It states that the primary objective of the SANDF is to defend South Africa 
against an enemy threatening its sovereignty and territorial integrity, in conjunction with service for 
the preservation of life, health and property.  The secondary function of the SANDF is of an internal 
nature:  “…for service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the 
South African Police Service under circumstances set out in law where the Police Service is unable 
to maintain law and order on its own.”1 
 
The involvement of the SANDF in law enforcement is a perpetuation of the historical role and 
application of military forces in South Africa initiated by the Dutch in 1652.  This use of military 
force was not unique to South Africa as many countries, including Portugal, Britain, France and 
Germany applied it in the territories they colonised.2  But the military, para-military and volunteer 
units in South Africa have some unique qualities.  It is therefore important to describe the 
colonisation of South Africa during the Dutch and British regimes to provide the background from 
which the military culture developed.  The experiences and actions of other colonial powers, such 
as Britain, France and Germany are described to provide the milieu in which the Dutch and later 
the British handled the situation in South Africa.  An evaluation of the origin of militant policing 
follows in order to discover why it became synonymous with expansion and white supremacy.  The 
development of the military system is discussed with the focus on how the different military forces 
in South Africa evolved into a national force, the Union Defence Force (UDF).  The final section 
describes the different roles of the UDF and, in particular, the policing role it inherited.   
                                                
1  Department of Defence:  Defence in Democracy as approved by the South African Parliament, 
May 1996 [and] South African Defence Review as Approved by Parliament, April 1998, p.34;  
Department of Defence:  Command Doctrine, GWU 90, pp.8-3. 
2  H. Strachan: European Armies and the Conduct of War, pp.76-89;  I.F.W. Beckett: The Roots of 
Counter-Insurgency, Armies and Guerrilla Warfare, 1900-1945, p.11;  M. Bennett: “The German 
Experience”, in I.F.W. Beckett: The Roots of Counter-Insurgency, Armies and Guerrilla Warfare, 
1900-1945, p.63;  F. Toase: “The French Experience”, in I.F.W. Beckett: The Roots of Counter-
Insurgency, Armies and Guerrilla Warfare, 1900-1945, p.41;  J. Pimlott. “The British Experience”, 
in I.F.W. Beckett: The Roots of Counter-Insurgency, Armies and Guerrilla Warfare, 1900-1945, 
p.17. 
 2
1.2 THE COLONISATION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The colonisation of South Africa was a side effect of the need to establish a refreshment post along 
the ocean trade route, halfway between Europe and the East.  The Cape was initially discovered 
by the Portuguese in their search for an ocean route that would minimise expenditure in the 
overland trade of silks and spices.  (See Figure 1.1: Portuguese Trade Routes.)  Companies from 
France, England and the Netherlands travelled the ocean route, but it was the Dutch East India 
Company (DEIC) who established a refreshment post at the Cape of Good Hope.  The main goal 
was to provide fresh produce to curb the scurvy which broke out among the crew during the long 
voyage.3 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1:  The Portuguese Trade Routes, 1485 - 1497.4 
 
                                                
3  T.R.H. Davenport:  South Africa, A Modern History, p.19; L. Thompson, A History of South 
Africa, p.33; A. Lester, et al: South Africa, Past Present and Future, pp.50-51. 
4  A. Lester, et al: South Africa, Past Present and Future, p.52. 
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The task of establishing the refreshment post was given to Commander Jan van Riebeeck.  He 
arrived in Table Bay in April 1652 and began in earnest to trade with the indigenous Khoikhoi tribes 
for fresh meat.  The DEIC did not intend to establish a permanent colony at the Cape, but after a 
few years, it became inevitable for three reasons - company employees were given the right to 
become free burghers, the influx of slaves and the gradual expansion of the Dutch settlement.5 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2:  Cape Town and Early Surrounding Settlements, 1657 - 1701.6 
 
The business-like reasoning of the DEIC hoped that free burghers would provide produce at a 
lower cost than slaves and men on the company payroll.  Merchandise was sold at a fixed rate to 
the company and with the rise in the demand for fresh produce, the number of free burghers, as 
well as Dutch, French and German immigrants also rose.  From 1658 the population at the Cape 
rose steadily with the influx of slaves from Dahomey, Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Indonesia, India and Ceylon (Sri Lanka).  By 1778, the number of slaves was 14,747, 
outnumbering the 13,830 free burghers.  The influx of immigrants and slaves was coincidental to 
the gradual expansion of the Dutch territory to the areas known today as Stellenbosch and 
                                                
5  T.R.H. Davenport:  South Africa, A Modern History, p.19; L. Thompson, A History of South 
Africa, p.33; A. Lester, et al: South Africa, Past Present and Future, pp.50-51. 
6  A. Lester, et al: South Africa, Past Present and Future, p. 53. 
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Somerset-West.  It was grudgingly accepted by the DEIC that the refreshment post was growing 
into a fully-fledged colony.7(See Figure 1.2 and 1.3: Expansion of the Cape Colony.) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3:  The Expansion of the Cape Colony in 1790.8 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4:  Expansion (a) and States (b) by 1870.9 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
7  T.R.H. Davenport:  South Africa, A Modern History, pp.19-21; L. Thompson, A History of South 
Africa, pp.33-36; A. Lester, et al: South Africa, Past Present and Future, pp.50-51. 
8  A. Lester, et al: South Africa, Past Present and Future, p.57. 
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Figure 1.5:  The Main Trek Routes during the “Great Trek”.10  
 
The gradual colonisation of South Africa had a direct effect on the indigenous population.  They 
faced the dilemma of either displacement or integration.  Whatever choices were made profoundly 
affected them.  Tribal cohesion and traditional values were lost in the constant battle to regain the 
land taken from them by the colonists.  The use of military power was instrumental in facilitating the 
growth of the small refreshment post into a colony at the southern tip of Africa.  These actions did 
                                                                                                                                                               
9  A. Lester, et al, South Africa, Past Present and Future, p.91. 
10  A. Lester et al, South Africa, Past Present and Future, p.75. 
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not only include military expeditions, but also the policing of the settled areas by militant means.11  
South Africa is not unique in this policing tradition, as this was the norm for many western colonial 
powers. 
 
1.3 IRREGULAR WARFARE BY COLONIAL FORCES  
 
Britain, France and Germany were three prominent participants in the colonisation of Africa, but the 
real “Scramble for Africa” only began in the 1880s and 1890s.  The European colonisation of the 
various territories was met with fierce resistance by the indigenous tribes.  Germany consistently 
carried out military expeditions in German East Africa from 1889 to 1907, including the one against 
the Maji-Maji uprising from 1905-1907.  Resistance to German rule also occurred in German South 
West Africa with the Herero revolt from 1904-1907.  The indigenous populations of West and 
North-Central Africa bravely resisted French colonisation, but were eventually suppressed by 
French colonial forces.  Resistance was especially fierce in Algeria (1903-10) and Morocco (1912-
1934).  British colonisation in West Africa encountered fierce resistance from the indigenous 
populations of Nigeria (1892-1902) and the Gold Coast (1895-1900), as was the case in South 
Africa.  The Basutos (1868), the Xhosas (1878), the Pedi and the Zulus (1879), the Boers of the 
Transvaal and the Orange Free State (1899-1902) and other groups resisted this colonial drive, but 
in the end all succumbed to British rule.12 
 
The military played a significant role in suppressing the uprisings in the various colonies.  These 
colonial operations were not carried out in the orthodox style of war for which the conventional 
armies were trained.  The irregular wars in distant colonial territories received scant theoretical 
attention due to the priority placed on preparing for and fighting conventional wars.  At a strategic 
level armies approached colonial operations with a conventional doctrine and only adapted to the 
environment at a tactical level.  The military lacked a coherent doctrine regarding its role and 
application in colonial operations, due to the diversity of the colonial opponents and the variety of 
campaigns.13 
 
The general assumption of colonial forces in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was that the use 
of extreme force and superior firepower was an appropriate response to suppress the uprising of 
local inhabitants.  This was the case with Germany’s colonial campaign in German East Africa and 
                                                
11  L. Thompson, A History of South Africa, pp.52-53; T.R.H. Davenport:  South Africa, A Modern 
History, p.21; A. Lester, et al, South Africa, Past Present and Future, p.58. 
12  T. Pakenham: The Scramble for Africa, pp.xv-xvii; G. Pool:  Die Herero-Opstand, 1904-1907 
(Unpublished M.A. Thesis, US, 1976), pp1-17; H. Strachan: European Armies and the Conduct of 
War, pp.77-9; I.F.W. Beckett: The Roots of Counter-Insurgency, Armies and Guerrilla Warfare, 
1900-1945, p.11; F. Toase: The French Experience, p.41. 
13  H. Strachan: European Armies and the Conduct of War, p.76; I.F.W. Beckett: The Roots of 
Counter-Insurgency, Armies and Guerrilla Warfare, 1900-1945, p.15, B. Vandervort:  Wars of 
Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914, pp. 11-12, 37-39; T.M. Meguire:  Guerilla or Partisan 
Warfare, pp.1-3. 
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German South West Africa during the Maji-Maji uprising and the Herero revolt respectively in the 
period 1904-1907.  Over 26,000 people died during the Maji-Maji uprising and the Herero 
population declined by over 60,000 in this period.  French colonial strategy was typical of the 
approach used by European forces at the time.  In 1830, the French applied their tactics of Grande 
Armée in French North Africa without initial success.  It was through Marshal Bugeaud that a 
change in their approach towards colonial operations was initiated in 1840.  Bugeaud brought into 
play the element of achieving a political aim during colonial campaigns.  Conquering a land was 
now no longer the only objective - the colonisation of the land as an asset to France was added.14 
 
Joseph Galliéni and Hubert Lyautey developed Bugeaud’s ideas further by emphasising the slow 
and methodical expansion of French administration alongside a strong military presence.  The 
theoretical expression of this type of colonisation was written by Lyautey in an article for the Revue 
des Deux Mondes in 1900, which stressed the political context of colonial operations and equally 
importantly, the regeneration of French society and politics.15 
 
It was only in 1896 when C.E. Callwell published his Small Wars:  Their Principles and Practise 
that the British Army received a standard manual for conducting colonial operations.  This book 
categorised the potential foes expected in colonial operations as well as the operational objectives 
of the colonial force.  Callwell was of the opinion that the use of force with just enough violence 
was called for to overawe the enemy and bring them to terms.  The use of extreme force, however, 
would only exacerbate the situation and inflame the uprising.  In this manner military force was 
used to acquire new territories.  In the early 20th Century, Col. H.T. Lukin, Commandant General of 
the Cape Colonial Forces, influenced the debate on colonial warfare with the publishing in Cape 
Town of a training pamphlet, Savage Warfare:  Hints on Tactics to be Adopted and Precautions to 
be Taken.  Lukin draws from his experience in previous conflicts with the South African Zulus and 
Basothos and describes what a colonial army can expect in campaigns against indigenous 
populations.16 
 
1.4 THE ORIGIN OF MILITARY POLICING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Technological advances enabled expanding colonial communities to counter indigenous resistance 
to white settlement successfully.  Indigenous weapons, such as the bow and arrow and the spear 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
14  H. Strachan: European Armies and the Conduct of War, p.79; I.F.W. Beckett: The Roots of 
Counter-Insurgency, Armies and Guerrilla Warfare, 1900-1945, p.11; B. Vandervort:  Wars of 
Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914, pp. 48-55, 62-64. 
15  I.F.W. Beckett: The Roots of Counter-Insurgency, Armies and Guerrilla Warfare, 1900-1945, 
pp.14-15; H. Strachan: European Armies and the Conduct of War, pp.78-80; B. Vandervort:  
Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914, pp. 72-73. 
16  I.F.W. Beckett: The Roots of Counter-Insurgency, Armies and Guerrilla Warfare, 1900-1945, 
p.9; H. Strachan: European Armies and the Conduct of War, pp.76-8; B. Vandervort:  Wars of 
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were overwhelmed by colonial firepower.  The technologically disadvantaged indigenous 
populations were subjugated eventually by the use of military force and firepower.  Steamships, 
prophylaxes, developments in communications and modern weapons, such as air power and the 
machine gun, assisted the Europeans to consolidate their power.  A few examples were the 
Xhosas who were beaten decisively after nine frontier wars ending in 1878, the Pedi and the Zulus 
who were subjugated in 1818 and 1879 and in 1885 control was established over the Tswana-
speaking people and their territory.  Firepower was the key to ensuring the settlement of South 
Africa by populations migrating from Europe.17  
 
The structures that facilitated the victories were the Boer commandos and the British military 
regiments.  It is within these military systems that the policing tradition of South Africa must be 
viewed.  John Brewer states, Police bodies in South Africa began as colonial forces… and retained 
most of the features of this model as the 20th century progressed.18  Brewer further describes two 
policing traditions within South Africa.  The first was the Afrikaner tradition present in the Boer 
Republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.  The second was the colonial tradition that 
was present in the British territories of Natal and the Cape Colony.19 
 
Jan van Riebeeck established what became the Afrikaner tradition of policing in the initial 
appointment of a Geweldiger (Enforcer) barely six months after his arrival in 1652.  The task of the 
Geweldiger was to deal with the growing crime problem in the settlement.  The main problems 
were stock theft by colonialists and the indigenous tribes in the area and illegal trade between the 
Dutch and Cape populations.  The combating of crime within the early Dutch settlements needed 
to be increased as the settlements expanded and the usual crimes associated with an urban 
environment were committed.  The urban police in the Boer Republics were not only used to 
prevent crime, but also to regulate social and cultural boundaries between black and white, by 
calming white fears regarding the crime committed by blacks and keeping blacks out of white 
areas.20 
 
Another feature of the Afrikaner tradition was the policing of the rural environment using the 
commandos.  The commando system was born in 1659 from the need to protect the outlying areas 
against stock theft and possible attacks by the Khoikhoi.  War with the local tribes was not viewed 
                                                                                                                                                               
Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914, pp. 209-211; H.T. Lukin:  Savage Warfare:  Hints on 
Tactics to be Adopted and Precautions to be Taken, pp.1-9. 
17  A. Seegers: The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, pp.1-7; E. Roux: Time Longer 
Than Rope, pp.13-18; G. Cawthra: Policing South Africa, The South African Police and the 
Transition from Apartheid, p.5; D.E. Omissi: Air Power and Colonial Control.  The Royal Air 
Force 1919-1939, pp.3-4. 
18  J.D. Brewer: Black and Blue, Policing in South Africa, p.15. 
19  A. Seegers: The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, pp.1-2; J.D. Brewer: Black and 
Blue, pp.15-18. 
20  J.D. Brewer: Black and Blue, pp.15-18; E.M. Meyers: Voorgeskiedenis tot die Stigting van ‘n 
Unieverdedigingsmag, Militaria, vol. 12, no. 2, 1982, p.1. 
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as economical, but expeditions to punish them were often executed.  The use of the horse was 
born from the necessity to react quickly to dangers in the outlying areas of the early settlement.  
The tasks of the commandos were twofold, primarily to defend the Cape against a foreign invasion 
and secondarily to curb stock theft by the indigenous tribes.  Company soldiers of the DEIC were 
initially used to man the commandos.21 
 
The expansion of the colony changed the setup of the commando profoundly.  It created the need 
for a commando consisting primarily of citizens in charge of their own defence and policing.  In the 
rural environment crime and disorder were manifested in stock theft and plunder and policing was 
done by these commandos.  The commandos constituted burghers and even integrated Khoikhoi 
with a Company officer in charge.  The burgher commandos provided a mobile and flexible 
component that was able to take over the policing of its area of responsibility and become a 
military component if the need arose.  Regions were demarcated and the commandos consisted of 
all able-bodied males with a firearm, horse, saddle and a few rounds of ammunition.  Participation 
became compulsory from 1739 and an elaborate system began to emerge as the white settlers 
moved into the interior.  The settlements in the rural interior of South Africa were isolated and 
constantly feared attacks from the indigenous population.  They were responsible for their own 
defence and the commando system was the most practical and best tactical system for protection 
of these small isolated communities.22 
 
The burgher commandos became synonymous with the expansion of the Afrikaner communities 
during the “Great Trek” and protected the settlements that followed.  These settlements expanded 
and spread into the territory of the later Transvaal and the Orange Free State.  They eventually 
received independence from Britain in 1852 and 1854 respectively.  The burgher commandos 
became the Boer commandos and grew to become the cornerstone of the Boer military machine 
responsible for the defence and policing of the Boer Republics.23   
 
The same process occurred in the Cape and Natal with regard to mobile units protecting and 
policing the rural areas.  The British military tradition prevalent in the British colonies of the Cape 
                                                
21  C.M. Bakkes: Die Kommandostelsel met Spesiale Verwysing na die Historiese Ontwikkeling van Sy 
Rangstruktuur, in P.G. Nel (red):  Die Kultuurontplooiing van die Afrikaner, pp.294-295;  A. 
Seegers: The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, pp.1-2; P.H. Frankel: Pretoria’s 
Praetorians, pp.19-20; J.D. Brewer: Black and Blue, pp.15-18; G. Cawthra: Policing South Africa, 
pp.8-9; E.M. Meyers: Voorgeskiedenis tot die Stigting van ‘n Unieverdedigingsmag, Militaria, vol. 12, 
no. 2, 1982, pp.1-3. 
22  C.M. Bakkes: Die Kommandostelsel met Spesiale Verwysing na die Historiese Ontwikkeling van Sy 
Rangstruktuur, in P.G. Nel (red):  Die Kultuurontplooiing van die Afrikaner, pp.294-310;  A. 
Seegers: The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, pp.1-2; P.H. Frankel: Pretoria’s 
Praetorians, pp.19-20; J.D. Brewer: Black and Blue, pp.15-18; G. Cawthra: Policing South Africa, 
pp.8-9; E.M. Meyers: Voorgeskiedenis tot die Stigting van ‘n Unieverdedigingsmag, Militaria, vol. 12, 
no. 2, 1982, pp.1-3. 
23  C.M. Bakkes: Die Kommandostelsel met Spesiale Verwysing na die Historiese Ontwikkeling van Sy 
Rangstruktuur, in P.G. Nel (red):  Die Kultuurontplooiing van die Afrikaner, pp.294-310;  J.D. 
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and Natal introduced volunteer units and regular units.  Volunteer units were created alongside the 
burgher commandos to supplement the numbers of regular units during campaigns against the 
indigenous population.  These volunteer units were disbanded as soon as the conflict came to an 
end.  Within these colonies regular units such as the Cape Mounted Police, Cape Mounted 
Rifleman, Natal Mounted Police and Zululand Mounted Police patrolled the rural areas.  These and 
other regular units were responsible for the defence of the Cape and Natal colonies.  These police 
units were paramilitary in style and it was their task to impose British rule of law in the colony, to 
protect territory, suppress uprisings and to show a presence in the countryside.  Their daily routine 
consisted of civil police duties, but it was more often the case that they acted as the general 
servants of the colonial power and so were responsible for civil justice, enforcing health regulations 
and collecting tax.  These forces were often needed to guard, extend and uphold colonial authority 
against local resistance.  Civil and military duties were merged in these paramilitary policing forces 
and enabled the state to centralise control over the population.24  
 
The rurally-based paramilitary police forces of the British colonies had the extra role of protecting 
the borders against invasion.  Their transformation into mobile military units was essential to the 
defence of the territories in case of an invasion.  A good example of this was the participation of 
regiments from the Cape and Natal in the Second Anglo-Boer War.  The Boer Republics also 
employed their commandos in a military role to resist British imperialism during the First and 
Second Anglo-Boer Wars in 1880-1881 and 1899-1902 respectively.25 
 
In 1900, during the Second Anglo-Boer War, the South African Constabulary (SAC) was 
established under the leadership of Col. R.S.S. Baden-Powell.  British colonial policing through 
police and military forces continued after the war to ensure dominance and the enforcement of 
British rule of law.  The main task of this paramilitary force was the policing of the rural areas of the 
conquered Boer Republics for the duration of the war.  After the war in 1902 the SAC continued its 
policing of the rural areas, but was disbanded in 1908.  The Transvaal Police and the Orange River 
Colony Police were allocated the task of rural policing together with their urban policing roles after 
the SAC was disbanded.  The police and military structures within the four colonies, the Cape 
Colony, Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, were steadily finalised as negotiations 
towards a union of these colonies progressed.  The Union of South Africa was established on 31 
                                                                                                                                                               
Brewer: Black and Blue, pp.15-18; G. Cawthra: Policing South Africa, pp.8-9; E.M. Meyers: 
Voorgeskiedenis tot die Stigting van ‘n Unieverdedigingsmag, Militaria, vol. 12, no. 2, 1982, pp.1-3. 
24  J.D. Brewer: Black and Blue, pp.6, 15-18; A. Seegers: The Military in the Making of Modern 
South Africa, pp.1-2; P.H. Frankel: Pretoria’s Praetorians, pp.19-20; G. Cawthra: Policing South 
Africa, pp.8-9; E.M. Meyers: Voorgeskiedenis tot die Stigting van ‘n Unieverdedigingsmag, Militaria, 
vol. 12, no. 2, 1982, pp.1-3; A. Clayton and D. Killingray, Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in 
British Colonial Africa, pp.4-6;  J.S. Kotze:  Kaapse Stande Mag, 1872-1882, pp1-3. 
25  J.D. Brewer: Black and Blue, pp.15-21; G. Cawthra: Policing South Africa, pp.8-9; A. Clayton and 
D. Killingray, Khaki and Blue, pp.4-6. 
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May 1910 and the role and application of the new Union Defence Force and the South African 
Police were firmly based on the military policing that had existed in South Africa since 1652.26  
 
1.5 VOLUNTEER UNITS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE COLONIES 
 
In the aftermath of the Second Anglo-Boer War the victorious British Supreme Commander, Lord 
Kitchener, and the British High Commissioner, Lord Milner, were of the opinion that a contingent of 
the Imperial troops returning from the war should stay behind.  The reason for stationing Imperial 
troops in South Africa was stated by Milner in a letter to Gen. N.G. Lyttleton.  It read:  “I attach 
great importance, from the political point of view and with a view to the complete pacification of the 
country and the abandonment of all schemes of future disturbance to the maintenance for at least 
a year or two longer, of such a force in the country.”27  The Imperial garrisons were stationed in all 
four provinces with the aim of suppressing any Afrikaner or black unrest for at least two years after 
the war.  The Imperial troops fell under the central British command of Lt Gen. Lord Methuen who 
was stationed in Pretoria.28 
 
In conjunction with these Imperial garrisons stationed in the different colonies, each colony had an 
independent defence organisation and command structure.  The military forces of the Zuid-
Afrikaansche Republiek as well as the Orange Free State were disbanded after the War.  The 
commando system of the old Boer Republics was disbanded, but the principle was incorporated 
into the colonial military and British-orientated volunteer organisations.  Gen. L. Botha re-
established the commandos, firstly as defence rifle associations, in July 1907.  The rifle 
associations were an economic necessity.  The lack of funds hampered scheduled training for all 
the volunteer units and the decision was made to group them into defence rifle associations where 
they could continue training informally.  Weapons and ammunition were supplied to the 
associations in order for musketry training to continue without the added expenditure of mobilising 
a unit.  In addition, these organisations were established to lessen the responsibility of protection 
by the Imperial troops.  Imperial troops in the colonies were decreased in due course as the 
volunteer organisations were established and this also saved the British government money.29 
                                                
26  A. Seegers: The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, p.24; J.D. Brewer: Black and 
Blue, p.28; J. Ploeger: Hoofstukke Uit die Voor- en Vroeë Geskiedenis van die SAW, Militaria, vol. 
1, no. 3, 1969, p.2; E.M. Meyers: Voorgeskiedenis tot die Stigting van ‘n Unieverdedigingsmag, 
Militaria, vol. 12, no. 2, 1982, p.2; C.L. Grimbeek: Die Totstandkoming van die 
Unieverdedigingsmag met Spesifieke Verwysing na die Verdedigingswette van 1912 en 1922 
(Ongepubliseerde D Phil Thesis, UP, 1985), p.6; J.D. Brewer: Black and Blue, p.28;  
27  J. Ploeger: Hoofstukke Uit die Voor- en Vroeë Geskiedenis van die SAW, Militaria, vol. 1, no. 3, 
1969, p.2. 
28  J. Ploeger: Hoofstukke Uit die Voor- en Vroeë Geskiedenis van die SAW, Militaria, vol. 1, no. 3, 
1969, p.2; E.M. Meyers: Voorgeskiedenis tot die Stigting van ‘n Unieverdedigingsmag, Militaria, vol. 
12, no. 2, 1982, pp.2-3; C.L. Grimbeek: Die Totstandkoming van die Unieverdedigingsmag met 
Spesifieke Verwysing na die Verdedigingswette van 1912 en 1922, p.1-2. 
29  E.M. Meyers: Voorgeskiedenis tot die Stigting van ‘n Unieverdedigingsmag, Militaria, vol. 12, no. 2, 
pp.2-5; C.L. Grimbeek: Die Totstandkoming van die Unieverdedigingsmag met Spesifieke Verwysing 
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In the Transvaal, the Transvaal Volunteers was established in 1902 and various other 
organisations followed.  The volunteers were mainly English-speaking men from the urban 
environment.  Units that were established on the Witwatersrand were the Imperial Light Horse, the 
South African Light Horse, the Johannesburg Mounted Rifles, the Scottish Horse, the Transvaal 
Light Infantry and the Transvaal Scottish Volunteers.  The strength of the volunteer force in the 
Transvaal at the end of 1904 was 4,644 men.  The inhabitants of the Orange River Colony rejected 
the idea of volunteer units and had none, but kept the SAC for police work.  There were, however, 
a substantial number of defence rifle associations, but the members had no obligation to do active 
service.30 
 
Apart from the Imperial garrisons defending the coast, 60 volunteer and cadet organisations were 
stationed in the Cape.  The backbone of the Cape defence organisation was, however, the Cape 
Mounted Rifles (CMR).  The CMR was initially the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police who had 
been doing police work on the Eastern Border since the 1850s.  In 1878 the Frontier Armed and 
Mounted Police was renamed the Cape Mounted Riflemen and described as the colonial 
permanent force of the Cape for police work and defence.  It subsequently participated in the 
Basuto War (1880-1881) as well as in the Second Anglo-Boer War.  After the War, the CMR went 
back to its original task of policing.  The CMR definitely had a military and a policing element and 
was unique in South Africa.  By 1903, the landward defence of the Cape Colony was the task of 
the Cape colonial defence organisations.31 
 
The landward defence of Natal was also based upon volunteer organisations and they actively 
participated in the Second Anglo-Boer War.  After the war the Militia Act of 1903 was passed which 
set out the reorganisation of the defence of Natal.  The volunteer organisations were transformed 
into a militia force.  Members were now called up by ballot in order to defend the colony of Natal.  
During times of emergency the Permanent Militia Force could be supplemented by the Active 
Militia, comprising white male citizens between 18 and 50 years of age.  It was, however, the 
prerogative of the governor of Natal to call up male non-whites to perform non-fighting tasks if the 
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situation called for it.  In 1904, apart from the militia, 74 defence rifle organisations were already 
available in Natal to be called up for the purpose of defence.32 
 
1.6 INTER-COLONIAL CO-OPERATION AND THE UNION DEFENCE FORCE 
 
The idea of inter-colonial co-operation was born from the fear of black uprisings against British 
colonial rule, not excluding the possibility of an Afrikaner uprising.  The Bambatha uprising in 
Zululand, in 1906, strengthened the idea of co-operation.  The operational commander of the 
expedition, Col. C. McKenzie, was unable to fully control the situation with his limited resources.  
The Transvaal was asked for support and the Transvaal Mounted Rifles were despatched to the 
theatre of operations, with the result that the Bambatha-uprising was suppressed.  The co-
operation during the operation highlighted the importance and need for inter-colonial co-
operation.33  
 
Imperial defence conferences were held in Johannesburg in 1907, Durban in 1908 and Pretoria in 
1909.  These conferences set out an inter-colonial defence scheme for British colonies south of the 
Zambezi River.  Early in the restructuring process it was decided that this inter-colonial force would 
consist of a number of troops provided by each colony.  The Cape would provide 1500 men, the 
Transvaal 1000 men, Natal 500, the Orange River Colony 500 and Southern Rhodesia 200.  As 
the discussions continued, the close co-operation between Southern Africa and the rest of the 
British Empire was emphasised.  In 1908, at the Durban Conference, it was decided that 
equipment, discipline, training, organisational structure and classification of each colonial defence 
structure was to be standardised.  (See Figure 1.6: Forces Available to the Four Colonies.)  Each 
colony was to have a small permanent force supported by volunteer or militia forces and reserve 
forces or rifle associations.  This conference laid the foundation for the structure of the Union 
Defence Force for the years to come.34 
 
Inter-colonial co-operation extended from the military to the political level.  The Cape, Natal, 
Transvaal and Orange River Colonies unified at government level in 1910 to form the Union of 
South Africa.  The formation of a unified defence force for the Union was, however, more 
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complicated than the inter-colonial defence agreements.  The task of constructing a Defence Act 
for the Union became the responsibility of Gen. J.C. Smuts, H.M.R. (later Sir Roland) Bourne, 
Capt. J.J. Collyer, Sir William Graham Greene (British Admiralty), Brig. Gen. George Ashton and 
Gen. Lord Methuen.35  Each had a specific role to play in the construction of a significant document 
for the young Union of South Africa.  After much deliberation the Defence Act No. 13 of 1912 was 
promulgated on 14 June 1912.  The Act now combined the different defence organisations of the 
four colonies.  The newly established Union Defence Force consisted of the Permanent Force, the 
Coast Garrison Force, the Citizen Force, the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and Special 
Reserves established under the Act.36 
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Figure 1.6:  Forces Available to the Four Colonies in 1908.37 
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British colonial and military thinking had a strong influence on the role and application of the Union 
Defence Force.  As a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, the Union of South Africa was 
subject to British influence.  Exposure to British military tradition since 1795 and the significant role 
that British soldiers and officials like Sir William Graham Greene (British Admiralty), Brig. Gen. 
George Ashton and Gen. Lord Methuen played in the construction of the Defence Act indicate this 
influence.  The British model became the norm in South Africa and was instituted by the many 
officers of British lineage who served in the new Union Defence Force.38 
 
1.7 THE POLICING HERITAGE OF THE UNION DEFENCE FORCE 
 
The military policing tradition of the paramilitary and civil police forces in South Africa before 1910 
was passed on in 1912 to the newly-formed Union Defence Force.  The structure of the new South 
African Mounted Riflemen (SAMR), as the Permanent Force of the Union Defence Force under 
Brig. Gen. H.T. Lukin was called, was a clear indication of this policing heritage.  It consisted of five 
regiments and was formed from parts of the old colonial police and military units, which continued 
their original policing duties after formation.  The Cape Mounted Riflemen and a portion of the 
Cape Mounted Police constituted the first regiment of the SAMR (1 SAMR) and were based in King 
William’s Town.  The second regiment (2 SAMR) was constructed from portions of the old Free 
State and Natal Police and were based in Pietermaritzburg.  The third regiment (3 SAMR) 
consisted of the rest of the former Natal Police and was based in Dundee.  A portion of the old 
Transvaal Police constituted 4 SAMR, based in Pretoria.  The rest of the Cape Mounted Police 
constituted 5 SAMR, based in Kimberley.39 
 
The construction of the SAMR was a product of its time and a solution to the ever-present fear of 
black uprisings.  Brewer stated “Union was in part an act of decolonisation for Whites, but it left a 
tremendous task of internal colonialism in monitoring, regulating and controlling the Black 
population”.40  This statement reflected the need of the state to have a police force to continue the 
regulation of race relations, but to also have a modern police force to police whites.  The 
compromise was found in the construction of the SAMR and the SA Police.  These two separate 
police forces had their own jurisdiction, function and style.41 
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The SA Police and the SAMR were responsible for policing the urban areas and the rural areas 
respectively.  Many of the characteristics of the former colonial forces were retained when the 
SAMR was formed.  It was mounted, paramilitary in style and was specifically tasked to police the 
black population.  As a military unit, it was better equipped than the police to enforce law and order 
in black areas and to deal with black resistance to white domination.  After the SAMR was 
promulgated under the 1912 Defence Act, rural policing was the responsibility of the Department of 
Defence.  Section 12(4) of the Defence Act clearly allocated the task of policing in times of peace 
to the SAMR and stated:  
 
“In time of peace there shall be allotted to each regiment or part of a regiment of South 
African Mounted Riflemen the duty of maintaining order within such portions of the Union as 
may be appointed, and when any member of such a regiment is carrying out that duty he 
shall be capable of exercising all such powers and shall perform all such functions as are 
by law conferred on or are to be performed by a police officer or constable and shall be 
liable in respect of acts done or omitted to be done to the same extent as he would have 
been able in like circumstances if he were a member of a police force and shall have the 
benefits of all the indemnities to which a member of a police force would in like 
circumstances be entitled.”42   
 
The further employment of the Defence Force to suppress internal unrest was catered for in 
sections 76 and 79 of the Defence Act which stated: 
 
“The whole or any part of the Permanent Force shall at all times be liable to be employed 
on active service against an enemy anywhere in South Africa within or outside the Union, or 
for the prevention or suppression of internal disorder within the Union…The Governor-
General may, by proclamation in the Gazette, call out the whole or any portion of the Coast 
Garrison Force, the Active Citizen Force, and the Citizen Force Reserve for the prevention 
or suppression of internal disorder within the Union.”43 
                                                
42  Defence Act No 13 of 1912: Statutes of The Union of South Africa, pp.196, 244, 246; J.D. Brewer: 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE SUPPRESSION OF WHITE INDUSTRIAL UNREST 
 
2.1 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EARLY INDUSTRIAL UNREST, 1907 AND 1913 
 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, South Africa was becoming a strong roleplayer in the mining 
sector.  Labour disputes were common occurrences and the mining sector found itself able to deal 
with these disputes with little need of government intervention until 1907.  General J.C. Smuts, 
then Colonial Secretary of the Transvaal, called in Imperial troops to curb the disturbance during a 
strike on the Knight’s Deep Gold-mine on the Witwatersrand in 1907.  The strike involved more 
than 4,000 white underground mineworkers who were protesting against the downscaling the 
number of white supervisors by the mining companies. The strike was suppressed and the 
foundation was laid for further state intervention in industrial disputes.  The increase in union 
activities and syndicalism involving co-ordinated strikes had a serious impact on the productivity of 
the mines, which caused the government to assert its authority in order to ensure economic 
stability.  Syndicalism and industrial unionism spread to South Africa by means of unionists and 
syndicalists from America, Australia and Britain.  Syndicalism promoted general strikes and was 
seen as the method to usher in a new order by overthrowing the state through industrial action.  
South Africa was in the process of becoming a Union and a stable political and industrial 
environment was imperative to ensure prosperity in the new state.  Military power was an 
instrument used by the Government of the day to ensure stability.44 
 
This stability was challenged in 1913 by another strike by white miners, at the New Kleinfontein 
Mine on the Witwatersrand.  The working hours of the underground mechanics were modified, 
causing them to work an additional half-day on Saturdays.  The mine management mishandled this 
strike and it became a general strike on 4 July, bringing all the mines and power stations on the 
Witwatersrand to a standstill.45  The Government was caught unprepared and were not equipped 
to deal with a strike of this magnitude.  A day before the general strike was announced 1,000 extra 
men, consisting of police and South African Mounted Riflemen, were deployed on the Rand.  The 
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Minister of Defence, General J.C. Smuts and other Government officials deemed the available 
manpower insufficient to ensure the maintenance of law and order.  Sir Reginald Hart, commander 
of the Imperial troops in South Africa, was therefore asked to assist the Union in this matter.46 
 
Lord Gladstone, the Governor-General, wrote to the Secretary of State, Lewis Harcourt, to justify 
and explain the use of Imperial troops.  The Government was unable to call upon its own military 
power due to the fact that the Union Defence Force (UDF) was still being formed.  The new Active 
Citizen Force (ACF) had just been formed and consisted of raw recruits unsuited for the task at 
hand.  Precious time would also be wasted in mobilising these forces, which further necessitated 
the use of Imperial troops.  Government forces on the Rand during the strike comprised 2,853 
policemen, 1,681 special constables, 2,910 Imperial troops and 670 members of the Citizen Force.  
These forces were, however, unable to curb acts of vandalism by the strikers.  The offices of a 
newspaper, The Star, and Corner House, the headquarters of a prominent mining company, were 
set alight on the evening of 4 July.  Skirmishes between the combined Government and Imperial 
forces on the one hand and strikers on the other continued the following day.  The dispersal of an 
illegal gathering of strikers turned sour and twenty strikers and five innocent people were killed in 
front of the Rand Club.47 
 
A public outcry followed and the Rand newspapers were used as a mouthpiece for the strikers 
through the joint publication of a special paper, The News, on 7 July 1913.  The use of Imperial 
troops was severely criticised and the shooting condemned.  A list of the deceased was published 
evoking strong resentment towards the government and those who ordered the shooting.48 
 
The incident at the Rand Club prompted Gen. Smuts and the Prime Minister, Gen. Louis Botha, to 
intervene personally and broker a settlement.  Government and Imperial forces were found lacking 
in strength to suppress the strike.  It was in the best interests of the state to settle, since a 
prolonged strike would wreak havoc on the economy.  The strikers were in a strong bargaining 
position and Botha and Smuts convinced the Chamber of Mines to capitulate to their demands.  
Smuts felt humiliated by the settlement because the strike committee walked away as the victor 
and the government had to take second place.  He was determined not to let it happen again.  His 
determination and the fear of more industrial unrest ensured that the organisation and training of 
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the UDF was accelerated.  This ensured their readiness when another general strike threatened 
the Union’s industries in 1914.49 
 
2.2 THE GENERAL STRIKE OF 1914 
 
2.2.1 THE CAUSES OF THE STRIKE 
 
Labour relations had remained tense since the July 1913 strike and were further strained by the 
announcement on Christmas Eve of the possible retrenchment of railway workers during the 
course of 1914.  The Amalgamated Society of Railway and Harbour Servants (ASRHS) were trying 
desperately to reverse the planned retrenchment of railway workshop employees.  The cabinet 
minister in charge of the South African Railways and Harbours (SAR & H), Henry Burton, and the 
general manager, William Hoy, justified the retrenchment as an economic necessity.  Plans for the 
railway retrenchments continued, whereupon the ASRHS issued instructions to its members 
throughout the country to strike on 8 January 1914.  The ASRHS demanded that Government 
renounce the retrenchments and reinstate the dismissed workers.  Shortly after the railway strike 
was called, J.T. Bain announced that the Federation of Trade Unions was in charge of the strike.  
The ASRHS’s general secretary, Hessel Poutsma, asked the Federation of Trade Unions to call for 
a general strike.  Railway employees from workshops in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Bloemfontein, 
Durban and Salt River in the Cape Peninsula, as well as coal miners in Natal, went on strike.50 
 
The Government, especially Gen. Smuts, was not unaware of the growing tension between capital 
and labour at the end of 1913.  Wealthy inhabitants of Johannesburg had even boarded up their 
homes and vacated the Witwatersrand fearing the worst from the imminent strike.  By 1914, there 
was only one police officer for every 73 square miles (117.53 km2).  The area that needed 
protection on the Witwatersrand constituted 50 square miles (80.5 km2).  There were 45,000 
railway workers, 22,000 white mine workers and 12,000 semi- and unskilled workers on the 
Witwatersrand alone and it was feared that the SA Police would not be able to suppress another 
general strike, but this time Government was ready to act swiftly.  The Governor-General issued 
three proclamations when the news of the railway strikes broke.  Proclamation No. 8 in the 
Extraordinary Government Gazette of 9 January 1914 prohibited the selling or transporting of 
weapons and ammunition in the magisterial districts of Johannesburg, Boksburg, Germiston, 
Krugersdorp, Pretoria and Middelburg for a month with effect from date of issue.  Proclamations 
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No. 9 and 10 in the same Gazette ordered the mobilisation of 20 Active Citizen Force (ACF, Class 
“A” reserve) units and Citizen Force Reserve (CFR, Class “B” reserve) units from various districts 
for the suppression of a possible strike and to ensure the maintenance of law and order.51 
 
Further proclamations on 10 January ordered the mobilisation of more Class “B”-reserves, as well 
as units of the Coast Garrison Force.  Tensions heightened when eight strike leaders were 
arrested, black workers rioted at the Jagersfontein mine in the Orange Free State52 and attempts 
were made to sabotage railway lines.  To suppress possible riots by black workers and to patrol 
the suburbs of Johannesburg special constables were sworn in.  Including other installations and 
the railway lines, over 100 strategic points were protected against sabotage by the reserve units 
and armed police.  The ASRHS were not geared for a general strike and, in centres like East 
London and Uitenhage, the workers voted against a strike.  Only a small number of workers went 
out on strike beyond the Witwatersrand area.  The majority of the trouble was expected on the 
Witwatersrand and most of the armed forces were subsequently deployed there.  As the 
mobilisation and deployment of the UDF continued, the Federation of Trade Unions announced a 
ballot for a general strike to take place on 13 January.53  
 
The build-up to the ballot included acts of sabotage and attempted sabotage to railway lines as 
well as a mass meeting on 11 January in Market Square in Johannesburg.  Bain used this meeting 
to air more anti-government and anti-capitalist thoughts, but the Government forces refrained from 
any action.  The Krugersdorp Commando was present in the area, and was to be used as a rapid 
deployment force in case of an emergency.  The mobilisation of Government forces went smoothly 
and they were in position by the evening of 13 January.  The UDF waited in anticipation for the 
outcome of the vote for a general strike.54  
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2.2.2 MARTIAL LAW IS PROCLAIMED 
 
The workers of the Federation of Trade Unions voted in favour of a general strike, which 
commenced immediately.  Shift workers still working were to go out on strike upon completion of 
their shift, which put the general strike in full swing on 14 January.  The Government reacted the 
same day by placing various magisterial districts in the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal 
under Martial Law.  The districts in the Transvaal were Pretoria, Johannesburg, Boksburg, 
Germiston, Krugersdorp, Middelburg, Lydenburg, Barberton, Carolina, Potchefstroom and 
Heidelberg.  In the Orange Free State, the districts were Vredefort, Heilbron, Kroonstad, Winburg 
and Bloemfontein.  Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Inanda and Camperdown constituted the districts in 
Natal.55 
 
The maintenance of order and the preservation of life and property became the responsibility of the 
Controlling Officers of twelve Control Areas.  These Control Areas divided South Africa into 
command responsibilities to ensure better command and control as well as co-ordination and 
deployment of forces.  Colonel T.G. Truter, Commissioner of the South African Police, was in 
charge of Control Area No. 1 with its headquarters in Johannesburg.  This area included the 
municipal districts of Springs, Benoni, Boksburg, Germiston, Johannesburg, Maraisburg, 
Roodepoort and Krugersdorp.  Brigadier General H.T. Lukin, Inspector General of the Permanent 
Force, became the Controlling Officer for Areas No. 2, 3 and 4 with its headquarters in Pretoria.  
This area included all the magisterial districts in the Transvaal except those mentioned in Area No. 
1 and 5.  Inspector C.M.J. van Dam of the South African Police was in charge of Control Area No. 
5 with its headquarters in Potchefstroom.  This area included the magisterial districts of 
Potchefstroom, Wolmaransstad, Bloemhof, Lichtenburg and the rural district of Krugersdorp.  
Deputy Commissioner M.S.W. du Toit took charge over Control Area No. 6 with its headquarters in 
Bloemfontein comprising all the magisterial districts of the Orange Free State.56 
 
Controlling Areas No. 7, 8, 11 and 12 were the regimental districts of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th 
Regiments of the SAMR, respectively.  Control Area No. 9 was the responsibility of Deputy 
Commissioner D.G. Grey with its headquarters in Cape Town and comprised the Western Cape 
Division of the SA Police.  Divisional Inspector M.M. Hartigan of the SA Police was in charge of 
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Control Area No. 10.  Its Headquarters were in Naauwpoort and comprised the Cape Eastern 
Division of the SA Police.57 
 
Martial Law prohibited large gatherings, the use of explosives to destroy property and endanger 
people, public speeches and the possession of material that may incite riots.  Hundreds of strike 
and union leaders were arrested and censorship of the media was enforced.  The action of the 
strikers was restricted to the Witwatersrand.  Their final stand was made in Fordsburg, 
Johannesburg.  Bain and other strikers, after the arrest of many strike leaders, barricaded 
themselves in the Trades Hall.  Government forces surrounded the Trades Hall, cleared a large 
area of inhabitants and blocked all the exits.  The unconditional surrender of the strikers inside the 
hall was demanded, but was ignored.  Advances on the Trades Hall were answered with rifle fire 
from the strikers and the forces laying siege to the Trades Hall awaited further instructions.58 
 
Further instructions came on 15 January.  A thirteen-pound field gun from the Transvaal Horse 
Artillery was placed in front of the besieged building.  Col. R. Sholto-Douglas and two officers 
approached the Trade Hall with the field gun and Government rifles ready to provide covering fire.  
Bain answered the door upon which Col. Douglas again demanded the immediate and 
unconditional surrender of everyone in the building.  He also informed Bain that a failure to comply 
with the demand would result in an attack on the building.  The inhabitants of the Trades Hall 
conceded and surrendered to the Government forces.59 
 
2.2.3 ORDER IS RESTORED AND UNITS DEMOBILISED 
 
The stronghold of the strikers at Fordsburg collapsed and with it the strike.  Sporadic and isolated 
incidents of sabotage and violence still occurred until 30 January 1914, but the threat of a general 
strike had passed.  Railway workers returned to work from as early as 15 January.  By 18 January 
a part of the UDF was demobilised, followed on 20 January by the Witwatersrand commandos.  
The Federation of Trade Unions called off the strike on 22 January and the Active Reserve 
demobilised two days later on 24 January.  Various units were warned to remain alert for possible 
redeployment in case of an emergency.  This state of readiness only ended after Martial Law was 
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finally lifted in March 1914.  No noteworthy damage was inflicted during the strike and the loss of 
life was restricted to two UDF members who died in a shooting accident.  No strikers were killed by 
the UDF.60 
 
The deportation of nine strike leaders, H.J. Poutsma, J.T. Bain, A. Crawford, R.B. Waterson, G.W. 
Mason, D. Mckerrel, W. Livingston, A. Watson and W.H. Morgan to London on 30 January, was 
seen as a necessary action by the Union Government.  Gen. Smuts argued that they had used 
industrial action with the aim of overthrowing the state.  According to Smuts it was in the best 
interests of the country to deport them, thereby ensuring that the strike would not be repeated.  
Labour circles in South Africa and Britain were outraged.  This action contributed to the political 
success of the South African Labour Party in winning a number of seats in the parliamentary by-
elections in the Cape and Natal later that year as well as seats (and a majority of one) in the 
election for the Transvaal Provincial Council.  T.R.H. Davenport called this arbitrary action by 
Government a demonstration of kragdadigheid (power play).61  Many, both in the government and 
the opposition parties, were offended by the callous manner in which the deportations were carried 
out.  In the wake of the deportation, the Undesirables Special Deportation Bill was passed to cover 
Government action.  Another outcome of the 1914 strike was the Riotous Assemblies Bill, which 
aimed at ensuring public order.  This bill banned violent picketing, any strikes in the public utility 
services, the recruitment of unions by force, permitted magistrates to prohibit meetings which might 
endanger public peace and increased police powers of law enforcement.62 
 
2.2.4 PREPARATIONS FOR FUTURE MOBILISATION 
 
The possibility of another deployment to suppress industrial unrest could not be ruled out.  In order 
to ensure that a capable force was available for this as well as to suppress any internal uprising, 
especially from the black communities, it was decided to ensure that the UDF was capable of such 
a deployment even after the First World War.  The Government’s initial mobilisation plan to 
suppress unrest did not include the utilisation of aeroplanes, but by the beginning of 1922, the UDF 
included this new weapon in their planning.  Being an airpower enthusiast and the main architect of 
the Royal Air Force at the end of the First World War, Gen. Smuts was aware of the potentially 
decisive role the use of aeroplanes could play in policing actions and suppressing internal unrest.  
He also had knowledge of Britain’s successes in utilising aeroplanes for suppressing internal 
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unrest in Somalia (1919) and Iraq (1920).  His accession as Prime Minister in 1920 gave him the 
opportunity to wield this new weapon.63   
 
In 1919, the Union received a weapons package from Britain as a gift, consisting of 100 
aeroplanes with spare parts, maintenance equipment, pilots and fuel.  This contributed to the 
Union Defence Force’s ability to form a new independent Air Force even though the Defence Force 
was downsizing and rationalising.  Air Force workshops were already assembling aeroplanes by 
1922.  This was stopped at the end of January 1922 in order to assemble 45 army vehicles to 
provide the Army with road transport for its possible deployment.  Afterwards the aeroplane 
assembly was resumed and eight were available for military service by 10 March 1922, consisting 
of De Havilland DH9 and DH4 aeroplanes.64 
 
2.3 INDUSTRIAL UNREST ON THE RAND, 1922 
 
2.3.1 THE RUN-UP TO THE 1922-STRIKE 
 
The same basic grievances that led to industrial unrest in 1907, 1913 and 1914, laid the foundation 
for the 1922 strike.  Disputes over working conditions, working hours, manpower reductions and 
especially wages persisted between capital and labour.65  The fall in the gold price after the First 
World War led to a depression in the Union’s economy.  The weakened economy as well as rising 
production costs placed mine companies in a tight spot.  It was especially the gold-mine industry 
that had to take action to stay profitable.  The Chamber of Mines could do nothing to curb the rising 
costs of mine material, but they could try and increase the productivity of the mines and save on 
wages.  The Chamber informed the miners in 1921 of the planned course of action, who, in turn, 
rejected it.66 
 
The above-mentioned steps were not enough to resolve the crisis in the mining industry.  The 
Chamber went ahead and announced on 28 December 1921 that the status quo agreement, 
reserving mainly skilled and half-skilled job opportunities for white workers, was to be terminated 
with effect from 1 February 1922.  Secondly, the wages of the better-paid white workers were to be 
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reduced and finally a reorganisation of underground work was planned.  The long-term 
consequence was that as many as 15,000 white workers would lose their jobs.67 
 
The South African Industrial Federation (SAIF) was likewise opposing the reduction of wages in the 
coal mining industry and on 20 December 1921 rejected the Chamber of Mine's proposal in this 
regard.  The Chamber refused to make concessions, whereby the SAIF announced that the coal 
miners would strike on 1 January 1922.  Elsewhere the SAIF had its hands full.  The Victoria Falls 
and Transvaal Power Company (VFP) and workers at machine workshops were suspending 
negotiations regarding the reduction of wages.68 
 
The SAIF enjoyed support only on the Witwatersrand and represented only white miners.  The 
different trade unions thus tried to establish joint trade union action at management level and 
formed the Joint Committee of the SAIF.  In conjunction with this, propaganda was launched 
warning that the whole white population was in danger.  Political parties, such as the National Party 
of Gen. J.B.M. Hertzog, were now offered the opportunity to further this issue in the political arena.  
On 30 December 1921 the Joint Committee approved the strike on the coal mines and decided 
that the workers on the gold mines, power stations and machine workshops should also take a 
ballot on the strike.  The SAIF created the Augmented Executive of the Federation by drawing in 
representatives of non-affiliated trade unions.  The duties of the SAIF during the strike became the 
responsibility of the Augmented Executive.69 
 
Negotiations between the Augmented Executive and a Government deputation led by the Prime 
Minister, Gen. J.C. Smuts, failed and the workers on the gold mines, VFP Power Company and 
machine workshops joined the striking coal miners.  All the mines from Randfontein in the west to 
Springs in the east, as well as machine workshops in Johannesburg were brought to a standstill by 
the strike.  The power stations of the Victoria Falls Power Company were also shut down and only 
essential services, such as pumping out water, were maintained to ensure that the mines did not 
close down permanently.  The direct consequence of this was that 20,000 white workers and 
180,000 black workers stopped working.70  A quick solution had to be found to save the situation 
on the Rand. 
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2.3.2 FAILED NEGOTIATIONS LED TO VIOLENCE 
 
Gen. Smuts quickly organised negotiations between the Chamber and the SAIF under the 
chairmanship of Judge J.S. Curlewis, but no settlement could be reached.  Further negotiations 
between the Chamber and the Augmented Executive were organised by Gen. Smuts.  The 
meetings failed and by 11 February Gen. Smuts realised that further negotiations would be 
fruitless.  As far as he was concerned, the Government had done all it could to resolve the issue.71 
 
The white miners had not forgotten Smuts’ harsh handling of the previous strikes.  In their minds, 
he was only a puppet in the hands of the capitalistic bankers and mine owners.  Due to their 
mistrust, he was handicapped in his attempts to resolve the current strike issue.  The Transvaal 
leader of the National Party, Tielman Roos, criticised the Government’s actions and accused them 
of deliberately creating a situation which would necessitate the promulgation of Martial Law.  The 
Government was thus, according to Roos, conspiring, as with the previous strikes, to use force 
against the strikers eventually.72 
 
On 11 February 1922, Smuts requested the miners to call off the strike and he promised police 
protection to any member who went back to work by 13 February.  This effort was also 
unsuccessful due to intimidation and violence from members of the striker commandos who 
reprimanded those workers who broke from the striker ranks to go and work.  They were marked 
as strike-breakers and were known as “scabs”.73 
 
The striker commandos were established at the beginning of the strike to keep the strikers busy 
and maintain order.  These striker commandos consisted of 50 to 500 individuals who were mainly 
from the Afrikaner population.  They were initially successful in their task and good co-operation 
even existed with the police.  It was the radical, revolutionary element growing within the striker 
commandos that influenced them to become more militant.  The agents responsible for maintaining 
law and order amongst the strikers became violent towards the scabs in order to maintain the 
strike itself.  The police were forced to be harsh with the striker commandos, since the Government 
promised protection to strike-breakers.  The police were, however, prevented from executing their 
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task properly due to the striker commandos outnumbering them.74  (See Figure 2.1:  A Striker 
Commando.). 
 
A substantial number of members within the striker commandos were armed, because they 
belonged to the UDF’s Rifle Associations.  The rest of the weapons were stolen as the opportunity 
arose.  The striker commandos were also armed with dynamite, taken from the mining sites, and 
homemade bombs.  In addition, thousands were veterans of the First World War and they had at 
their disposal extensive military knowledge and experience.75  In military terms the striker 
commandos were a force to be reckoned with. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1:  A Striker Commando Manning a Roadblock.76 
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Col. T.G. Truter, Commissioner of the South African Police, issued a proclamation on 22 February 
1922 that prohibited striker commandos and other similar groups from molesting people, 
intimidating the families of strike-breakers and damaging mining property.  Accordingly, all 
gatherings by striker commandos and other groups were proclaimed illegal.  Lt. Col. R.S. Godley, 
Deputy Commissioner of Police on the Witwatersrand, gave clear instructions regarding this.  He 
ordered that all illegal gatherings were to stop and warned that force, even armed force when 
needed, would be used to enforce law and order.  The police on the other hand had to handle 
these gatherings with extreme caution, so as to not provoke unnecessary violence.77 
 
The UDF at that stage played no active role in the suppression of the strike, but they did prepare 
for possible involvement.  A total of 35 Permanent Force members from the various military 
districts in the Union received orders to report to the SA Military School (currently the SA Army 
College) in Robert’s Heights (later Voortrekkerhoogte, currently Thaba Tshwane).  Together with 
instructors from the Military School, ten special machine gun units were formed and placed on alert 
from the 11 February 1922 to be deployed on the Witwatersrand at a moment’s notice.78 
 
The police asked for military assistance on 22 February as the situation deteriorated to the point 
where policemen were unable to control it.  The UDF answered the call by sending six machine 
gun detachments to the Witwatersrand.  The situation on the Rand deteriorated to such an extent 
that Col. Truter requested additional military reinforcements on 28 February.  The Minister of 
Defence, Col. H. Mentz, then ordered elements of the Permanent Force to deploy on the East 
Rand upon which the 1st (Maj. J.F. Wolmarans) and 3rd Permanent Battery SAMR (Capt. Hunt-
Grubbe) left on the same day for Benoni and Boksburg respectively.  These forces reached their 
destination on the morning of 1 March.79 
 
At the end of February the striker commandos clashed with the police and various incidents 
occurred that contributed to the collapse of law and order.  One of the incidents occurred on 28 
February when strikers in Boksburg marched to the local gaol to sing to their detained comrades.  
Capt. J. Fullard of the SA Police in Boksburg was under the impression that they wanted to attack 
the gaol and release their friends upon which he ordered them to disperse.  He was of the opinion 
that they disobeyed his order, upon which, he subsequently ordered a squad of police under the 
command of Capt. O.S. Leishman to launch a baton charge.  During the charge shots were fired at 
the police from the crowd.  The police reacted by firing warning shots over their heads and then 
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into the crowd after they refused to disperse.  This caused the death of three strikers and several 
strikers were wounded.80 
 
2.3.3 THE UNION DEFENCE FORCE IS CALLED IN TO HELP 
 
After the Boksburg incident, the strikers became more militant.  The police feared that more 
violence could break out and they realised that two squadrons of Mounted Rifles were not going to 
be enough.  On the night of the Boksburg incident the Minister of Defence ordered Lt. Col. N.H.M. 
Burne to move the rest of the Permanent Force and the remaining machine gun detachments via 
rail to the East Rand.  The UDF also formed a special short-service unit, as was allowed under the 
Defence Act, which stipulated that a voluntary force could be formed as part of the Permanent 
Force in times of unrest.  Time and finances restricted the unit to 120 men, instead of the planned 
500, and it was known as the short-service company.  The task of this company was to take over 
the guard and other duties of the Permanent Force in Pretoria.  It could also be used for service 
outside Pretoria if the ACF was called up.81 
 
The Boksburg incident elicited strong public reaction.  The decision by Gen. Smuts not to launch 
an investigation into the incident evoked strong criticism especially from strikers and the political 
opposition.  Striker commandos now made a conscious effort to move their focus from strike-
breakers to state property and anyone who represented state authority.  The result was violent 
confrontations between the police and the striker commandos.  All these activities only contributed 
to fanning the zeal of the insurgents as thousands of strikers from the Witwatersrand attended the 
funeral service on 2 March of two of the strikers who had died in the Boksburg incident.82   
 
Tension on the Rand was high, several strikers returned to work and many strike leaders 
questioned the continuance of the strike.  The Augmented Executive of the Federation decided to 
take the initiative and tried to open another round of talks with the Chamber.  A letter was sent to 
the Chamber regarding possible negotiations about resuming mine operations.  The Chamber 
replied with an undiplomatic, insulting letter in which it reiterated its conditions and gave notice that 
it did not recognise the SAIF as the representative of the miners.  This reaction pushed the tension 
on the Rand to breaking point.83 
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The letter from the Chamber discredited the union leaders and paved the way for extremists to play 
a more decisive role.  These extremists consisted of few outspoken communists, such as P. 
Fisher, J. Wordingham and E. Shaw, who fell into disfavour with the unions and founded their own 
Council of Action in July 1921.  The Council of Action aimed to carry out Marxist principles and 
form a worker’s republic in South Africa.  The SA Industrial Federation and Augmented Executive’s 
lack of action was exploited by the Council of Action who tried to keep the strikers’ moral high and 
incite violent action against the Government, mine owners and strike-breakers.  Shaw, who was 
detained for inciting public violence, announced directly after his release that every significant 
historical change and reform had been brought about through violence.  Violence, according to 
him, was now the solution for the strikers in their fight against the mine owners if their demands 
were not met.  This communist-revolutionary incitement and the extremist actions of the Council of 
Action became popular amongst the strikers and its influence expanded to the detriment of the 
Augmented Executive.  The Committee of Action within the Council of Action, on which Fisher, 
Wordingham and Shaw served, campaigned for the continuation of the strike.  The Augmented 
Executive was not in favour of continuing the strike as proposed by the Council of Action.  The 
proposals recommended that strikers become more militant and continue to attack government 
targets in order to bring about a new order.  The Council of Action, however, had no authoritative 
voice within striker management to really influence its decisions.  But because of the continuous 
support from the striker commandos the Committee of Action could play a deciding role in the 
events on the Rand.84 
 
The Augmented Executive gathered on 6 March in the Trades Hall, Johannesburg, to deliberate on 
the future of the strike.  Thousands of strikers surrounded the Hall and called out for a continuation 
of the strike.  They threatened to not let the union leaders leave the Hall if they did not comply with 
their demands.  The Augmented Executive caved in under the pressure, decided upon continuing 
the strike, and called for all the workers represented by the Augmented Executive to strike.  The 
strike fell under the control of a five-man committee, whose identities were kept secret, but who 
were known as the Big Five.85 
 
The striker commandos used violence and intimidation to force people to participate in the strike.  
Workers who were unwilling to arm themselves and attack government targets were persuaded to 
acquire arms in order to protect their families in case of black unrest.  Extremist leaders 
deliberately fanned these rumours of “black peril” and fights broke out between black and white 
strikers in Vrededorp on 7 March.  Insecurity amongst the strikers was now even higher and this 
prompted them to action.  There were also indications that the Council of Action and striker 
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commandos were following their own agenda and radical plans of overthrowing the Government 
were formed, from which the Augmented Executive distanced itself.  A co-ordinating meeting 
between the striker commandos and the five-man committee of the Augmented Executive on 8 
March delivered no results.  After this meeting two closed meetings were held by the striker 
commandos without the trade union leaders, to discuss further militant action.86 
 
The security situation on the Rand further deteriorated with striker commandos continuously 
committing acts of violence against police and SAMR patrols, houses of mining officials and public 
transport.  On a recommendation from the Minister of Defence, Government mobilised various 
units of the ACF.  These units were the 8th Citizen Battery (Transvaal Horse Artillery), the 8th 
Infantry (Transvaal Scottish), the 5th Mounted Rifles (Imperial Light Horse), the 1st Field Ambulance 
(SA Medical Corps), 12th Infantry (Pretoria Regiment), Durban Light Infantry, the Battalion staff and 
“A” and “B” Companies of the 1st Infantry Battalion and two infantry battalions of the Railway and 
Harbour Brigade.87 
 
On the night of 9 March, the police headquarters in Johannesburg received intelligence that striker 
commandos were planning to attack police stations after which they would launch a co-ordinated 
march to central Johannesburg in order to take control of the town.  The police commander on the 
Witwatersrand, Lt. Col. R.S. Godley, was in no position to prevent these attacks with his limited 
manpower.  Although police numbers had risen during the strike from 1,192 to 3,136, with 
reinforcements drawn from elsewhere in the country, there was still not enough manpower to 
effectively counter the strikers numbering 20,000, even with the initial support from the Union 
Defence Force.  Law and order ended on the morning of 10 March, when the striker commandos 
attacked several police stations on the Rand.  Lt. Col. Godley tried only to keep the strikers 
occupied with his limited force.  This action succeeded in preventing the different striker 
commandos from joining one another for the planned march on the city centre.  Through these 
attacks, the striker commandos were in turn pinning the police down in their respective areas.88 
 
With the police armed only with small calibre weapons, most police stations, such as Newlands, 
Auckland, Brixton Ridge and Benoni, were in a critical situation.  Food and ammunition supplies 
were insufficient, while they were surrounded by strikers and continuously fired upon by snipers.  
Home-made bombs were thrown at them intermittently and in most cases the police surrendered to 
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the strikers.  Benoni and Brixton Ridge were two of the exceptions where the police held out 
against the siege until the Government forces relieved them three days later.89 
 
2.3.4 MOBILISATION OF THE UNION DEFENCE FORCE 
 
Even with the Permanent Force elements already deployed, it was apparent that the police could 
not save the situation.  The Union Government was thus obliged to mobilise the UDF to suppress 
the disturbance.  The UDF was ready to deploy at a moment’s notice, because Smuts had 
anticipated the probability of deployment.  The UDF had gone ahead organising men and 
equipment for possible deployment on the Rand throughout the downsizing and rationalisation of 
the Defence Force after the First World War.  When the situation on the Rand got out of hand the 
Union Defence Force’s mobilisation plan was implemented.90 
 
On 10 March 1922, the Government proclaimed Martial Law on the Rand and surrounding areas, 
including Benoni, Bethal, Boksburg, Ermelo, Germiston, Heidelberg, Johannesburg, Klerksdorp, 
Krugersdorp, Middelburg, Potchefstroom, Pretoria, Roodepoort-Maraisburg, Springs and 
Standerton.  The Government also issued two more proclamations, whereby the ACF and the 
CFR, which had not yet been called up, could be mobilised.  The ACF units involved were the 10th 
Infantry (Witwatersrand Rifles), the 11th Infantry (Rand Light Infantry), the 3rd Mounted Brigade 
Train, 3rd Infantry Brigade Train and the 1st Sanitation Section (SA Medical Corps).  The CFR units 
that were called up numbered 26 commandos from the areas where Martial Law was proclaimed.  
These commando units were immediately called up per telegram and the first commando moved 
out to its assembly point within 34 hours of the call.  Approximately 55 hours from receiving their 
call-up instructions commandos started arriving at their assembly points.91  With the proclamation 
of Martial Law in the above-mentioned areas, the Deputy Commissioner of Police on the 
Witwatersrand, Lt Col R.S. Godley, handed over the responsibility of maintaining law and order 
and protecting life and property to the Union Defence Force.  Aeroplanes accompanied the ACF 
and CFR units that were called up and who marched from their various assembly points to 
suppress the disturbances.92 
 
The military authorities had worked out a system to co-ordinate co-operation between air and 
ground forces by the end of January 1922.  The Air Force had a two-part role.  Aeroplanes were 
firstly used for reconnaissance and secondly to disperse illegal gatherings.  Pilots received clear 
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guidelines on how they had to go about dispersing illegal gatherings.  The Government printed the 
procedure for the utilisation of aeroplanes in the local papers where the unrest occurred, informing 
the strikers and the local population of what to expect.  The papers stated categorically that the 
aeroplanes would take three steps to disperse an illegal gathering.  The pilot’s first step was to fly 
at a height of 500 feet and shoot red signal flares with a Very flare pistol while circling the crowd.  If 
the crowd did not disperse, the pilot’s second step would be to fly low over them while firing 
machine-gun bursts into the air.  If this was also unsuccessful, the pilot’s third step was to fire into 
the crowd with the machine-guns.93 
 
A secret document was distributed by the authorities amongst the commanding officers of the 
Government forces that stipulated more steps, in conjunction with the three steps mentioned 
above, regarding actions and communication procedures between air and ground forces.  This 
document informed the pilot that if the third step was unsuccessful he had to continue with step 
four, throwing bombs into the crowd.  Every ground commander was issued with strips of white 
sheet one metre wide and varying in length.  The aim was firstly to show a previously determined 
letter to the pilots as identification of Government forces.  The letters H, I, L, T, V, X, and Z were 
used for this purpose since they could easily be laid out on the ground.  The rest of the 
commander’s white sheet inventory was a circle and an arrow.  As is shown in the Figure 2.2, the 
commander would lay out the circle, with the arrow inside it pointing towards the crowd against 
which steps one to four were to be taken.  The identification letter of the day was laid out next to 
the circle.94  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2:  Method of Communication between Aeroplanes and Government Ground Forces. 
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2.3.5. THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNION DEFENCE FORCE 
 
As soon as the UDF took over authority from the SA Police, it appointed six officers in the various 
unrest areas to maintain law and order.  Brig. Gen. P.S. Beves assumed responsibility for 
Johannesburg (Central Witwatersrand), while Brig. Gen. Sir J.L. van Deventer assumed command 
of the East Rand, including the magisterial districts of Germiston, Boksburg, Benoni, Springs and 
Brakpan.  Lt. Col A.H.M. Nussey assumed command of the magisterial districts Krugersdorp and 
Roodepoort-Maraisburg on the West Rand.  Lt. Col. I. Swemmer was in charge of the magisterial 
districts of Bethal, Ermelo, Heidelberg and Standerton, while Insp. J.H. Irvine controlled the 
magisterial district of Potchefstroom, which included Klerksdorp.  The magisterial districts of 
Pretoria and Middelburg were the responsibility of Lt. Col. J.H. Breytenbach.95 
 
The Chief of the General Staff, Brig. Gen. A.J.E. Brink, ordered a reconnaissance flight by the Air 
Force on the morning of 10 March over Benoni and Brakpan before the official proclamation of 
Martial Law.  Three planes, armed only with machine-guns, participated in the reconnaissance 
flight over Benoni.  The situation was critical for the Government forces on the ground, since they 
were surrounded by the strikers and involved in heavy fighting.  The pilots regarded the situation 
as serious.  They identified the Trades Hall, where a red flag fluttered and the windows were 
boarded up, as the centre point of the unrest in Benoni.  In accordance with procedure, the pilots 
first fired signal flares and then warning shots to disperse the rioters.  The planes were met with 
heavy rifle fire from the Trades Hall and private residences.  The pilots subsequently fired on the 
boarded windows of the Trades Hall.  One of the reconnaissance planes sustained serious 
damage over Benoni and had to execute an emergency landing north-west of the town.96  The 
reconnaissance flight over Brakpan was fired upon from the woods close to the Apex mine and the 
officer in charge, Capt. W.W. Carey-Thomas, was fatally wounded.97 
 
The Government forces were at that stage involved in various heavy battles against the strikers.  
On the East Rand, the strikers were in control of Brakpan and Springs, although the besieged 
police forces in Benoni were still holding out against the striker commandos.  Lt. Col. D.M. McLeod 
and 160 men of the Transvaal Scottish hurried to Benoni by rail to reinforce the police, but they got 
bogged down at the Dunswart Junction in a skirmish against members of the striker commandos.  
The Transvaal Horse Artillery came to their rescue an hour later.  The Government forces then 
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executed a tactical withdrawal upon which the Transvaal Scottish and the Transvaal Horse Artillery 
entered Benoni from the south reaching the police barracks by eight o’clock the same night.  While 
the ground forces advanced towards Benoni to help the police, Lt. H.C. Daniel (pilot) and Lt. J.J.C. 
Hamman (observer) launched an aerial attack upon the Trades Hall.  The warning procedures 
were followed before they opened fire on the Trades Hall with machine-guns.  Lt. Daniel then 
followed by dropping a single Cooper’s bomb, which exploded behind the hall.  This had the 
desired effect and twenty strikers fled the hall to seek shelter in the surrounding private residences.  
Lt. Daniel then dropped the rest of his bombs, two of which hit a house and one failed to explode.  
The aerial attack and the reinforcements from the Transvaal Scottish and the Transvaal Horse 
Artillery were, however, not enough to break the strikers’ hold on Benoni.98 
 
Brig. Gen. Van Deventer arrived in Boksburg on 11 March and held a meeting with Lt. Col. N.H.M. 
Burne of the 1st Mounted Rifles and Capt. J. Fullard, District Commandant of the Police, in order to 
be brought up to date on the situation in his area of command.  After his scrutiny of the reports 
regarding the events at Dunswart and other incidents, he decided that the situation on the East 
Rand, especially in Benoni, Brakpan and Springs, was critical.  The striker commandos showed 
open hostility towards the Government forces.  He subsequently went ahead with his planning to 
restore law and order, if necessary through force, and, in consultation with Lt. Col. Burne and Capt. 
Fullard, placed the armed forces in his area under the overall command of Lt. Col. Burne.  In this 
way, Van Deventer tried to co-ordinate the actions of the police and Permanent Force units in his 
area of command.99 
 
Reliable intelligence on the strength of the strike commandos in Benoni and Brakpan was 
unavailable and Van Deventer was convinced that the information available inflated their numbers.  
In order to determine the real strength of the rioters Van Deventer decided to advance immediately 
on Benoni, Brakpan and Springs.  In his opinion it was necessary to act immediately against the 
striker commandos in the three towns to deprive them of the opportunity of organising military 
actions.  After he made a personal reconnaissance of Benoni he decided to invade the town the 
following morning, 12 March, at 05:00.100 
 
Brig. Gen. P.S. Beves also had a hard time suppressing the striker commandos in the Central 
Witwatersrand.  The Jeppe and Denver striker commandos launched a surprise attack on the 
Imperial Light Horse on 11 March at the Ellis Park sport grounds while the unit was being 
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equipped.  The attack killed or wounded more than twenty Government troops and was aimed at 
preventing the mobilisation of the CFR.  The Durban Light Infantry arrived in Johannesburg (Park 
Station) as the attack on the Imperial Light Horse took place, upon which they hurried to Ellis Park 
to render support.  The Imperial Light Horse immediately launched a counter-offensive and 
throughout the day, with the Durban Light Infantry’s assistance, suppressed any further attacks in 
the area.  Reinforced by the Durban Light Infantry and supported by the Air Force, Brig. Gen. 
Beves decided to launch a counter-offensive against the striker commandos on 12 March.  His aim 
was to relieve the pressure on the police, under siege in the ridges north-east of Johannesburg, 
and to break the hold of the rioters in his area of command.101 
 
2.3.6 THE SUPPRESSION OF UNREST ON THE EAST RAND 
 
At precisely 05:00 on 12 March 1922 the planned attack on Benoni commenced under the 
command of Lt. Col. Burne. (See Figure 2.3:  Line of March.)  The 351-man attacking force 
consisted of units from the Permanent Force as well as the ACF.  This force reached the black and 
Indian suburb by 06:30 where they joined up with the 1st Mounted Rifles under Maj. J.F. 
Wolmarans and two police units, A and H Squadron, under the command of Capt. J. Fulton and 
Capt. H. Halse.  The immediate objective was to defeat the striker commandos at the steel factory 
and then move into the rest of the town.  The Government forces commenced with their attack at 
11:00 and immediately came under heavy fire from the steel factory.  Lt. Col. Burne’s attack on the 
steel factory was supported by artillery fire from two positions, which greatly contributed to the 
striker commandos being dislodged from their positions and falling back in an easterly direction 
through the town an hour later.  Burne then changed his axis of advance to continue his attack 
along Main Reef Road.  Comdt. P. Botha and a portion of the Standerton East Commando joined 
him at 16:00, after which Burne started to consolidate his position.  Burne and his men were under 
continuous sniper fire from strikers shooting from rooftops, fields and orchards, but he succeeded 
in suppressing it with small arms and artillery fire.102 
 
Lt. Col. Burne called off the attack on Benoni at 17:00 in order to reorganise his force and to further 
consolidate his position before dark.  During the course of the day, the CFR arrived at East Rand 
Station, but they were badly equipped.  Ammunition and arms arrived later that night, with the last 
commando, and was distributed to the other commandos.  The commandos then received the 
order to join up with Burne’s force at the Dunswart Junction.  This movement commenced at 06:30 
on the morning of 13 March, and strengthened Burne’s force with an additional 66 officers and 831 
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men bringing his total to more than a thousand men.  The reinforcements consisted of the rest of 
the Standerton East Commando, the Blesbokspruit Commando (Standerton), the Heidelberg 
Commando, the Hoogveld Commando (Heidelberg), the Roodekoppe Commando (Standerton), 
and the Standerton West Commando.  The 295 unmounted soldiers of the various commandos 
stayed behind at the East Rand Station as a reserve force.103 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3:  Van Deventer’s Line of March to the East Rand.104 
 
Burne commenced his attack on Benoni on 13 March with the combined force in the middle and 
the Hoogveld, Standerton East and Standerton West Commandos on the left flank to envelope 
Benoni from the north-west.  The Blesbokspruit and Roodekoppe Commandos were on the right 
flank to complete the envelopment.  The Heidelberg Commando did not participate and was kept in 
reserve.  The operation went according to plan and the besieged police and Permanent Force 
elements were relieved by 10:00.  The arrival of the commandos, according to Burne, had such a 
paralysing effect on the striker commandos that they refrained from resisting.  The attacking force 
crossed various abandoned obstacles placed in the streets by the strikers to serve as barriers and 
continued towards the fortified Trades Hall.  Burne occupied the hall for a while and started with 
mopping up operations.  Since it was difficult to distinguish between members of the striker 
commandos and the public, all men that could bear arms were rounded up.  They were held until 
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they could be properly identified and give sufficient explanation of their activities.  The unmounted 
elements in reserve at the East Rand Station were ordered to occupy Benoni and support the 
police.105 
 
The next priority for Brig. Gen. Van Deventer was the relief of Brakpan.  The mounted elements 
were concentrated at the junction of Modderfontein and Brakpan Roads, after which he 
commenced with his advance on Brakpan at 12:30.  The Brakpan power station and mine were 
occupied an hour later without resistance and the Brakpan Police Station was relieved by 14:30.  
Little resistance was encountered except for sporadic sniper fire that was soon suppressed with 
small arms and artillery fire.  Many suspects were taken in for questioning by the police during the 
mopping up operations.  Meanwhile Cmdt. J.J. Alberts occupied Springs without any noticeable 
resistance, which finally broke the striker commandos’ hold on the East Rand.  Brig. Gen. Van 
Deventer’s relief force lost only five men with 19 men wounded.106 
 
2.3.7 THE SUPPRESSION OF UNREST ON THE WEST RAND 
 
The situation was less active on the West Rand than on the East Rand and the local striker 
commandos did not attack most of the police stations on 10 March.  Future attacks could not be 
ruled out and the Government forces quickly deployed on the West Rand.  Comdt. E. Wolfaardt 
arrived in Krugersdorp on 11 March with a commando from the Hekpoort area with the aim of 
suppressing possible striker commando activities.  The commander of the West Rand, Lt. Col. 
A.H.M. Nussey, was already on his way with a force by rail from Potchefstroom and arrived in 
Krugersdorp on 12 March.  Several commandos, such as the Magaliesberg and Luipaardsvlei 
Commandos, were under his command.107  These forces moved unopposed to Witpoortjie after 
which they were transported by rail to Roodepoort on 13 March.  An armoured train escorted the 
convoy of troop trains, which also enjoyed air cover in the morning.108 
 
The striker commandos did not oppose Lt. Col. Nussey’s arrival at Roodepoort or his occupation of 
Florida.  He then launched an attack on striker commandos entrenched on the ridges north of 
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Maraisburg. (See Figure 2.4:  Operations on the West Rand and Central Witwatersrand.)  
Elements of the Air Force were used again in a reconnaissance role and utilised to stop the strike 
commandos from concentrating their forces in the surrounding woods and hills.109  After driving the 
strikers off Nussey started with mopping up operations in the occupied areas of the West Rand and 
detained suspicious persons for questioning.  During the mopping up operations, Government 
forces confiscated various weapons, as well as an amount of ammunition and dynamite sticks with 
fuses and detonators.  Meanwhile Nussey was also deploying his forces for the attack on the 
striker commandos’ stronghold at Fordsburg.110 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4:  Operation on the West Rand and Central Witwatersrand.111 
 
2.3.8 THE SUPPRESSION OF UNREST IN THE CENTRAL WITWATERSRAND 
 
In Central Witwatersrand, Brig. Gen. Beves launched an attack against the striker commandos of 
Newlands and Vrededorp, who had besieged two police units (F and J Squadron), under the 
respective command of Maj. S. Hutchons and Capt. J.W. Carruthers, at Brixton Ridge.112  Beves 
wanted to achieve two objectives with this operation.  The first objective was a counter-offensive in 
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reprisal of the strikers’ attack the previous day on the Imperial Light Horse at the Ellis Park sports 
grounds ensuring the end of the strikers’ control of the area under his command.  The second 
objective was to relieve the besieged police at Brixton Ridge. (See Figure 2.4:  Operations on the 
West Rand and Central Witwatersrand.)113 
 
Lt. Col. E.F. Thackery had the extremely difficult task of leading the attack on Brixton Ridge.  He 
was assisted in his task by the combined application of air and ground forces.  The position of the 
police on Brixton Ridge was very critical.  They were totally cut off, with little ammunition and no 
food or water.  They were determined to defend their position at all costs, even with bayonets.  The 
Minister of Defence, Col. H. Mentz, delivered a message to Maj. Hutchons by aeroplane, which 
lifted their morale and prepared them for the upcoming relief force.114  The message read: ”A 
combined attack is being made to-day to relieve you.  Hold on.  The Minister of Defence admires 
your pluck and endurance, and every nerve is being strained so that your splendid effort will not be 
in vain.”115 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5:  The Attack on Brixton Ridge.116 
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On the morning of 12 March, at 08:30, six planes flew over the besieged positions and dropped 
supplies of bread and ammunition.  The bread was of little use since the policemen’s mouths were 
too dry to eat it!  The ammunition was a welcome relief and enabled the besieged to hold their 
position until the relief force arrived.  The planes were not only of importance for logistical support, 
but were also involved in giving close air support to the advancing ground forces.  The fortified, 
entrenched position of the strikers was attacked from the air using machine-guns and bombs.  
These not only greatly suppressed the strikers’ fire on the besieged positions, but also led to 
various members of the striker commandos surrendering to the besieged police.  The police were 
still subject to heavy fire as soon as the planes withdrew.117 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6:  Troops of the Witbank Regiment in Trenches around Braamfontein, Johannesburg.118 
 
Lt. Col. Thackery’s ground forces attacked Brixton Ridge at 11:00 from the north and the east, 
supported by artillery fire from the Transvaal Horse Artillery under the command of Maj. F.B. Adler.  
The Durban Light Infantry, who attacked Brixton Ridge from the north and the north-east, 
succeeded in reaching the besieged forces by 14:00.  (See Figure 2.5: Attack on Brixton Ridge and 
Figure 2.6: Troops of the Witbank Regiment in Trenches around Braamfontein.)  They did not 
suffer any serious casualties, but the Transvaal Scottish, who attacked from the south-east, 
suffered three dead and 29 wounded.  At 15:00 that afternoon, the siege of the two police units 
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was ended and the Government forces regrouped for an attack on Fordsburg, the last stronghold 
of the strikers, on 14 March.119 
 
2.3.9 THE ATTACK ON FORDSBURG 
 
Reconnaissance flights over Fordsburg on 13 March revealed that the striker commandos had 
fortified the market square and the Market Hall and had surrounded it with interconnecting 
trenches.  Double breastworks were erected in the main street and the striker commandos were 
deployed in a strong all-round defence.  Before the Government forces commenced their attack on 
14 March, pamphlets were dropped over Fordsburg to warn the women, children and loyal citizens 
against the attack that was to commence at 11:00.  Many people, mainly women and children, 
subsequently left Fordsburg and assembled at the Milner Park show grounds.  Half an hour before 
the attack was to take place, the striker commandos came out under a white flag and requested 
negotiations on conditions for peace.  Brig. Gen. Beves rejected this proposal and demanded their 
unconditional surrender before 11:00.  The strikers, in turn, rejected this demand upon which the 
attack started at exactly 11:00.120 (See Figure 2.7: The Attack on Fordsburg.) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: The Attack on Fordsburg.121 
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The Government forces started their attack with an artillery bombardment on the striker 
commandos’ positions upon which the infantry, which surrounded Fordsburg, moved in.  The 
Durban Light Infantry, supported by the Rand Light Infantry, attacked from the north, the Transvaal 
Scottish, with the special police force of Lt. Col. Godley on their left flank, advanced from the north-
east and Lt Col. Nussey’s force from the west.  The artillery barrage successfully dislodged the 
striker commandos, which made the task of the attacking infantry easier.  As with previous battles, 
the Government forces were subjected to continuous sniper fire while the barricades in the streets 
slowed them down.  The infantry, nonetheless, reached the market square by 14:00 and forced the 
striker commandos to surrender.  The normal mopping up operations aimed at finding the snipers 
and any member of the striker commandos still running free followed the attack.  The Government 
forces did not suffer any noteworthy casualties during their attack on Fordsburg.  According to the 
official report on the events two striker leaders, P. Fisher and H. Spendiff, committed suicide.  The 
public, particularly the strikers, did not believe these reports and Government forces were accused 
of murdering them.122 
 
2.3.10 CONSOLIDATION AND DEMOBILISATION 
 
The striker commandos’ hold on the Witwatersrand was finally broken by 15 March.  A section of 
the Government’s forces, the Transvaal Horse Artillery and the Transvaal Scottish, were 
immediately demobilised.  The rest were still involved with final mopping up operations, mainly 
scouting for weapons and remaining groups of armed strikers, in which the Air Force played a vital 
supporting role.  The weapons confiscated during and after the strike amounted to one machine-
gun, 3500 rifles, 1281 shotguns, 4945 revolvers and 60500 rounds of ammunition. (See Figure 2.8:  
Weapons Confiscated.)  By 17 March, the trade union leaders decided to call off the strike upon 
which the CFR started to demobilise on 18 March and completed demobilisation on the morning of 
22 March.  The rest of the Permanent Force and Active Reserve Force units remained until Lt. Col. 
Godley resumed his normal duties of maintaining law and order on 22 March.123 
 
The Martial Law Commission put the total number of casualties of the 1922 industrial unrest on the 
Rand at 687, with 153 dead and 534 wounded.  The tables below show that the Government 
forces sustained 291 casualties compared to the 376 civilian casualties.  There were 219 (55.4%) 
casualties of innocent civilians 197 of whom were wounded and 42 killed, while the strikers 
sustained 157 (39.6)%) casualties of whom 118 were wounded and 39 killed.  After the unrest, 
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eighteen of the rioters were sentenced to death of which only four, H.K. Hull, D. Lewis, S.A. Long 
and C.C. Stassen were hanged on 17 November 1922 for murders committed during the strike.124 
 
Weapons and Ammunition Confiscated  
Type During the Strike After the Strike Total 
Machine-guns 1 0 1 
Rifles 1150 2350 3500 
Shotguns 231 1050 1281 
Revolvers 745 4200 4945 
Ammunition 60500  60500 
 
Figure 2.8: Weapons Confiscated during the 1922-Strike.125 
 
Civilian Casualties of the Industrial Unrest on the Witwatersrand, 1922 
Group Wounded Dead Total 
Strikers 118 39 157 
Innocent Civilians 197 42 239 
Total 315 81 396 
 
Figure 2.9: Civilian Casualties during the Industrial Unrest on the Witwatersrand, 1922.126 
 
Total casualties during the Industrial Unrest on the Witwatersrand, 1922 
Group Wounded Dead Total 
Government Forces 219 72 291 
Civilian 315 81 396 
Total 534 153 687 
 
Figure 2.10: Total Casualties during the Industrial Unrest on the Witwatersrand, 1922.127 
 
2.3.11 CRITICISM OF “PLATSKIET POLITIEK” 
 
The Benoni Chamber of Commerce came out strongly against the use of military force.  The use of 
bombs was severely criticised and called a diabolical murder of innocent women and children.  The 
Labour Party voiced their criticism in Parliament and accused the Government of using military 
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force against innocent civilians.  The strike had a ripple effect that affected commerce, education 
and other services in all the towns on the Rand.  The striker commandos contributed to the 
disruption of the public’s daily routine, but, even more so, did the proclamation of Martial Law.  
Inevitably, the war between the strikers and the Government was fought in the streets of Benoni, 
Brixton Ridge, Maraisburg and Fordsburg inflicting many casualties on innocent civilians.  The 
civilian attitude towards the whole affair ranged from outrage, fear and outright hostility towards not 
only the strikers, but also towards the Government forces fighting their own brothers.128 
 
The National Party under Gen. J.B.M. Hertzog used Smuts’ harsh action against the strikers and 
the accompanying casualties for political gain.  Smuts was singled out and depicted as the main 
architect of the bloodbath and his actions, especially the proclamation of Martial Law, were 
branded as “platskiet politiek” (shoot down politics).  The execution of Hull, Lewis, Long and 
Stassen also evoked sharp criticism of Smuts from the white population, which the political 
opposition used to their benefit.  It is accepted that the criticism the Smuts government elicited with 
its handling of the 1922 industrial unrest contributed to its demise in the 1924 election against the 
coalition of the National Party and the Labour Party.129  Krikler is of the opinion that the industrial 
unrest on the Rand was the manifestation of white labour’s need for dignity, to fight against the 
extinction of white labour in favour of black labour and to struggle against unemployment.  The new 
government elected in 1924 did not protect the white working class.  Wages were reduced from 
between 10% to more than 40% and union activities, including the ability to strike, were curtailed 
through various mechanisms and procedures.130 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE SUPPRESSION OF INDIGENOUS UNREST 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The period from 1914 to 1932 in the Union of South Africa’s history is an abstract of how the 
Government utilised their resources to punish and subdue recalcitrant indigenous populations.  
Recalcitrance was rooted in the lack of political rights of any indigenous population, except whites, 
drafted in the Union’s constitution.  This was automatically applicable to the indigenous populations 
of South West Africa when they were administered by Pretoria.  When laws were transgressed by 
the Israelites, the Bondelswarts, the Rehoboth Basters and the Ukuambi a punitive expedition was 
the outcome.  The legitimacy of these actions was founded in the laws governing the authorities.131 
 
The approach towards indigenous populations in the early twentieth century is displayed in the 
policy of separate development.  The 1913 Land Act, reserving portions of land for separate races, 
provided for a measure of control on land acquisition and further control over economic and social 
affairs followed in its footsteps.  An attitude of master and servant was obvious in the mandated 
territory, as a spill over effect from the Union Government’s racial policy.  Prejudice, double 
standards in executing branding laws, enforced indentured labour, dog and hut tax were some of 
the grievances that indigenous populations had against the authorities.132 
 
The incidents discussed in this chapter indicate how the Governing authority executed governance.  
Negotiations were a prelude to enforcing authority by means of force.  The use of the aeroplane 
has been criticised, but it was an economic, quick and efficient way of suppressing uprisings.  It 
was a force multiplier and it clearly saved lives on many occasions.  The efficient way in which 
force was applied shows a willingness by the authorities to spare lives, rather than kill innocent 
civilians.  Also fewer soldiers were placed in harm’s way thus preventing many Government 
casualties and minimising criticism.  Criticism of the use of force, especially when the casualties 
were innocent women and children, varied, and the ramifications thereof are discussed.  
 
The Israelites, Bondelswarts, Rehoboth and the Ukuambi shared the grievance of forced 
submission to Government laws and policies.  The incident at Bulhoek and the action against Chief 
Ipumbu are indicative of Government resolve to enforce the law and racial policies.  The 
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Bondelswarts and the Rehoboth shared a bond in some of their reasons for resistance.  The size 
of the land allocated to them in the transition from German to South African rule, the way they had 
to do business and brand their cattle and their utilisation as labourers were some of the shared 
reasons for their resistance. 
 
3.2 THE INCIDENT AT BULHOEK, QUEENSTOWN, 24 MAY 1921 
 
3.2.1 ENOCH MGIJIMA AND THE ISRAELITES  
 
The Israelites annually observed Passover in the middle of April.  This event had to be attended by 
all the church members, at a specific place, for a period of ten to thirty days.  The Bulhoek sub-
location, one of eight sub-locations of the Kamastone Location in the Queenstown district, was the 
preferred venue because this was the home of their leader, Enoch Mgijima.133 
 
Enoch Mgijima was born in 1868, the tenth and last child of Jonas Mayekiso Mgijima.  The Mgijima 
family settled in Ntabelanga (The mountain of the rising sun) in 1856.  The friendly attitude of the 
British exposed many of the African families living in the area to Western ideas and culture.  The 
children attended missionary schools and the Wesleyan Methodist Church played a significant role 
in educating many of the Africans in the area.  This included Mgijima, who did not continue his 
formal education past Standard 3 (Grade 5), but stayed on at Bulhoek to become a farmer and a 
hunter.134 
 
Mgijima was an active Christian who preached the gospel to all who would listen.  His ties with the 
Wesleyan Methodists became strained when he continued to preach a return to the beliefs of the 
Old Testament.  He gradually gained an independent following and finally broke away from the 
Wesleyan Methodists in 1912.  Mgijima and his followers identified with the stories of the Old 
Testament and they eventually became known as the Israelites.  A small church in the United 
States of America, the Church of God and the Saints of Christ, became his new haven.  John J. 
Msikinya was a bishop of this church in South Africa and converted Enoch Mgijima to the new 
church.  Enoch Mgijima himself became a bishop and took over the reigns from Msikinya when he 
died in 1914.  The Union Government was aware that the independent black churches played a 
role in the black communities becoming vehicles of political and social advancement and a conduit 
for exchanging ideas between blacks in America and Africa.  These ideas were perceived as 
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radical and these movements were monitored and, if necessary, suppressed as was the case with 
the Israelites.135   
 
Enoch Mgijima was renowned for his visions.  His path as missionary was attributed to visions of 
the end of the world on Christmas Day 1912 and of the First World War.  He foresaw a war 
between blacks and whites, but explained that the Israelites would not participate.  Mgijima was 
asked by the Church of God and the Saints of Christ in America to renounce these visions.  His 
refusal led to his excommunication by the Church, which split the local branch of the church in two.  
Mgijima and the Israelites continued on their religious path, obtaining converts from the local 
districts in Queenstown, the Transkeian Territories and the Western Transvaal.136 
 
3.2.2 THE ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF LAND LEADS TO CONFRONTATION 
 
The bone of contention between the Israelites and the Union Government was not religion per se.  
The Union Government tolerated such movements and allowed them the freedom to exercise their 
religion in any way desirable as long they stayed within the boundaries of the law.  The conflict was 
due to the fact that the Israelites were unlawfully occupying land (the Bulhoek commonage) and 
refused to leave.  This commonage was named Ntabalanga and a tabernacle was erected for 
services.  This land was the area that the Israelites had occupied over Passover since 1917, with 
permission from the Shiloh Mission Station, the local lot-holders of Bulhoek and the Superintendent 
of Natives at Kamastone, G.E. Nightingale.  Permission was granted on the premise that the 
building of permanent structures for the members attending the ceremony was not allowed and 
that the participants immediately depart after the ceremony.  The reason for this was that the 
Native Locations Act No. 37 of 1884 forbade damaging, squatting upon or building upon any 
commonage.  In 1920, it came to the attention of Nightingale that the Israelites were transgressing 
the law by building permanent structures.137 
 
Strangers squatted on the commonage, but Nightingale allowed them to stay, after Mgijima 
explained that they were there for a special ceremony.  This arrangement was made on the 
condition that the squatters were to depart as soon as the ceremony was over.  Permission for the 
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annual Passover was granted on the same condition.  However, the Passover of 1920 was going 
to be different.  Mgijima called all his followers to his home to wait for the Lord's coming, thereby 
increasing the number of attendants at the yearly festival.  Robert Edgar explains that the 
prophecies of Mgijima offered the attractive alternative of salvation, hope, change, solace and 
comfort in contrast to drought and plague.  It was thus, as a matter of course, that the Israelites 
converged on Bulhoek, expecting salvation.138 
 
The expectations of the Israelites caused friction amongst the Queenstown communities.  This was 
not due to their religious practices, but due to the presence of illegal squatters in the Kamastone 
Location.  The rest of the African inhabitants of the Location were unhappy - especially their 
neighbours.  Their pastures and gardens became grazing for the Israelites’ animals.  Furthermore 
they feared that the Government would use this situation to confiscate their land.  Their fear was so 
great that they eventually requested the local officials to intervene.  This intervention was strongly 
supported by the local white farmers, who believed that the Israelites were criminals and 
responsible for the theft of their sheep and cattle.  These allegations were investigated and proved 
false, but the white farmers were still adamant that the law had to be enforced and the squatters 
removed.  They did, however, not see force as the preferred method, but rather tactful 
persuasion.139   
 
3.2.3 ASKING FOR MORE TIME 
 
Nightingale approached Mgijima on 8 June 1920 to determine why the Israelites had not dispersed 
after the annual Passover as per their agreement.  Sickness, lack of funds and a special service 
were the excuses for the infringement, but the assurance was given that the group would disperse 
by 20 June.  The Israelites did not disperse and continued to erect permanent dwellings.  
Summonses under the regulations were issued, but were ignored.  On 14 September, the 
magistrate, E.C. Welsh, spoke to Mgijima and was assured that they would disperse on 30 
September.  The Israelites did not disperse, but rather applied for another extension on 3 
October.140 
 
The extension was refused, which strained the relationship between the Government and the 
Israelites.  The Israelites resisted passively, defeating the ends of justice by refusing to give their 
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names, which prevented the issuing of summonses.  Tension was mounting as the rest of the 
African inhabitants and the white farmers were unhappy with the Government's apparent inability 
to end the dispute.  The Government decided on a more active measure and instructed 
Nightingale, in his capacity as Superintendent of Natives, to proceed with enforcing the law.141 
 
In an effort to enforce the law, a name list was to be drafted of every member residing in the 
Bulhoek area.  This enabled the issuing of summonses against an individual, but if the inhabitants 
refused to give their names, they were to be arrested and charged with contravening the Native 
Locations Act No. 37 of 1884.  The police were informed of the plan and they were instructed to 
assist Nightingale.  The procedure proved to be a challenge greater than expected.  The Israelites 
refused Nightingale entrance and posted guards as well as a notice that read, "Halt - No 
Admittance".142 
 
Welsh returned to Bulhoek on 8 December 1920 with a force of 93 mounted and armed police 
under the command of Maj. S. Hutchons.  The magistrate was authorised to issue the Israelites 
with free passage per train and rations if they were willing to depart immediately.  Welsh and 
Hutchons spoke with delegates from the Israelite village and informed them of the registration that 
was to take place.  The Israelites held firmly to the belief that God did not approve of the 
registration and that they would not allow it.  Welsh and Hutchons concluded that the Israelites 
were religious fanatics and that the current force was insufficient to have an impact.  Subsequently, 
they requested reinforcements.  Their fear of an insufficient force became apparent when the 
police moved from their camp near the village after an aggressive demonstration by the Israelites.  
This proved to be an overreaction, but fuelled the mounting tension.143 
 
The request for reinforcements was denied due to the fact that the Government felt the situation 
did not warrant bloodshed.  Instead, the Secretary of Native Affairs, E.E. Barrett, the Commissioner 
of Police, Col. T.G. Truter, and a Defence Force representative, Brig. Gen. A.J. van Deventer, 
were instructed to investigate the matter.  Barrett called a meeting with headmen and 
representatives of the Kamastone Location two days prior to meeting the Israelites.  The 
representatives were adamant that the dispute should be ended, the houses destroyed and the 
Israelites removed.  Barrett also had discussions with prominent members of the African 
community, such as J. Tengo Jabavo, the editor of Imvo Zambanzsundu (a leading African 
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newspaper), Rev. F. Xabanisa of Idutywa, Chief Veldtman of Butterworth and M. Pelem of 
Queenstown.  These people held their own talks with the Israelites in order to persuade them to 
disperse, but to no avail.  The investigating team finally held a meeting with Israelite 
representatives on 17 December, but they too failed to reach a settlement.  The Israelites 
requested an interview with the Prime Minister, Gen. J.C. Smuts, who agreed to meet them as 
soon as his schedule allowed, but the meeting never materialised.  In the meantime, the Israelites 
continued to ignore both the officials and their procedure.144 
 
Instead of an interview with the Prime Minister, on 6 April 1921 they received a visit from the Native 
Affairs Commission.  This commission was established in 1920 with the aim of consulting and 
discussing topics that were of concern to Africans.  The Commission was the interface between the 
Government and the people at grass roots level.  The Bulhoek affair was the first opportunity to 
test the commission, which comprised of General L.A.S. Lemmer, Dr C.T. Loram and Senator A.W. 
Roberts.  The commission held talks with the Israelites’ representatives, but they failed to bridge 
the gap between the needs of the Israelites and statutory law.  They reinforced the opinion that the 
Israelites were religious fanatics, but emphasised that there was no political agenda involved.  
They indicated that any attempt to remove the group by force would be resisted and bloodshed 
would be inevitable.  The commission also had talks with local Africans and white farmers who 
continued to complain of the Government's reluctance to resolve the issue.  The general feeling 
was that the attempts to find a peaceful solution were commendable, but the issue had to be 
resolved or else they would take the law into their own hands.145 
 
In the meantime one of the farmers had, in fact, already taken the law into his own hands when he 
opened fire on three Israelites for trespassing, killing one and wounding another.  The farmer 
appeared before the Circuit Court, in East London, at the end of April 1921, but the Israelites failed 
to appear as witnesses.  The Court subsequently followed procedure and issued warrants of arrest 
for the witnesses.  The Government made it clear in a public statement that a Court of Law should 
always be respected, irrespective of race or religion.146   
 
The commission held a final meeting with the Israelites on 11 May and again delivered the 
Government's request.  The Israelites refused to accept it and stated categorically that the issue 
was between the Government and God.  Directly after they returned from the meeting, the 
commission reported via telegram their failure to defuse the situation.  The telegram also included 
the suggestion that a sufficient force be sent to remove the illegal squatters.  Forceful eviction was 
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the last option available to the Government.  This was to be executed by the police, supported by 
elements of the UDF.147 
 
3.2.4 THE EVICTION OF THE BULHOEK SQUATTERS 
 
The public opinion at the time reflected strong support, across the demographic spectrum, for the 
Government’s stance.  On 17 May, Imvo criticised the Israelites and pointed out that the 
Government was left with no choice.  The General Council of the Transkeian Territories followed 
suit and passed a resolution condemning the Israelites and calling on the Government to enforce 
the law.  The Johannesburg Star fully supported the Government and insisted on a massive 
contingent to enforce the law.148 
 
This "massive contingent" consisted of 800 policemen selected from all over the country. Police 
arrived at Queenstown between 12 and 15 May, and were divided into two regiments (six 
squadrons) and a Maxim machine-gun detachment.  The Union Defence Force detached an 
Artillery section and an Ambulance section to the police force for support.  The preparations 
continued, while Col. Truter notified Mgijima that he had been ordered by the Union Government to 
carry out the following orders: 
 
“a. To arrest certain men, against whom warrants have been issued, in order that they 
should be dealt with according to law. 
b. To see that all unauthorised residents leave Ntabalanga and go back to where they 
came from. 
c. To destroy all houses erected without authority. 
d. On completion of these operations, a force will be left at Ntabalanga to prevent any 
unauthorised resident squatting there.  Everyone's person and property will be 
respected…any resistance to lawful authority will be drastically dealt with.”149 
 
Mgijima answered this notice and again explained his background and how the Israelites where 
ordained by God to stay there and wait for Him.  Col. Truter mobilised the force under his 
command early on the morning of 23 May and moved out in the direction of the Kamastone 
Location.  On 24 May 1921, at 09:00, Truter deployed his force on the sloping hills south of 
Bulhoek.150  (See Figure 3.1: Sketch of Bulhoek Incident.) 
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Figure 3.1:   Sketch of the Bulhoek Incident (Left).151 
Figure 3.2: Enoch Mgijima (Right).152 
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The Israelites were gathering in formations, dressed in white smocks and khaki shorts and armed 
with swords, knobkerries, spears and other home-made weapons.  Three policemen, Sgt. Wicks, 
Sgt. Boucher and Insp. W.H. Quirk, were dispatched to speak to the Israelites before the general 
advance was to begin.  They were met by three Israelites and the following conversation took 
place: 
 
SA Police: "What are your intentions?  Will you allow us to come in and do as we intend 
to do or do you intend to fight?" 
Israelites: "From Jehova we will not allow you to scatter our people from Ntabalanga, 
we will not allow you to burn our huts and we will not allow you to arrest the 
two men you wish to." 
SA Police: "That means you intend to fight?" 
Israelites: "That is for you, not for us to know."153 
 
Sgt. Wicks reiterated the point that surrender could still save them from harm, but the Israelites did 
not surrender and they returned to their respective sides.  The Israelites grouped into four armed 
columns of a 100 each with smaller armed groupings bringing their total strength up to 500.  The 
commander of the 2nd Regiment, Lt. Col. E. Woon, had advanced to 300 yards from the Israelites, 
when three Israelites approached him from within the group.  They enquired as to his intentions 
and they were told that Woon wanted to enter the village, but would meet any opposition with 
force.  They warned him that God was on their side and returned to their position.  The Israelites 
subsequently advanced upon Woon's force.154 
 
The centre troop of 25 men was ordered to shoot one volley as a warning over their heads, but this 
had no effect on the Israelites’ charge.  Woon then ordered the whole front line to open fire with 
five rounds rapid fire.  Still the Israelites advanced amidst heavy casualties. (See below for figures) 
Hand-to-hand fighting broke out, but the Israelites fell back and regrouped for a counterattack on 
the right flank of the police.  The machine gun, stationed on the right flank on high ground under 
the command of Lt S. Chisholm, opened fire on the attacking column and drove it back.  The firing 
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stopped as soon as the attack was broken off.  The Israelites surrendered and Mgijima (see Figure 
3.2) was arrested and taken to the Queenstown jail.  A total of 95 Israelites were arrested.155 
 
3.2.5 THE AFTERMATH OF THE BULHOEK INCIDENT 
 
Lt. Col. Woon continued his advance on the village and arrested the rest of the Israelites.  The 
prisoners were allowed to take care of their dead and hold a burial service.  The Ambulance 
section, under the command of Maj. Welsh, assumed responsibility for the wounded and attended 
them until they could be transported to the Queenstown hospital.  The casualties amongst the 
Israelites were 163 dead and 129 wounded.  The woman and children were registered on 26 May, 
while the Native Affairs Department and the magistrate arranged for them to be dispersed.156 
 
The police had only one stab wound as casualty, and shortly after the incident the policemen were 
shipped back to their original posts.  The operation cost the police £472.  The Artillery section 
returned to Pretoria without firing a shot while the Ambulance section received praise for a job well 
done.157   
 
Hearty congratulations, however, were not forthcoming from the press or the opposition.  The 
Johannesburg Star, ironically, led the charge in criticising the Government for sending too big a 
force, not utilising air power to frighten the Israelites into submission and for shooting at the last 
minute, which ensured maximum casualties.  The use of force, however, became inevitable when 
negotiations failed.  The police gave verbal and physical warning of their intention to use force if 
necessary.  The police force advanced upon the inferiorly armed Israelites.  Their warning shots 
were insufficient and in the execution of their duties they fired upon the charging Israelites as a last 
resort.  The South African Native National Congress strongly criticised the action and denounced it 
as racial bigotry.  A commission of inquiry was demanded in African political and social circles.  
However, the Government announced on 15 June 1921 that no commission would be 
appointed158.  Gen Smuts bore the brunt of the criticism and was even labelled the "Butcher of 
Bulhoek".  The severity of the Government's actions was not forgotten when, in the following year, 
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the Government reacted against the uprising of the Bondelswarts in the Protectorate of South West 
Africa.159  
 
3.3 THE UPRISING OF THE BONDELSWARTS, MAY TO JUNE 1922 
 
3.3.1 THE SOUTH WEST AFRICAN MANDATE 
 
Union forces invaded German South West Africa, known today as Namibia, in 1915 and occupied 
the territory for the remainder of the First World War.  Gen. L. Botha provided this force in support 
of Britain's fight against Germany.  The German colony was thereafter under martial law until 1919.  
The victors of the war divided the colonial assets of Germany amongst themselves.  The Treaty of 
Versailles identified South West Africa as a category C mandate, which was henceforth placed in 
the custody of the British Monarch.  The League of Nations endorsed various nations with the 
responsibility of administrating these territories.  The Union of South Africa was requested to 
administrate South West Africa on behalf of the British Crown.160   
 
President W. Wilson of the United States of America initiated the system of mandatory government 
to prevent outright annexation of territories.  He envisaged the mandatory power to fulfil a “sacred 
trust of civilisation”, providing “tutelage for those people not yet able to stand by themselves in the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world”, and it was expected to promote their “well-being and 
development.”161  The Union Parliament accepted this responsibility and approved the South West 
Africa Mandate Act No. 49 of 1919.  The mandate was signed on 17 December 1920.  Martial law 
was recalled and the civilian administration was awarded the authority to rule South West Africa as 
a mandated territory from 1 January 1921. (See Figure 3.3: Map of South West Africa.)  G.R. 
Hofmeyer, the appointed Administrator-General, ruled with an Advisory Committee of nine 
members.162   
 
3.3.2 THE BONDELSWARTS UNDER GERMAN RULE 
 
The Bondelswarts were indigenous to the South West African region, known today as Southern 
Namibia and the Northern Cape in South Africa.  In South West Africa, they were the masters of 
the south before the German occupation.  They were a nomadic, pastoral people who lived in 
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temporary huts and moved only to the next waterhole when grazing became scarce.  Their stock 
consisted of goats and cattle, but their sustenance was derived from the hunting of game.163 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3:  South West Africa, 1921.164 
 
The proud, self-reliant attitude of the Bondelswarts brought them into conflict with the Germans, 
which manifested in a protracted war from 1903 to 1906.  The Bondelswarts were defeated, but 
their reputation as fierce, ruthless and cunning fighters was confirmed.  In their natural stronghold, 
the Fish River Canyon, they employed guerrilla tactics to good effect to keep the German forces at 
bay.  They raided isolated farms and police stations for supplies, arms and ammunition, which 
could sustain them for up to two years.  Jacobus Cristiaan and Abraham Morris were leading 
figures amongst the Bondelswarts during their conflict.  Cristiaan was the hereditary chief and 
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Morris fought as a captain.  He made a name for himself as being a capable and resourceful leader 
and a master of guerrilla tactics.165 
 
The conflict ended with both parties signing a peace treaty, which stipulated that the territory of the 
Bondelswarts would be reduced to 175,000 hectares and that no chief was to be appointed.  
Cristiaan and Morris feared personal retribution from the Germans.  They crossed the Orange 
River into the Northern Cape accompanied by a few followers and settled in the Steinkopf and 
Matjiesfontein areas respectively.  They were declared outlaws with a price on their heads.  The 
rest of the tribe lived under German rule until Union forces defeated the Germans 1915.166 
 
3.3.3 “EXCHANGING ONE YOKE FOR ANOTHER”  
 
The Bondelswarts expected the new colonial power to abolish the restrictions of the German 
treaty.  Instead, the conditions of the treaty were confirmed.  This aroused strong resentment 
among the Bondelswarts and they remarked to the Commission of Enquiry that they had, “only 
exchanged one yoke for another”.167  The return of their true chief, Cristiaan, in 1919, fuelled these 
resentments.  The Administration did not recognise Cristiaan and confirmed Timotheus Beukes as 
the chief appointed by the Administration.  Cristiaan surrendered himself to the police to face 
charges of illegally entering South West Africa and bringing stock over the border without 
authorisation.  He was subsequently tried and was fined £100 or 12 months imprisonment.  
However, the sentence was suspended and Cristiaan was allowed to stay in the area.  This 
commuted sentence was brought about by the fact that the Union Government refused to let 
Cristiaan’s stock return to the Union.168 
 
The reaction of the Administration to Cristiaan’s return enraged the Bondelswarts, but was by no 
means the only reason for their eventual uprising.  The poverty amongst the Bondelswarts 
worsened year after year.  The reserve allocated to them became too small to accommodate their 
nomadic ventures and the cultivation of crops was unknown to them.  They bartered and shop 
owners paid them in "good-for" vouchers that were only redeemable at the specific store.  Their 
poverty was compounded by the fact that Hofmeyer proclaimed a new dog tax, Proclamation No. 
16 of 1921.  Dog owners had to pay £1 for the first dog, £2.10 for two dogs, £4.10 for three dogs, 
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£7 for four dogs and £10 for five dogs.  The dog tax was applicable to everybody, but the tax itself 
was extremely high for the prevailing economic situation.  A drought in the region caused an 
economic slump, which caused the payment of lower wages or of payment in kind.  The effect of 
the tax on the Bondelswarts was fines or imprisonment and inevitably, fewer dogs.  This resulted in 
their inability to protect their flock from jackals and hampered their hunting.169 
 
The hunting of game was also restricted and caused many Bondelswarts to go without the vital, 
established component of meat in their diet.  The compulsory dipping and strict quarantine 
measures also hampered the selling of their stock.  These measures were implemented to curtail 
the spreading of stock diseases and were vital in an area where many commercial farmers traded 
in stock.  However, much of the stock died and the economic viability of selling stock continued to 
decline during the economic slump.170 
 
The remark of, “trading one yoke for another”, became all too true for the Bondelswarts.  They 
resented the Administration for their unjust approach and felt antagonised by not being afforded 
their proper place in their historic area.  Many of the older members of the tribe remembered when 
they were rulers of the whole of southern South West Africa and it was a bitter disappointment 
when the Union accepted the treaty between the Bondelswarts and the Germans, which confirmed 
the boundaries of the Bondelswarts Reserve. (See Figure 3.4: Map of the Bondelswarts Reserve.) 
It became a bone of contention between the Administration and the Bondelswarts when land was 
allocated to white farmers on their northern boundary and the Bondelswarts living on the land were 
removed to Driehoek.  They had a sketch in their possession, which was given to them by the 
German Commission when the allocation of the reserve was discussed, that indicated the northern 
boundary.  This included parts of the Uitschot, Welgelegen and Plankieskop farms.  However, the 
official survey map indicated that their northern boundary ran south of these farms.  The 
Administration accepted the official survey as the true reflection of the boundaries, which left the 
Bondelswarts believing that they had been robbed of much needed land.  Their contempt grew to 
include all activities of the Administration. 171  
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Figure 3.4:  The Bondelswarts Reserve.172 
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One of these activities was the Branding of Cattle Proclamation.  This provided for the branding of 
large stock by everyone.  The white farmers were allowed to keep their branding iron in their 
possession after they had paid for and registered the brand.  The indigenous populations were not 
allowed to keep their branding iron, even after paying for and registering the brand.  The branding 
iron was kept in the possession of the local magistrate.  He authorised the branding of stock by 
tasking an official to do it, but only after ownership was established.  The reason for this 
discrimination was to contain stock theft by the indigenous populations.  The Bondelswarts, being a 
proud tribe, felt antagonised by this blatant act of discrimination.  Thus, the relationship between 
the Bondelswarts and the Administration continued to deteriorate.173 
 
The Administration continued the German law which stated that indigenous men had to enter the 
labour market if they had no visible means of support.  This was interpreted by the Administration 
as having less than ten head of cattle or fifty head of small stock.  The influx of indigenous people 
to the towns to seek work was strictly controlled and no vagrancy was allowed.  This forced many 
to seek work on commercial farms.  The dog tax and hunting regulations were aimed at ensuring 
that the Bondelswarts would be forced to seek work.  These taxes were instated when farmers 
asked the Administrator to facilitate a process whereby labour would be secured.  Hofmeyer 
denied this to be the intention, but the magistrate of Warmbad and a farmer in the district delivered 
evidence to the Native Affairs Commission confirming it.174 
 
However, the Bondelswarts were notorious for being bad labourers.  It was not part of their natural 
heritage to render labour on commercial farms and their tribal responsibilities often kept them away 
from work.  Much friction arose between the Bondelswarts and the white farmers.  The farmers 
described the Bondelswarts as lazy and uncooperative and handed out punishment, such as 
flogging and not paying wages or not giving the labourers food.  This friction was further 
aggravated by the sour relationship between the Bondelswarts and the police.175   
 
The Bondelswarts experienced the police as harsh, provocative and unnecessarily severe.  The 
police, on the other hand, viewed them as insolent, lazy and thievish.  The general view of the 
police was that they were policing a subservient race and insolence was rewarded with flogging.  
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The Bondelswarts viewed the police with suspicion and fear.  This antagonism between the police 
and the Bondelswarts was exacerbated following Cristiaan's return.  A police force of 15 men was 
sent to arrest some of the men who returned with Cristiaan on suspicion of stock theft.  The police 
were confronted by the naturally suspicious Bondelswarts.  The situation was, however, quickly 
brought under control after the police explained their presence.  They said that Cristiaan and four 
headmen had to discuss their presence with the magistrate, Fleck, at Warmbad.  Cristiaan sent 
four headmen who were arrested in Haib on their way to the magistrate.  They were released soon 
thereafter, but the relationship between the Bondelswarts and the police continued to deteriorate.  
This provided a breeding ground for contempt on both sides.176 
 
3.3.4 THE RETURN OF ABRAHAM MORRIS 
 
White fears of indigenous uprisings created an atmosphere of paranoia in which any large 
movement by the Bondelswarts was seen as a possible mobilisation.  Cristiaan and 50 of his 
followers were no exception.  Their movement into South West Africa was immediately noticed and 
reported to the magistrate in Warmbad.  The message, which reached the centre of the farming 
community in the area, contained a warning that a large force of 3 000 Bondelswarts was about to 
attack the town of Warmbad.  The magistrate was not affected by the hysteria of the moment and 
dispatched policemen to arrest the illegal immigrants.177 
 
More Bondelswarts crossed the Orange River in the wake of Cristiaan's return.  Their return 
sparked off more fears of unrest and the relationship between the Bondelswarts and the police, as 
well as the Bondelswarts and the white farmers, deteriorated.  The tension reached breaking point 
with the return of Abraham Morris in April 1922.  Morris embodied the fighting spirit of the 
Bondelswarts and he was given a hero’s welcome when he arrived at Guruchas.178 
 
The motive for his return to Guruchas is unsure.  The members of the Commission investigating 
the uprising had different arguments.  Dr. A.W. Roberts and Dr C.T. Loram argued that his 
intention in returning to his homeland was to rest and die there.  He was a man in his fifties, his 
wife had passed away recently and he had been away from his home for almost seventeen years.  
He was not spoiling for a fight.  The opposing argument by Gen. Lemmer states that he was 
looking for a fight.  His return was the sign that the Bondelswarts would rise again.  He would lead 
them in tearing up the treaty and in the process reclaim what was rightfully theirs.  Scores of 
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Bondelswarts apparently believed some action would follow, because they converged on Haib and 
Guruchas as soon as Morris returned.179   
 
However, his return was not kept secret.  Cristiaan notified the Location Superintendent, Noothout, 
stationed at Driehoek, who in turn notified the magistrate at Warmbad.  The information reached 
the ears of Hofmeyer, who issued instructions that Morris must be arrested and charged with the 
following offences:180 
 
a. Bringing sixteen rifles into the territory of SWA without permits. 
b. Bringing cattle over the border without a permit. 
c. Entering the territory without a permit. 
 
Sgt. Van Niekerk and Native Constable Gert Kraai were ordered on 5 May to arrest Morris on 
these charges.  Their attempt to arrest Morris was obstructed by the tribe.  It was the opinion of the 
tribe that Morris had done nothing wrong and their champion would not go to gaol.  Angry words 
were exchanged, although Van Niekerk and Kraai denied this, the Bondelswarts delivered 
testimony at the Commission of Enquiry that the following was said: "Die lood van die 
Goevernement sal nou op julle smelt."  ("The Government's lead will now melt upon you.")  The 
Bondelswarts accepted this as a declaration of war.  The word spread through the reserve of an 
impending conflict.  The Bondelswarts converged on Haib and Guruchas with their stock, 
possessions and rifles.181 
 
3.3.5 NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE BONDELSWARTS 
 
Sgt. Van Niekerk reported the incident to the magistrate, who dispatched Johannes Bezuidenhout, 
a Bondelswart, on 10 May with a message ordering Cristiaan to attend a meeting in Warmbad.  
Bezuidenhout delivered the message, but informed Cristiaan that he was not returning to 
Warmbad.  In view of the previous meeting, when four headmen were arrested, this invitation was 
met with cynicism and the order was ignored.  The magistrate telegraphed the Administrator on the 
same day he sent Bezuidenhout.  He stated the events of the attempted arrest as well as the 
movement of the Bondelswarts to Guruchas.  He requested a strong police force to deal with the 
situation.  The Administrator answered the call by sending the Commissioner of Police in South 
West Africa, Maj. C.A. van Coller, and at the same time mobilised volunteers.  The dichotomy in 
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this approach confused the Bondelswarts and made them suspicious of Hofmeyer's true 
intentions.182 
 
Hofmeyer’s duality clouded the negotiation process.  Maj. Van Coller was instructed by the 
Administrator to facilitate the arrest of Morris and four other members on related charges.  Van 
Coller called in the support of Noothout and the head of the Catholic Mission in the Bondelswarts 
Reserve, Monsignor Von Krolokowski, to facilitate the process.  Over the following ten days, 
several attempts were made to bring the Administrator and the Bondelswarts to an amiable 
agreement.  The Bondelswarts were suspicious of moving out of their reserve and feared arrests.  
Cristiaan demanded that the Administrator should come to see him in the reserve.  The 
Administrator, however, declined and sent an ultimatum on 20 May.  The ultimatum called for 
Morris and four tribesmen to hand themselves over for trial, the surrender of all arms and 
ammunition and the obstruction of officers of the law to stop, or there would be dire consequences 
for the whole tribe.183 
 
The Bondelswarts rejected the ultimatum and continued preparations for the coming conflict.  In 
the period 22 to 25 May 1922 various farms were raided for horses, supplies, rifles and 
ammunition.  These raids included the house of the Superintendent of the Bondelswarts Reserve, 
Noothout, himself.  The raids were executed at gunpoint, but nobody was injured or physically 
abused.  In a separate incident three Namas attacked and murdered Mrs. Lydia Sarah Coleman on 
the farm, Kubub, near Luderitz.  This unrelated incident only heightened white fears and anti-
Bondelswarts feelings.184 
 
3.3.6 PREPARING FOR THE CONFLICT 
 
It was important for Hofmeyer to resolve the situation quickly and quietly for various reasons.  He 
was in charge of a protectorate and had to answer to the Union of South Africa.  The Union in turn 
answered to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations.  A clash between 
Protectorate forces and an indigenous group, who they were supposed to develop and to hold in 
sacred trust, was an undesirable situation.  However, a prolonged uprising by the Bondelswarts 
constituted the danger of further uprisings by other indigenous populations of the Protectorate.  
This was even more undesirable and Hofmeyer did not wish to have to explain to Gen. Smuts why 
a general uprising had occurred.185 
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Hofmeyer was therefore reluctant to involve the Union of South Africa in the matter and 
altruistically pointed out that the Union was still reeling from the Rand strike of 1922 and that the 
settlers of the Protectorate had an opportunity to prove themselves worthy of the privileges they 
enjoyed by helping to suppress the uprising.  Aid from the Union, however, was forthcoming and 
came in the form of two De Havilland D.H. 9 aeroplanes (see Figure 3.5), two mountain guns and 
four Vickers machine-guns with the respective personnel.  Col. Sir P. van Ryneveld (see Figure 
3.6), Director Air Services, was in command of the aeroplanes.  The Protectorate forces mobilised 
and arrived at Kalkfontein South on 23 May.186  
 
 
       
 
Figure 3.5:   De Havilland, D.H. 9. (Left).187 
Figure 3.6:   Col. Sir Pierre van Ryneveld, KBE, DSO, MC. (Right).188 
 
Hofmeyer, a former Clerk of the Union House of Assembly, appointed himself commander of the 
combined force and bestowed upon himself the rank of Colonel.  It was his opinion that there was 
a lack of experienced commanders in the Protectorate and that he could not wait for the Union to 
send an able commander because quick action was called for.  However, the Union Defence Force 
did send a liaison officer with the support weapons, Maj. A.H. Prins, to assist Hofmeyer during the 
conflict.189 
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The volunteers arrived steadily at Kalkfontein South from the Gibeon, Keetmanshoop, Aroab and 
Warmbad districts and were grouped into squadrons.  The Union contingent joined the 
Protectorate force at Kalkfontein South on 26 May.190  (See Figure 3.7: Composition of the 
Protectorate Force.)  
 
Hofmeyer employed siege tactics against the Bondelswarts.  He enveloped their positions at 
Guruchas and Haib by occupying the waterholes situated at Wortel, Driehoek, Dawigabis, 
Neufontein, Auputs and Norachas.  He planned to deprive them of food and water and to cut off 
their retreat to the Orange River and the Fish River Canyon.191 
 
Unit Officers Other Ranks Total 
Headquarters 5 4 9 
A Squadron 4 103 107 
B Squadron 4 88 92 
C Squadron 4 70 74 
D Squadron 2 47 49 
Mountain Gun Section 1 13 14 
Machine Gun Section 2 15 17 
Signalling Sections  8 8 
Total 22 348 370 
 
Figure 3.7: The Composition of the Protectorate Force.192 
 
South of the Orange River, forces from the Union of South Africa prepared to intercept possible 
stragglers crossing the border.  The head of the South African Police in the Western Districts, Lt. 
Col. H.F. Trew, instructed reinforcements in the Steinkopf region to assist with border patrols.  
Smuts made it clear to Trew that the police were not allowed, under any circumstances, to cross 
the border and participate in the expedition against the Bondelswarts.  Lt. Col. A.H.M. Nussey, the 
Staff Officer of the Potchefstroom Military District, was sent with orders by the Prime Minister to 
support the police and to prepare for the possible rapid deployment of volunteers in the event that 
military intervention became necessary.193 
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3.3.7 MILITARY OPERATIONS 
 
The Bondelswarts organised their hierarchy, with Cristiaan as the hereditary chief and Morris as 
the war chief with a few vice-captains.  Each vice-captain was in charge of a commando, which 
was divided into sections.  They still had a severe shortage of arms and ammunition, but their 
raidning strategy was to ambush Protectorate soldiers and relieve them of their weapons and 
ammunition.194  During their war with the Germans, the Bondelswarts executed this tactic with 
efficiency and they were hopeful of more successes.195 
 
Morris sent Babab, also known as Klaas Isaacks, and Adam Pienaar to Driehoek and Wortel with a 
commando of 75 men to dominate the direct line of advance towards Guruchas from Kalkfontein 
South.  Morris accompanied by Beukes and a commando of 50 men, moved east towards 
Warmbad.  The intention of this move was never truly established, but it is commonly accepted that 
Morris wanted to attack and occupy the town.  Beukes later testified that their intention was to link 
up with the Warmbad Bondelswarts.  An attack on Warmbad would divide Hofmeyer's force and 
divert his concentration from the reserve.  Cristiaan and the rest of the Bondelswarts occupied the 
hilly western region of the reserve around Guruchas and Us.196 
 
Hofmeyer deployed his squadrons.  On 25 May, Capt. J.C. Balt marched with C Squadron, a 
machine gun section and a Heliographic team on Norachas, after they had disembarked from the 
train at Klein Karas.  On 26 May, Capt. Jordaan was ordered to occupy Driehoek and Wortel with D 
squadron, comprising 47 unmounted men, one machine gun and 21 mounted men.  They were 
transported with lorries and were escorted to their objective by two troops of mounted rifles, Capt. 
Du Preez and Capt. Prinsloo being in command of a troop each.197 
 
The advancing column of D Squadron narrowly missed an ambush laid by Babab at Driehoek.  
Their choice to take a higher route to avoid the soft sand, because of the vehicles, took them past 
the ambushing party, who in turn was caught off guard.  A fire-fight ensued and the Bondelswarts 
were driven off without one Protectorate rifle being captured.  The pursuit had to be called off due 
to bad light.  The advancing Protectorate force had only one fatal casualty, but the Bondelswarts 
left three wounded, nineteen killed and nine prisoners behind.  The prisoners were duly sent to 
Kalkfontein South.198 
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Upon hearing of the Bondelswarts’ reverse at Driehoek Morris immediately returned to Guruchas.  
His plan to fight on an extended front was abolished.  Their failure to acquire more weapons and 
ammunition was a serious setback for their combat power, but Morris deployed the Bondelswarts 
in and around Guruchas in defensive positions, hoping to make the Protectorate forces pay dearly 
for every inch of ground.  The Bondelswarts numbered some 1,100 people, with 600 cattle and 
8000 small stock.199 
 
The troops of Du Preez and Prinsloo returned on the night of 26 May to prepare for the advance on 
the following day.  On the next day, 27 May, A Squadron, two mountain guns, two machine-guns 
and a heliograph section accompanied Hofmeyer and the HQ personnel as they advanced towards 
Neufontein via Dawigabis.  Prinsloo and his troop provided the advance and the screens, while Du 
Preez was placed in charge of B Squadron, which covered the rear of the advancing column.  The 
HQ was established at Neufontein on 28 May.  Prinsloo received orders to advance from 
Dawigabis towards Auputs on 27 May and joined Balt's C Squadron, that had advanced from 
Norachas towards Guruchas.  Prinsloo's squadron took a direct line of advance towards Auputs, 
which took him past the waterhole Us, close to Guruchas.  Pienaar ambushed Prinsloo and his 
men near Us on 28 May, but the trap was sprung too quickly.  Prinsloo had one fatality and three 
wounded, while Pienaar was shot and killed.  The Bondelswarts were driven off and Protectorate 
forces occupied all the waterholes around Guruchas.200 
 
The Protectorate forces surrounded Guruchas and Hofmeyer attacked the stronghold on 29 May at 
15:00.  The mountain guns opened fire from a commanding position east of the objective as soon 
as the aeroplanes commenced their bombing.  Machine gun and rifle fire accompanied the aerial 
and artillery bombardment.  The aerial bombardment concentrated on enemy strong points and 
concentrated stock.  Stock was very dear to the Bondelswarts and the subsequent killing of their 
stock was a severe blow to their fighting spirit.  The aeroplanes would fly over advancing columns 
and fire ahead on their line of advance and occasionally bomb a position.  This co-ordinated air 
and ground assault afforded the advancing troops the opportunity to make excellent use of air 
cover.  The Bondelswarts bravely held their positions and continued to fire on the advancing force.  
This was not enough to stop the advance and night found the Protectorate forces between 400 m 
and 1.6 km from their objective.  At the foot of the Guruchas hills in the west, the Protectorate 
forces were holding the line in the Haib River bed, while the lower hills in the south, west and north 
were also occupied.201 
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The attack was halted for the night with the aim of commencing activities the next morning.  
Meanwhile, a cordon was established to prevent any Bondelswarts from escaping.  This was 
ineffective as a band of 30 horsemen, 30 donkey-riders and 290 men on foot escaped to the 
southeast driving a small number of stock in front of them.202 
 
The bombing was resumed at dawn on 30 May, while the Protectorate force advanced towards the 
defensive Bondelswarts positions.  The order to cease fire was issued at 09:00, when the 
Bondelswarts raised white flags indicating their surrender.  Hofmeyer's victory was short-lived 
when he realised that the prize only included 90 old males, and 700 women and children.  Prinsloo 
and 45 mounted rifles were immediately mobilised to pursue the fleeing Bondelswarts.203   
 
Balt was tasked to hold the waterholes surrounding the reserve and to sweep the area for any 
stragglers and livestock.  The stock rounded up totalled 13,970, which comprised 12,470 sheep 
and goats, 800 head of cattle and 700 donkeys.  The prisoners were escorted to Wortel, where 
arrangements were made to incarcerate them.  Hofmeyer believed the uprising had been crushed 
and sent a telegram to Smuts confirming this.  He subsequently returned to Kalkfontein South via 
Neufontein and awaited Prinsloo's report.204 
 
3.3.8 GUERRILLA TACTICS IN THE GUNGUNIB 
 
Prinsloo followed the spoor of the fleeing Bondelswarts and reported the same day that they had 
split into three groups.  The first was a group of approximately 70 men who were heading for 
Sperlingsputs, the second group comprised 130 men and were moving towards Kurniams and the 
third group consisted of 60 mounted men and 160 men on foot who were heading for Haibmund.  
Prinsloo decided to follow the last group and requested the occupation of the Swarthuk, 
Sperlingsputs and Kurnaims waterholes as well as reinforcements.205 
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The Protectorate forces moved out to occupy the waterholes and Balt sent Lt. Jordaan and 75 
mounted rifles to reinforce Prinsloo.  Lt. Eksteen, 18 men and one machine-gun were transported 
via Uhabis to Vioolsdrift to act as a cut-off group, and they were reinforced by Balt and 70 men on 
3 June.  Morris and the Bondelswarts were hampered from moving towards their traditional 
stronghold, the Fish River Canyon by the continued aerial reconnaissance.  Morris adapted his 
plan and moved into the Gungunib gorge with the aim of fighting the pursuing force with guerrilla 
tactics.206 
 
The guerrilla tactics employed by the Bondelswarts were well known to Prinsloo and he 
remembered the lessons learned by the Germans 16 years earlier.  He therefore decided not to 
meet Morris head on, but to envelope Morris by moving at night via Ramans Drift, a gorge running 
parallel to the Gungunib, stopping at Goodhouse to replenish.  Goodhouse was a farm across the 
Orange River and C. Weidner, the manager, gladly provided them with oranges, fodder and much 
needed water.  This envelopment cut Morris off from the Orange River, his southern escape route, 
preventing him from continuing his retreat.207 
 
Prinsloo expected his reinforcements to arrive on 31 May, because he was under the impression 
that Hofmeyer was camped at Neufontein in order to quickly support his force.  The move towards 
Kalkfontein South subsequently caused the reinforcements to arrive two days later than expected.  
The aeroplane ensured that Prinsloo was quickly informed of the delay, which provided him with 
the opportunity to rest his men, their mounts and to replenish their supplies until 2 June.208 
 
The pilots of the two aeroplanes, Col. Sir Van Ryneveld and Lt. Holthouse, facilitated co-ordination 
between Prinsloo and Jordaan.  They landed at Goodhouse to ascertain the battle plan from 
Prinsloo and in turn located Jordaan on 1 June before he entered the Gungunib to brief him.  The 
plan was for the two forces to move into the Gungunib Gorge209 on 2 June and crush the 
Bondelswarts between them in co-ordination with aerial support.  The attack commenced on the 
morning of 2 June.  Each attack group had a plane flying in front of them to reconnoitre and to 
engage the Bondelswarts.  The pilot and observer, Lts. Holtshouse and H. Daniel, located the 
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Bondelswarts and immediately engaged them by firing the machine gun into their midst and 
bombing them.  The attack wreaked havoc among the men and livestock, and the two Protectorate 
forces continued their advance into the Gungunib Gorge.210 
 
Morris regrouped and was informed by his scouts that the force, which had been behind them 
three days ago, was now between them and freedom, the Orange River.  He concluded that their 
only hope was for a decisive defeat of their pursuers and decided to lead Prinsloo into an ambush 
at their secret waterhole, the Bergkamer.  A group of approximately 160 Bondelswarts were not 
prepared to fight and moved down the Gungunib.  However, Prinsloo had already turned back to 
Goodhouse to regroup for the next day's advance and the Bondelswarts group skirted around the 
enemy position into the Union, where they broke into smaller groups and disappeared.211 
 
The pilots, via a letter drop, informed Jordaan that the Bondelswarts had left the Gungunib 
completely.  Jordaan continued his advance southwards along the gorge until he reached the 
Orange River and joined forces with Prinsloo.  Operations were continued the next day, 3 June.  
The Protectorate force tracked the Bondelswarts into the Haib River gorges.  Jordaan was ordered 
to bring up the rest of the force while Prinsloo and fifteen men investigated the rocky amphitheatre, 
known as Bergkamer.212 
 
Morris concealed his men in the crevices in the rocks forming the amphitheatre above the 
waterhole.  Halfway up the valley a Bondelswarts reserve force was waiting to storm the 
Protectorate force as soon as snipers had pinned them down.  The plan was to strike a decisive 
blow and to replenish their weapons, ammunition and meagre supplies.  The snipers, however, 
opened fire too soon and only pinned down a tenth of the whole force.  The main force quickly 
moved up to render support and to return the rifle fire.  Prinsloo and Jordaan managed to gain high 
ground and inflict heavy casualties during the battle.  Fifteen rifles were captured and 49 
Bondelswarts were killed in the battle, including Morris.  All their remaining cattle were left behind 
during their flight over the ridge.  Only three Protectorate soldiers were injured.213 
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The Protectorate forces retreated to the Haib valley where they spent two days resting and 
replenishing their supplies.  They set out again from Bergkamer on 6 June, following the spoor left 
by the Bondelswarts, caught up with them on 7 June in a gorge leading northwards into the plains.  
Cristiaan, who had assumed leadership of the group after Morris's death, surrendered with 150 
men and 50 rifles.  The Bondelswarts uprising was finally over.214 
 
3.3.9 THE RESULT AND THE REVIEW 
 
Cristiaan and Beukes explained in hospital to the Administrator on 9 June that Morris was solely 
responsible for the uprising.  He had incited violence against the Protectorate forces and worked 
them up to such an extent that neither Beukes nor Cristiaan could intervene.  Their explanation did 
not keep them from the courts and Cristiaan was sentenced to five years hard labour, while 
Beukes testified for the Crown and was pardoned.  The Bondelswarts were allowed to return to 
their reserve and the captured livestock was returned to them, although many of the stock had 
stampeded into the desert and were never recovered.  Action was taken to improve their economic 
plight.  Work and rations were offered, while medical assistance was given to paupers and the 
attendance of schools was encouraged.215 
 
The few casualties on the side of the Protectorate forces can be attributed to the Air Force.  Close 
co-operation between the ground and air forces ensured that the aeroplanes were effectively 
utilised.  The bombing and strafing of the Bondelswarts attributed to a loss of morale and gave 
their fighting power a great knock.  The aeroplane was unknown to the Bondelswarts and the 
psychological effect on them was tremendous.  Hofmeyer therefore requested Van Ryneveld and 
his pilots to fly over reserves in the Keetmanshoop area on 15 June as a show of force.  The aim 
was to prevent any other indigenous group attempting anything radical in the wake of the 
uprising.216 
 
Hofmeyer was criticised severely for his handling of the uprising and for appointing himself as 
commander.  Newspapers in South West Africa, South Africa and England questioned his 
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appointment and noted his lack in military experience.  The Labour Party criticised Smuts severely 
in Parliament.  The uprising, in the wake of the Rand strike, provided the Labour Party with the 
opportunity to further criticise Smuts.  Hofmeyer had acted on general guidelines and had been 
requested by Smuts to use constraint, but the leadership style of Smuts required him to shoulder 
the blame as Prime Minister.  The Native Affairs Commission was asked to investigate the whole 
affair.217  The report portrayed the sequence of events, but the result was clouded by the 
differences of opinion between Drs. Roberts and Loram and Gen. Lemmer.  The opposition 
capitalised on the report and used it against Smuts.218 
 
The British press questioned the use of force against the Bondelswarts in a mandated territory and 
went as far as to describe the event as a betrayal of the mandate trust.  Sir Edgar Walton, the 
South African representative at the League, produced the reports on the incident on 5 September 
1922.  The League Assembly passed a resolution on 20 September 1922 for the Permanent 
Mandate Commission to investigate the matter.  The uprising only received attention by the 
League Assembly on 12 May 1924, when Hofmeyer was requested to appear before the 
Permanent Mandate Commission.  Their report to the League Council stated their disapproval of 
Hofmeyer's action in combining the roles of military commander and the civil duty of Administrator.  
This removed the opportunity for the Bondelswarts to appeal to a higher authority or for an 
impartial judge to investihate the conduct of operations.  Hofmeyer’s actions were defended by 
Smuts and he remained the Administrator.219 
 
3.4. THE REHOBOTH UPRISING, 1924-1925 
 
3.4.1 THE TREATY OF PROTECTION AND FRIENDSHIP 
 
During the 18th century, descendants of white colonial men and Khoisan women established 
communities that called themselves Basters (persons of mixed blood).220  Two Baster groups 
existed.  One group eventually settled in Griqualand-East under the leadership of Adam Kok, while 
the second group moved to Rehoboth, South West Africa,221 in 1870.  The Rehoboth Basters were 
a community based on constitutional and religious beliefs, which were maintained by organised 
structures such as their elected council.  These structures provided a strong base from which they 
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executed self-administration.  However, in the late 19th century the tenure of the permanent Baster 
community on the Rehoboth land was in jeopardy due to constant attacks by Namas and 
Hereros.222 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8:  Rehoboth Reserve, 1925.223 
 
Germany proclaimed South West Africa a German Protectorate in 1884.  The Basters’ concern for 
security and protection from attacks paved the way for a Treaty of Protection and Friendship on 15 
September 1885 and a treaty relating to defence on 26 July 1895 between Germany and the 
Rehoboth Basters.  Germany accepted the responsibility of protecting the Basters in Rehoboth 
against further attacks from the Namas and the Hereros, which ensured their residence.  The 
Basters on their part provided men for military training and gave military assistance to the Germans 
during their fights against the Namas and Hereros in 1893, 1896-1897 and during the Herero 
uprisings in 1904-1906.  The Treaty, furthermore, recognised the rights and liberties of the Basters 
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in Rehoboth.  Internal matters were dealt with by the Baster Council, but disputes between the 
Basters and external parties were resolved by the German administration.224 
 
The execution of the Treaty was another matter.  German officials systematically encroached upon 
the Basters’ territory and liberties. (See Figure 3.8: Map of Rehoboth Reserve.) Tension between 
them and the German administration reached breaking point during the First World War, when the 
Basters were employed to guard prisoners-of-war.  This was in violation of the agreement that the 
Basters were not to be used against whites or that they would not be deployed outside the 
Rehoboth boundary.  The Basters protested, but the German military authorities ignored them.  
The Germans, subsequently, informed the Basters that the Treaties of 1885 and 1895 were invalid.  
Cornelius van Wyk, the leader of the Basters, made contact with Gen. L. Botha, commander of the 
Union Forces in South West Africa, in April 1915 informing him of their plight. The Germans 
declared war on the Basters during May 1915 and attacked men, women and children who were 
fleeing to Sam-Kubis, a natural fort in the form of a circle of mountains.  The Basters made final 
stand at Sam-Kubis against the Germans on 8 May and defended their position with 300 armed 
men.  The Germans attacked Sam-Kubis between sunrise and sunset, but retreated the next day 
leaving 30 Basters dead and wounded.225  
 
3.4.2 UNDER UNION MANAGEMENT 
 
The Union Defence Force did not mobilise to rescue the Basters because the Germans retreated 
from Rehoboth on 9 May 1915 and deployed to meet the Union Forces in strength.  On 9 July 
1915, the German Governor, Dr. Theodor Seitz, and Col. Victor Franke, the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Schutztruppe, surrendered to Gen. Botha at Khorab.  Martial law was instituted and the 
Basters remained in Rehoboth, working towards two goals:  they wanted to regain their former 
independence and recover the land taken from them.226 
 
Their hope of regaining independence was rekindled when Botha told Van Wyk during their 
discussion in April 1915, “that which you have, at least, you will keep”.227  The Basters expected 
the Union authority in South West Africa to allow a return to the state of affairs prior to the signing 
of the treaty of 1885.  The status of the Basters, prior to hostilities with the German government, 
was reinstated.  The Baster Council resumed their internal administrative affairs and retained their 
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Baster magistrate and other officials who dealt with legal matters, the collection of taxes and the 
granting of liquor permits.228 
 
The Baster community still hoped for full independence and continued their efforts to achieve this.  
A Member of the Union Parliament, D.W. Drew, became a staunch supporter of the Basters.  He 
eventually became a paid consultant of the Basters and participated in negotiations.  He prompted 
the Basters to seek protectorate status for Rehoboth from the British Crown, but their initial request 
in August 1917 was denied due to Britain’s involvement in the war.  Further requests were sent 
after the war, but those were continuously denied.  The Governor General, representing the British 
Crown in South Africa, Prince Arthur of Connaught, visited Rehoboth and explained to the Basters 
that their request would never be approved.  South West Africa was a mandate of the Union of 
South Africa and retained administrative and legislative powers.  The British Crown had no say 
over Rehoboth.229 
 
3.4.3 THE AGREEMENT 
 
The Administrator, G.R. Hofmeyer, submitted a draft agreement on how Rehoboth would be 
governed on 9 January 1922, after which he and the Baster Council held various rounds of 
negotiations in July 1923.  The two main issues that were discussed were the extent of their self-
governance and the issue of land.  These issues were not resolved and insignificant concessions 
were made to the Basters.  The agreement returned the affairs of the Basters, to what they had 
been when Union forces invaded the territory in 1915.  Hofmeyer’s approach was no different from 
what it had been with other tribes, such as the Bondelswarts.  The Basters only had limited 
authority over local matters and were subservient to the Administrator and his officials in legal and 
political affairs.  The boundaries remained unchanged despite the Basters’ objections.  After the 
negotiations the Council returned to Rehoboth to discuss the agreement with their community.230 
 
The community was opposed to the agreement and the issue was put to the vote on 9 August 
1923.  The Agreement was rejected by 116 votes to 43.  Drew and two council members travelled 
to Windhoek on 13 August to explain the outcome of the referendum to the Administrator who 
made it clear that the agreement had to be signed by 16 August or else it would be ratified by 
proclamation.  The Baster Council agreed to sign, but also sent a petition to the Union Parliament 
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regarding the boundary and land issues.  Proclamation No. 28 of 1923 ratified the agreement on 
28 September.231 
 
Opposition to the agreement was organised by Samuel Beukes and a letter informed the Council 
that the majority of the community did not accept it.  The festivities to celebrate the agreement 
were attended by the Council and the Administrator, but many Basters boycotted it to show their 
disapproval.  Samuel Beukes organised the opposition further and they became known as the 
Majority Party.  The Majority Party rallied the community to reject the agreement and by November 
1923 a campaign of passive resistance was instigated.  Proclamations and orders by 
Administration officials were ignored and taxes were not paid.  In the light of the repercussions 
from the Bondelswarts situation nothing was done for fear of another backlash.232 
 
The Majority Party continued to oppose the Agreement and the Council, who they saw as traitors, 
openly.  On 23 April 1924, the Majority Party organised elections for a new Council and a 
Parliamentary Council.  The Majority Party won all the seats on the Council and in the 
Parliamentary Council.  Major financial transactions were not allowed without the consent of the 
23-member Parliamentary Council.  The New Council was instated, but the old Council complained 
to the Administrator that the elections were unconstitutional.  The new Council refused to meet with 
the Administrator, who, in turn, on 5 May, issued Proclamation No. 13 of 1924.  This Proclamation 
decreed that the old Council was the elected and properly constituted authority of Rehoboth and 
that a new election was to be held on 16 June 1924.233 
 
The new Council refused to accept the Proclamation and the new elections were boycotted 
because, according to them, the Council had already been elected on 23 April.  The new Council 
pleaded their case with the League of Nations, but was informed that they had to send their petition 
via the mandatory power, the Union Government.  A delegation met with Gen. J.B.M. Hertzog, now 
the South African Prime Minister, early in August to discuss the situation.  They reiterated their 
wish for the agreement to be scrapped and for complete independence.  Hertzog stated that the 
agreement would not be scrapped and would only be amended through negotiations with the 
Administration.  He also offered a solution by suggesting that the old Council resign and that the 
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new Council provide proof, in writing, that they had the support of the majority.  The old Council did 
not resign and proof of the new Council’s majority support did not materialise.234 
 
The new Council continued to govern over Rehoboth, collecting taxes, making their own laws and 
issuing their own permits.  The state of affairs reached boiling point when the new Council issued a 
Declaration of Independence on 1 December 1924, and the old Council called on the Administrator 
to intervene.235 
 
3.4.5 PROCLAMATION 31 OF 1924 
 
On 10 December 1924, the Administration issued Proclamation No. 31 of 1924, which suspended 
the powers of the Captain and the Councils of the Basters and transferred power to the white 
magistrate, Maj. C.N. Manning.  The Proclamation was accompanied by a strong police contingent, 
which stepped up patrols in the area.  The new Council objected strongly to the increased patrols 
and petitioned the Prime Minister to redress the state of affairs.  On 16 December, they marched 
on the magistrate’s office and demanded that the police be withdrawn, dumped copies of the 
Proclamation at the office entrance and refused to abide by its conditions.  Elections were held in 
January 1925, in defiance of the Proclamation, and the new Council members were re-elected to 
their positions.  The new Council continued to rule Rehoboth as the de facto government, while the 
Administration worked on measures to curtail its influence.236 
 
Certain measures were executed by the magistrate who denied permits for various aspects linked 
to the economic structure of the Basters.  They were not allowed ammunition, to cut or export 
firewood, export stock or purchase liquor.  These actions had an adverse economic impact on the 
community.  Ammunition was needed to hunt in order to provide for those who did not own stock.  
Firewood as well as stock was sold outside the boundaries of Rehoboth to white traders.  By 
refusing to abide by the law of dipping and branding stock, no stock was allowed to leave the 
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boundaries of Rehoboth.  This measure was implemented to prevent the spread of stock disease 
and curtail stock theft.237 
 
The new Council refused to submit to the Administration and continued to rule.  They once again 
submitted a petition to the League of Nations, without consulting the Union Government, and V. 
Catastini, Chief of the Mandate Section of the League, returned the petition stating that they should 
follow the correct procedure.  The Administration contemplated taking legal action against the 
Basters.  The Basters refused to submit to the conditions of Proclamation No. 31, which provided 
the Administration with ample opportunity to prosecute the offenders.  Political considerations 
stemmed the Administration’s immediate response and it was decided that the Basters would only 
be prosecuted for contravention of the law on cattle branding.  Manning issued a notice that 
everybody in Rehoboth had to comply in terms of Proclamation No. 36 of 1921, Proclamation No. 
14 of 1923 and Proclamation No. 15 of 1923 with the regulations regarding stock branding by 1 
March 1925, or face the legal consequences.  This included the Nama and Herero tribes also living 
in Rehoboth, who hired land from the Basters to breed stock or worked for the Basters, and 
strongly supported the new Council.238 
 
This notice was totally disregarded and the magistrate issued summonses toToko Koopman, a 
member of the new Council, Piet Diergaart, the Baster magistrate, and Samuel Beukes, the leader 
of the Majority Party.  They failed to appear in court and their arrest was ordered.  The police, led 
by Sgt. H.H. Erasmus, were unable to arrest them because the community prevented them from 
entering the Council offices.  The magistrate issued warrants of arrest for Jacobus Beukes, Petrus 
Job, Jacob Beukes, Daniel Beukes, David Swart, Frederick Draghoender, Hendrik Beukes and 
Nicolaas Draghoender for obstructing the police when they were attempting to arrest Koopman, 
Diergaart and Samuel Beukes.  The new Council stated in a letter to Manning dated 28 March that 
the members would not be delivered to the court because the warrants that were issued were 
based on laws they refused to acknowledge.239 
 
3.4.5 MILITARY ACTION  
 
The Basters were on a collision course with the Administration and the new Council called for all 
the Basters, Namas and Hereros in the district to assemble at Rehoboth.  At least 600 men 
gathered to await the Administrator’s reaction.  Hofmeyer reacted in due course by sending 157 
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policemen to Rehoboth under the command of Van Coller.  They were armed with two Maxim and 
two Lewis machine-guns and arrived at Rehoboth on 1 April 1925.  Van Coller waited for the arrival 
of Col. M.J. de Jager, the Protectorate Force Commander, and the Citizen Force units from the 
Aroab, Bethanie, Gibeon, Keetmanshoop, Maltahöhe, Okahandja, Warmbad, Windhoek and 
Rehoboth districts, which were mobilised the same day.  Proclamation No.9 of 1925 instituted 
Martial law on 3 April in Rehoboth and the surrounding districts.240 
 
The mobilisation of the Citizen Force was hampered by a shortage of horses and coal as well as 
flooding the railway lines after the summer rains.  However, on 4 April 1925, within 72 hours, the 
Citizen Force of 36 Officers, 428 NCOs and troops of which only 108 were mounted, were in a 
staging area close to Rehoboth.  The Union Defence Force supported the Administration by 
sending Air Force elements under the command of Van Ryneveld, which comprised three De 
Havilland aeroplanes and support personnel.241 
 
Col. De Jager deployed his 621 men and surrounded the town of Rehoboth by first light on 5 April.  
Lt. Col. L. Rautenbach led A Squadron and deployed in the ridges west of the town.  Capt. J. Balt 
and B Squadron deployed east of the Town and C Squadron under the command of Capt. J.J. 
Smith was deployed as a cut-off group to prevent escape.  The police were on standby for 
deployment in the town.  The new Council received an ultimatum at 07:00, which demanded the 
unconditional surrender of everybody, the handing over of weapons and those Basters for whom 
warrants of arrest had been issued.  The deadline was 08:00 and De Jager warned the new 
Council that he would use violence, if necessary, if they did not conform to the ultimatum.  De 
Jager also requested them to remove all the non-combatants, women and children, to the north of 
the town to ensure their safety.242 
 
The new Council requested an extension until 12:00 the next day, but De Jager refused.  The new 
Council sent a second message to De Jager, in which they indicated their refusal to adhere to the 
ultimatum.  The Air Force was given the signal to take off and to start circling the town at 08:00, the 
time of the deadline.  Lt. Uys and his police contingent moved through the town towards the 
Council offices to execute the warrants of arrest.  Uys handed the names to Jacobus Beukes, who, 
in turn, refused to deliver the men.  Uys gave them five minutes to deliver the men and when they 
still refused he ordered a charge on the Council offices.  Everybody who stood in their way, 
including women, were removed and the men were arrested.  The police rounded up the Basters 
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with support from the aeroplanes, which did not fire a shot during their deployment.  The planes 
provided the psychological edge by making diving sorties over the town, while the police arrested 
632 members of the community.  (See Figure 3.9: Police Guarding Baster Prisoners.) The uprising 
was suppressed within an hour and without the loss of life.  De Jager ordered by right of martial 
law that all weapons, ammunition and explosives be surrendered.  The police confiscated 177 rifles 
and various clubs and sticks.243 
 
De Jager attributed the prevention of loss of life mainly to the use of aeroplanes, which scared the 
community and distracted them from focussing on the land force that was moving in.  He further 
indicated that rapid mobilisation, the concentration of force, well-executed orders and the show of 
force had also contributed to a quick and successful suppression of the uprising.  B and C 
Squadrons of the Citizen Force returned to their districts on 6 April.  A Squadron and 100 
policemen demobilised on 8 and 10 April respectively.  The remaining police force patrolled the 
area until 22 April and by 30 April the local police force was once again in charge of the area.  
Martial law was lifted on 11 May 1925.244 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9:  Police Guarding Baster Prisoners, 5 April 1925.245 
 
Hofmeyer received permission to use the Air Force for “show of force” demonstrations on 1 April 
1925, as was done in 1922 after the Bondelswarts uprising.  Bombing of targets and subsequent 
use of high explosive charges supplemented the air shows.  The air shows were presented at 
                                                
243  SANDFA, CGS 42, 7/62, Aeroplanes for Rehoboth Friction in South West Africa, 1925, Letter 
2/1925, Chief of General Staff - Imperial General Staff, 19 August 1925, pp.1, 8-9; G.J.J. 
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Suidwes-Afrika en Suid-Afrika, pp.206-208; P. Pearson: History and Social Structure of the 
Rehoboth Baster Community of Namibia, pp. 196-199. 
244  G.J.J. Oosthuizen: Die Rehoboth-Basters Binne die Konteks van die Staatkundige Verhoudinge 
tussen Suidwes-Afrika en Suid-Afrika, pp.209-210. 
245  G.J.J. Oosthuizen: Die Rehoboth-Basters Binne die Konteks van die Staatkundige Verhoudinge 
tussen Suidwes-Afrika en Suid-Afrika, p.210. 
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Otjiworongo, Tsumeb, Ondonga, Namatoni, Ovitot Reserve, Windhoek, Schiethof, Vaalgras 
Reserve and Keetmanshoop.  The local tribes were intimidated by the air shows and feared the 
use of aeroplanes against them.  However, the air shows gave away the element of surprise, but, 
since the tribes lacked an adequate military response to neutralise the aeroplane, the areas 
remained free of uprisings.  The Air Force element returned to Pretoria on 24 April 1925.246 
 
3.4.6 THE AFTERMATH 
 
The group of 632 arrested at Rehoboth consisted of 289 Basters, 218 Hereros, 75 Namas and 50 
Damaras.  A group of 226 was set free, but the remaining 406 appeared before the Windhoek 
magistrate, A.R. Wilmot, in the Rehoboth magistrate’s court between 7 and 9 April.  Manning was 
not allowed to preside over the cases, because he had to deliver testimony.  Judgement was 
passed and those found guilty were sentenced from between £30 or three months in jail to £2 and 
one month in jail.  Considering the impoverished nature of the Rehoboth few of the fines were paid; 
319 were imprisoned, of which 68 served the full sentence.  During a visit by the Prince of Wales 
on 4 May 1925, the rest of the group was released from prison as a gesture of good will.247 
 
Jacob de Villiers, a judge from the Appellate Division of the Union, was appointed to head a 
Commission of Inquiry into the uprising and submitted his report on 26 September 1926.  The 
Basters continually sent petitions to the Permanent Mandates Commission until 1932, when the 
Commission decided in favour of the Administration and indicated that the Basters did not really 
have independence and had therefore no grounds for further petitions.  It also decided that the 
Basters were not fit to rule themselves and that the Administration should take appropriate action.  
The Administration placed the management of Rehoboth under the white magistrate, who was 
advised by an Advisory Council, which consisted of three elected and three appointed Basters.  
The suppression of the revolt and the subsequent air shows were a clear indication to the rest of 
the tribes in South West Africa that recalcitrant communities would be severely dealt with.248 
                                                
246  SANDFA, CGS 42, 7/62, Aeroplanes for Rehoboth Friction in South West Africa, 1925, Letter 
2/1925, Chief of General Staff - Imperial General Staff, 19 August 1925, p.9; G.J.J. Oosthuizen: Die 
Rehoboth-Basters Binne die Konteks van die Staatkundige Verhoudinge tussen Suidwes-Afrika en 
Suid-Afrika, pp.210-211. 
247  T. Emmet: Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, pp.160-162; G.J.J. 
Oosthuizen: Die Rehoboth-Basters Binne die Konteks van die Staatkundige Verhoudinge tussen 
Suidwes-Afrika en Suid-Afrika, pp.210-212; R.G. Britz, et al: A Concise History of the Rehoboth 
Basters until 1990, p.36; P. Pearson: History and Social Structure of the Rehoboth Baster 
Community of Namibia, pp.199-200. 
248  I. Goldblatt: History of South West Africa from the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century, 
pp.223-224; T. Emmet: Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, pp.160-
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3.5. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST CHIEF IPUMBU OF THE UKUAMBI TRIBE, 1932 
 
3.5.1 THE ACTIONS OF CHIEF IPUMBU 
 
Apart from the trouble with the Bondelswarts and the Rehoboth Basters, the Administration had to 
deal with Chief Ipumbu who continuously disregarded its authority.  Chief Ipumbu of the Ukuambi 
tribe in Ovamboland was not convinced by the Administration’s show of force.  He defied the 
authorities and launched a raid against the Ukuanyama tribe in November 1921.  Subsequent talks 
with the Chief failed and Hofmeyer fined Chief Ipumbu 20 head of cattle for his offence.  Chief 
Ipumbu’s modus operandi was to promise the payment, then always have excuses why he could 
not pay by the time of the deadline.  Chief Ipumbu was sent an ultimatum in June 1923 to pay the 
fine and to surrender his arms and ammunition.  He reluctantly paid only 10 head of cattle and 
refused to surrender his arms and ammunition.  This set the stage for a punitive expedition against 
Chief Ipumbu, but in the light of the Bondelswarts debacle and the cost of a ground force no 
military action was taken.  Further negotiations were held and the Chief eventually paid the 
remaining 10 head of cattle on 27 November 1923.249 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10: The Strength of the Various Tribes in Ovamboland.250  
 
                                                
249  SANDFA, GG 289, 4/300, South West Africa, General Insurrection of Native Chief Ipumbu, Report 
by Administrator to Governor-General, 2 September 1932, pp.1-6; P. Pearson: History and Social 
Structure of the Rehoboth Baster Community of Namibia, p.170. 
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West Africa, General Insurrection of Native Chief Ipumbu, Report by Administrator to Governor-
General, 2 September 1932, p.1. 
Ondonga 65,000 
Ukunyama 55,000 
Ukuambi 8,000 
Ongandjera 6,600 
Ukualuthi 6,100 
Ombalantu 5,100 
Onkolonkathi 1,200 
Eunda 600 
Total: 147,600 
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Figure 3.11:  Boundaries of Ovamboland Tribes.251 
                                                
251  SANDFA, CGS 63/1, Native Tribe, Ovamboland, 1932; Lt. Col. J.J. Jacobs, Department Military 
Geography, Faculty Military Science, US, is recognised for processing the original map. 
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The rest of the tribes in Ovamboland watched the debacle with great interest. The population of 
Ovamboland was estimated at about 150,000. (See Figure 3.10: Strength of the Various Tribes 
and Figure 3.11: Boundaries of Ovamboland Tribes.)  All the tribal leaders in Ovamboland, except 
Ipumbu, accepted the Administration’s authority.  It was in the best interest of the Administration to 
appear strong in the eyes of the tribal leaders and leading headmen to ensure obedience.  Chief 
Ipumbu, however, did not openly oppose the Administration after he had paid the fine in 1923.  His 
reign over his tribe continued and was characterised by tyranny and forced obedience.252 
 
The chief of an Ovambo tribe was the ultimate authority and he ruled autocratically.  Custom forbid 
any member to question his rule and Chief Ipumbu exercised this authority with zeal.  He also 
overstepped the legal boundaries and executed members without trial.  The Finnish missionaries in 
Ovamboland complained of his actions and the neighbouring tribes severed ties with the Ukuambi.  
Several Ukuambi headmen left to reside with other tribes, but Chief Ipumbu continued to harass 
the missionaries and their converts.253 
 
In July 1931 Chief Ipumbu ordered that Christian girls from his tribe be brought to him to participate 
in rites practised on the attainment of puberty.  Some of the Christian girls discovered his intent to 
violate them and escaped capture.  They sought sanctuary at the Finnish Mission, which Rev. Aho, 
head of the mission, provided.  The relationship between the Mission and Chief Ipumbu was poor 
at the best of times and was further exacerbated by this turn of events.  Revs. Aho and Liljebad 
were occasionally shot at, but purposely missed.  An indigenous teacher from the mission was also 
assaulted as the harassment continued.  The Native Commissioner, Capt. C.H.L. Hahn, warned 
Chief Ipumbu to put an end to his misconduct, whereby the Chief solemnly promised that it would 
never happen again.254 
 
Ipumbu’s promise was short-lived and trouble between the Mission and the Chief erupted again on 
30 December 1931.  Chief Ipumbu intended to take one of his own daughters, Nekulu, as a wife.  
This was forbidden by tribal custom, but the Chief was adamant and pursued the union.  Nekulu 
escaped to the Mission where she received sanctuary.  This entitled Nekulu to stay at the Mission 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
252  SANDFA CGS(1) 43, DAS 7/13/1, Operations, Campaign and Stores in South West Africa, July 
1932, Report by Col. Sir P. van Ryneveld, 15 December 1932, p.2; SANDFA, GG 289, 4/300, South 
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253  SANDFA, GG 289, 4/300, South West Africa, General Insurrection of Native Chief Ipumbu, Report 
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7/13/1, Operations, Campaign and Stores in South West Africa, July 1932, Report by Col. Sir P. van 
Ryneveld, 15 December 1932, p.4. 
254  SANDFA, GG 289, 4/300, South West Africa, General Insurrection of Native Chief Ipumbu, Report 
by Administrator to Governor-General, 2 September 1932, p.12; SANDFA, CGS(1) 43, DAS 7/13/1, 
Operations, Campaign and Stores in South West Africa, July 1932, Report by Col. Sir P. van 
Ryneveld, 15 December 1932, p.5. 
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as long as the patron of sanctuary, Rev. Aho, occupied the Mission.  Chief Ipumbu disregarded the 
custom and demanded the return of the girl, which was refused.  Chief Ipumbu and 300 men 
armed with breech-loading rifles searched the Mission without success.  They withdrew from the 
Mission, butmaintained a cordon.  Rifles and arrows were randomly fired at the Mission and its 
inhabitants.  Nekulu was smuggled into a motorcar and was removed to Onandjokue, a Finnish 
Mission near Ondonga.  Chief Ipumbu returned to his kraal after a thorough search of the Mission 
failed to deliver his intended bride.255 
 
3.5.2 PAYMENT DUE 
 
As a result of these events, A.J. Werth, the SWA Administrator, decided to fine Chief Ipumbu 10 
head of cattle and requested an aircraft and a tank to assist his officials in enforcing their authority.  
He argued that a ground force would be too costly and would inevitably lead to bloodshed.  He was 
of the opinion that a demonstration would be sufficient to cow the Chief into paying the fine without 
any bloodshed.  No tank was available, but Van Ryneveld, 24 men and three Westland Wapiti256 
aircraft were dispatched from Pretoria. (See Figure 3.12: Westland Wapiti.)  A special train with 
supplies for the Air Force left on 21 July and the aircraft took off on 23 July.  The aircraft arrived in 
Windhoek on the evening of 23 July and a conference was immediately held with Van Ryneveld 
attending.257 
 
Hahn was instructed on 24 July to relay to Chief Ipumbu that his initial fine of 10 head of cattle had 
been increased with an additional 40 head of cattle.  He had to pay a total of 50 head of cattle for 
contempt of authority and non-compliance.  If the Chief did not pay the fine, Hahn was to inform 
him that he should surrender himself to the Administration to be dealt with in accordance with 
Section 1 of the Native Administration Proclamation No. 15 of 1928.  If he failed to comply he 
would ipso facto be deposed as Chief of the Ukuambi.  This message would be delivered under air 
cover to indicate the Administration’s willingness to carry out the threat.258 
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Figure 3.12:  A Westland Wapiti.259 
 
On 27 July, Hahn informed Chief Ipumbu, who listened attentively, of the newly imposed fine.  He 
made numerous excuses for not paying the initial fine in time and committed himself to paying the 
50 head of cattle on 1 August.  The payment was not made and Hahn sent three messengers to 
the Chief to deliver an ultimatum that he surrender at Mtswi on 3 August.  Under customary law the 
Chief was not allowed to leave the boundary of his tribal lands.  Mtswi was just inside Chief 
Ipumbu’s tribal land close to the boundary.  Hahn was awaiting Impumbu’s surrender, with the 
aeroplanes providing air cover, when he received a message from Ipumbu requesting him to be at 
a location about 13 km from the Chief’s kraal at 15:30.260  
 
Hahn moved to the new location, but instead of the Chief, 60 armed men awaited him as well as a 
total of 200 tribesmen hiding in the surrounding bush.  He was requested to enter the kraal, but 
Hahn declined for fear of treachery and his own safety.  Chief Ipumbu did not meet with Hahn.  
Hahn proceeded to give the armed detail of 60 Ukuambi a bombing demonstration and ordered 
them to inform Chief Ipumbu of their observations.  Hahn returned to Otjiwarongo to brief the 
Administrator.261 
 
                                                
259  Anon: ‘Pictures of Westland Wapitis, from the album of C.H. Harrison RAF’, 
http://www.ivyandmartin.demon.co.uk/v_wapiti.htm, n.d., (10 July 2004). 
260  SANDFA, GG 289, 4/300, South West Africa, General Insurrection of Native Chief Ipumbu, Report 
by Administrator to Governor-General, 2 September 1932, pp.18-19; SANDFA, CGS(1) 43, 23, 
Native Trouble Ovamboland 1932, Telegram Administrator to Prime Minister, 28 July 1932, p.1; 
SANDFA, CGS(1) 43, DAS 7/13/1, Operations, Campaign and Stores in South West Africa, July 
1932, Report by Col. Sir P. van Ryneveld, 15 December 1932, pp.7-10. 
261  SANDFA, CGS(1) 43, DAS 7/13/1, Operations, Campaign and Stores in South West Africa, July 
1932, Report by Col. Sir P. van Ryneveld, 15 December 1932, pp.10-12; SANDFA, GG 289, 4/300, 
South West Africa, General Insurrection of Native Chief Ipumbu, Report by Administrator to 
Governor-General, 2 September 1932, pp.19-20; SANDFA, CGS(1) 43, 23, Native Trouble 
Ovamboland 1932, Telegram Administrator to Prime Minister, 4 August 1932, p.1. 
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Werth, Van Ryneveld, Van Coller and Hahn met on 5 August to discuss further steps against Chief 
Ipumbu.  The Chief was seen as the central figure in the situation.  The removal of Ipumbu as chief 
would eradicate the problems facing the Administration in Ovamboland.  He had failed to accept 
the Administration’s authority, he had taken rifles from older men and given them to younger, 
reliable men, removed all the women and children, stationed picket lines around his kraal and had 
clear intentions of meeting any action with force.262 
 
Three options on how to remove Chief Ipumbu by force were considered.  The first option was to 
launch a surgical air strike and kill Ipumbu.  The second option was to use the air strike to kill him 
and his bodyguards and the third option was to discredit Ipumbu in the eyes of his tribe.  To 
facilitate this, he had to be frightened of losing his tribal land and his kraal had to be occupied and 
destroyed.  Tribal custom would ensure that this was seen as a defeat for Ipumbu.  The third option 
was decided on because it held the best chance of settling the dispute without bloodshed, which 
suited the Prime Minister, Gen. Hertzog.  In order to execute an occupation of the kraal two 
armoured cars were requested on 5 August.263 
 
3.5.3 THE ASSAULT ON IPUMBU’S KRAAL 
 
The military objective of the operation was to ensure the surrender or capture of Chief Ipumbu.  
Hahn’s intelligence network confirmed that the majority of the tribe of 8,000 would welcome the 
intervention, but a small following of 300 men would probably support Chief Ipumbu.  Hahn was 
instructed to try once more to settle the dispute, with the added request that the Ukuambi be 
disarmed.  When the message was given to Chief Ipumbu he sent an evasive reply and did not 
take the matter seriously.  He was duly informed that he had disobeyed the Administration long 
enough and that he was no longer the recognized Chief of the Ukuambi.  He had to surrender 
immediately or else action would be taken to secure him dead or alive.  Aerial reconnaissance 
continued while the Administration waited for the armoured cars to arrive.264 
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Two Crossley armoured cars265 with a crew of five men left Pretoria on 8 August under the 
command of Lt. J.B. Kriegler.  They arrived in Windhoek on 11 August and acquired a six-wheeler 
Thornycroft truck to assist their advance towards Ovamboland.  The journey of 440 km was mostly 
sand and the armoured cars struggled to advance.  The front wheels were solid and narrow and 
due to the weight of the car, sank into the soft sand repeatedly.  One armoured car was left at 
Otjiwarongo with a broken water pipe, while the second car continued its demanding journey north.  
It eventually arrived at the staging area near Ondonga on 14 August and preparations were made 
for the upcoming assault.266 
 
Kriegler was flown over the target area immediately after his arrival to show him his line of advance 
and rendezvous point near the kraal.  Hundreds of pamphlets were dropped over the kraal while 
the last reconnaissance flight was taking place.  The pamphlet read: “Ipumbu was instructed by the 
Government to surrender himself.  He has not done so.  He is no longer Chief of Ukuambi. 
Tomorrow (Monday) his kraal will be destroyed.  Everybody is warned to keep away.”  The 
pamphlets were picked up and read by the inhabitants of the kraal.267 
 
The Air Force and the armoured car had to work closely together and a code of signals was 
prepared.  The system of communication included the following: 
 
a. the use of the Popham Panel, which consisted of a series of white canvas strips, 
put out on the ground to spell out a prearranged code to the pilot and observer; 
b. message dropping by the aeroplane; 
c. message pick-up by the aeroplane.  (The message would be placed in a small 
canvas wrapping attached to a piece of string 7.5 m long.  The string would be 
placed on two 2 – 2.4 m poles.  The aeroplane was equipped with a hook or a 
weight attached to a string, which would catch onto the message wire as the pilot 
flew over.  The observer would then pull up the message); and  
d. wireless telephone between aircraft and armoured car.268 
 
On the morning of 15 August at 09:00 the armoured car with Hahn, Kriegler and the rest of the 
ground crew waited for the aeroplanes to commence bombing.  Warriors around the kraal moved 
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off as soon as the bombing commenced and the kraal was deserted.  The end of the bombing was 
the signal for Kriegler to debus from the armoured car and to set the kraal on fire.  This was 
hampered by a sudden attack of bees, which had been disturbed by the bombing.  Very pistols 
were fired to smoke out the bees and eventually the kraal was set on fire.  The perimeter was 
secured and large quantities of ammunition were found around the kraal where it had been left by 
the armed men when they departed.269 
 
The ground force quickly ascertained that Chief Ipumbu had left early that morning with twenty 
men and gone to one of his cattle kraals, Mevethia, some 13 km from the main kraal.  He left with 
orders that the men should stay until he returned.  Upon hearing the news the aeroplanes 
immediately took off for a follow-up operation with Hahn as observer to identify the kraal.  Chief 
Ipumbu heard the aeroplanes approach and escaped into the bush towards the Portuguese border 
(Angola).270  The aeroplanes proceeded to bomb the kraal and killed 50 head of cattle owned by 
Chief Ipumbu.  This was deemed appropriate as this was equivalent to the fine that had not yet 
been paid.  The aeroplanes returned to Ondonga, but the armoured car took up a defensive 
position outside the main kraal.271 
 
3.5.4 MEETINGS WITH THE UKUAMBI 
 
Members of the Ukuambi tribe returned to the main kraal the day after the bombing.  Van Ryneveld 
and Hahn addressed influential members of the tribe and informed them that their quarrel was with 
Ipumbu and not with the Ukuambi.  They were to surrender their weapons and ammunition and call 
a tribal meeting for Friday, 19 August.  Rifles and ammunition were surrendered during the course 
of the week and by Friday 500 rifles had been handed in. (See Figure 3.13:  Weapons Handed In.) 
The tribal meeting was attended by 1,300 adult male Ukuambi members and Van Ryneveld and 
Smit, the Secretary for South West Africa, addressed them.272 
 
Van Ryneveld explained the military aspect of the past events and Smit explained the 
Administration’s future policy.  In the light of the trouble with Ipumbu no successor would be 
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appointed.  The Union continued to implement a divide and rule policy in Ovamboland.  The 
Ukuambi would be governed by the system successfully used by the Ukuanyama.  This entailed 
that the tribal area would be split into areas where a headman, approved and appointed by the 
Administration, would be in charge.  The headmen would be obeyed, but the final authority would 
rest with the Administration’s representative, the Native Commissioner, Hahn.  The system was 
instantly accepted by the tribe and implemented in due course.273 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13:  Weapons Handed in by the Ukuambi Tribe.274  
 
A few days later news reached Van Ryneveld and Hahn that Ipumbu had been refused entrance 
into Angola.  He was wandering around in the Ukanyama territory when trackers caught up with 
him.  He was arrested and flown to Ondonga on 22 August where he was placed in custody.  Tribal 
custom prevailed and Ipumbu had deposed himself from his chieftainship by leaving his tribal 
boundaries.  Thus the troublesome Ipumbu was deposed as chief without bloodshed and removed 
to the Okawangu River.275 
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The armoured car returned to Pretoria on 23 August and the aeroplanes on 29 August.  The 
aeroplanes were utilised to visit all the tribal leaders in Ovamboland.  These visits, under friendly 
conditions, were used to underline the Administration’s position of power and to confirm their 
authority.  The aeroplane, a powerful military and political resource, ensured this authority.276 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE SUPPRESSION OF AFRIKANER UNREST  
 
4.1 THE BELEAGUERED AFRIKANER  
 
In all walks of life the Afrikaner of the early twentieth century felt beleaguered.  The end of the 
Second Anglo-Boer War in 1902 stripped the two Boer Republics, Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek 
(ZAR) and the Republic of the Orange Free State (OFS) of independence.  The High 
Commissioner of South Africa, Lord Milner, aimed to “knock the bottom out of the great Afrikaner 
nation”.277  Anglicising the schools was one of the methods used.  No Afrikaans was allowed in 
Government schools, except for three hours a week with an additional two hours for religious 
practices.  The Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, applauded the strategy and supported 
Milner wholeheartedly.  These overt attempts at suppressing the language and culture of the 
Afrikaner and make them British subjects fostered resentment for the British culture.  In due course 
the Dutch Reformed Church established their own schools and by 1906, 200 Afrikaans schools 
were active in the Transvaal and Free State.  By 1903, Chamberlain saw the Dutch Reformed 
Church as an astute adversary.  The establishment on the Union of South Africa in 1910 curbed 
the overt Anglicising, but social and economic hardships still plagued the urbanised Afrikaner.278 
 
After unification, British supremacy was forced on non-English-speaking South Africans in the 
cultural, administrative, social and economic arenas.  English-speaking employers and employees 
dominated the urban sector.  Trade unions who supplied mining, commerce and industry with 
labour executed a closed-shop principle and prevented semi-skilled white workers and unskilled 
blacks from obtaining employment.  Afrikaners who moved to the cities were generally uneducated 
and could only be employed as semi-skilled labour.  Afrikaners had little experience in dealing with 
trade unions at that time and hardly any urban relatives to help them find employment.  They were 
inevitably excluded from the formal job market and subsequently became poor whites.279   
 
The attempts to Anglicise them and their poor economic state had two distinct effects on the 
Afrikaner community.  Firstly, they resentment British imperialism and secondly, it stimulated 
initiatives towards Afrikaner identity and unity.  The subservient position of the Afrikaner struck a 
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blow at Afrikaner identity and pride and Britain’s involvement in the First World War appeared to 
provide an opportunity to redress the situation.280 
 
4.2 THE 1914-1915 REBELLION 
 
The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 raised the question of South Africa’s involvement.  
The Union of South Africa had been a dominion of the British Empire since 1910 and was therefore 
obliged to support Britain.  Gen. L. Botha argued that South Africa must take the initiative in 
Southern Africa or else face the embarrassment of Australia and New Zealand fighting the war for 
them.  Gen. Botha informed Britain on 4 August 1914, the same day that Britain sent an ultimatum 
to Germany, that South Africa would take responsibility for its own protection if the British forces 
deployed within South Africa were needed elsewhere.  Botha’s suggestion was gratefully accepted 
with an additional request for the Union Defence Force to invade and occupy German South West 
Africa to deny the Germans the use of its harbours and the strong radio transmitters in that 
territory.  The Union Parliament voted in favour of participation in September 1914 and 
preparations for the invasion of German South West Africa began.281  This decision caused the 
largest and politically most sensitive internal uprising against the Union government in the period 
1912-1945.  It not only polarised the Afrikaans and English speakers, but also caused a significant 
rift between Afrikaners.   
 
4.2.1 THE CAUSES OF THE REBELLION 
 
Elements within the Afrikaner community, especially veterans and victims of the Second Anglo-
Boer War, opposed participation.  The defeat of the Boer forces at the hand of the British during 
the Second Anglo-Boer War and the Anglicising that followed was still deeply resented by many 
Afrikaners at the time of the First World War.  The War, focussing Britain’s attention on Europe, 
seemed to provide elements amongst the Afrikaner Nationalists with the opportunity to reclaim 
independence from Britain by proclaiming independent Republics, and dispose of the mantle of 
dominion, including the overthrow of an out-of-touch Union Government.  These sentiments can be 
traced back to 1902 with the surrendering of the Boer forces at Vereeniging, when prominent 
Anglo-Boer War veterans still harboured hopes for a restoration of the Republics.282  
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These Anglo-Boer War veterans, who became the leaders of the Rebellion, also served in 
prominent positions in the UDF, and included Brig. Gen. C.F. Beyers (Commandant General of the 
Active Citizen Force), Lt. Col. S.G. Maritz (District Staff Officer in charge of the Northern Cape 
Territory bordering German South West Africa), Maj. J.C.G. Kemp (District Staff Officer of the 
Western Transvaal) and Capt. J.J. (Jopie) Fourie.  All the members, except Jopie Fourie, resigned 
their commissions in the UDF before the Rebellion.  Famous guerrilla leader of the Anglo-Boer 
War, Gen. C.R. de Wet, was also part of the leadership, while Beyers also consulted the equally 
prominent Gen. J.H. de la Rey, who was a senator and respected member of the Boer community,  
on the issue of the Rebellion.  Neither De Wet nor De la Rey were members of the UDF at the 
time, however.283 
 
Most of the Rebels were poor white Afrikaners (bywoners) who participated with the aim of 
restoring a disappearing culture and lifestyle.  Many white, uneducated, illiterate, subsistence 
farmers were pushed off their land and replaced by commercial farmers who could sustain a 
growing urban and industrial sector.  Widespread poverty amongst Afrikaners made them 
susceptible to the wave of republicanism and the hope of restoring the Afrikaner to a position of 
prominence.  This ideal was closely followed by sympathy for Germany, who they saw as an ally 
against the enemy, Britain.   German ancestry amongst the Afrikaners, and sympathy from Berlin 
during the Second Anglo-Boer War, were remembered when the call came to resist a South 
African invasion on behalf of Britain, into German South West Africa.  Some Afrikaner workers also 
still remembered the Government’s suppression of the 1913-1914 strike and felt alienated.284 
 
Tensions were strained to breaking point with the accidental killing of Gen. J.H. de la Rey on 15 
September 1914, when he and Beyers, on their way to Potchefstroom to speak with Kemp, drove 
through a police roadblock set up for the notorious Foster gang.  The death of De la Rey was a 
shock to many Afrikaners and the immediate outbreak of the Rebellion was averted.  De la Rey’s 
funeral was an emotional affair and many Afrikaners openly criticised the government and held 
Botha and Smuts responsible for his death.  In an effort to prevent political rift, Botha declared that 
only volunteers would be used in the invasion of German South West Africa.  Maritz was ordered 
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to take his men from Upington in the Northern Cape and invade German South West Africa in 
support of Brig. Gen. H.T. Lukin’s force.  Many Rebel leaders, especially Maritz, were adamant that 
they would not fight against the Germans.  In early October 1914, Maritz made contact with 
German forces in German South West Africa to discuss co-operation.  Maritz and his commando of 
over a thousand285 joined forces with the Germans on 9 October 1914.  He then sent word to the 
Government of his actions together with an ultimatum threatening an attack on Upington and 
Kakamas if he was not allowed to confer with Gens. Hertzog, De Wet, Beyers and Muller as well 
as Maj. Kemp.  The Government responded on 12 October 1914 by declaring Martial Law 
throughout the Union and calling up mostly Afrikaner citizens - to prevent further Afrikaner-English 
polarisation - to suppress the Rebellion.286 
 
4.2.2 THE OUTBREAK AND SUPPRESSION OF THE REBELLION 
 
The Rebel forces were outnumbered, ill-equipped and poorly armed compared to the Government 
forces.  Nonetheless they continued to prepare for armed resistance.  Meetings between the 
malcontents at Koppies in the Free State on 13 and 22 October finalised the Rebel plans.  Beyers 
and Kemp were to organise the Rebellion in the Transvaal and De Wet was responsible for the 
Free State.  Approximately 11,472 Afrikaners were organised into commandos to oppose the 
Government on the issue of invading German South West Africa.  The strength of the Rebel force 
was 7,123 in the Free State, 2,998 in the Transvaal and 1,252 in the Cape.  However, ineffective 
co-ordination and planning between the commandos limited their successes against the 
approximately 32,000 soldiers that Botha fielded against them.287 
 
Gen. Botha stepped in and personally assumed overall command of the UDF as Commander-in-
Chief in the field to fill the void left by Beyers’ resignation.  His preparations for the invasion of 
German South West Africa continued, while he prepared to mobilise against the Rebels.  The 
railway infrastructure was crucial to his plans and the South African Railways and Harbours (SAR 
& H) supported Botha’s efforts admirably.  Members of the SAR & H Defence Rifle Associations 
who supported the Government were used to protect railway bridges, and at the same time 
                                                                                                                                                               
Union of South Africa: Report on the Outbreak of the Rebellion and the Policy of the 
Government with Regard to its Suppression, no. 10, 2 February 1915, pp.29-30. 
285  The South African Biographical Dictionary reports that 60 of his men refused and were 
subsequently detained.  W.J. de Kock:  Suid Afrikaanse Biografiese Woordeboek, Vol. 1, p.535. 
286  T.R.H. Davenport:  ‘The South African Rebellion’, p.85-6; H. Giliomee: The Afrikaners, pp.380-382; 
Union of South Africa: Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Causes of and 
Circumstances Relating to the Recent Rebellion in South Africa, no. 46 - 1916, 5 November 
1915, pp.22-23; G.D. Scholtz:  Die Rebellie, 1914-15, p.117; B.J. Liebenberg: Botha en Smuts aan 
Bewind, 1910-1924, pp.406-407. 
287  H. Giliomee: The Afrikaners, p.382; B.J. Liebenberg: Botha en Smuts aan Bewind, 1910-1924, 
p.407; Union of South Africa: Report on the Outbreak of the Rebellion and the Policy of the 
Government with Regard to its Suppression, no. 10, 2 February 1915, pp.29-30; P.J. Furlong: 
Between Crown and Swastika.  The impact of the Radical Right on the Afrikaner Nationalist 
Movement in the Fascist Era, pp.71-73; Mahncke, J.: Cape Town Branch, Newsletter, no. 287, 
 97
provided crucial intelligence gathering services.  The allegiance of the SA Police was another 
crucial factor to Botha’s success.  The SA Police in conjunction with the Resident Magistrates were 
the eyes and ears of the Government.  Special constables were drafted to reinforce the police 
force, which totalled 11 514 at the height of the Rebellion.  Disloyal civil servants were quickly 
identified and dismissed.  The use of English speaking ACF personnel would exacerbate the rift 
between Afrikaans and English South Africans and it was politically prudent of Botha to use mostly 
Afrikaner ACF members to suppress the Rebellion.  Botha surrounded himself with people he 
could trust and set out from Pretoria to suppress the Rebellion.288 
 
 
Figure 4.1:  Rebellion in North Western Cape.289 
 
Rebel commandos were dispatched by Maritz to patrol the North Western districts of the Cape 
Province, south of the Orange River.  A commando moved towards Carnarvon and another 
commando proceeded to patrol in the direction of Calvinia.  The Rebel commando patrolling in the 
vicinity of Carnarvon encountered loyal Government forces and subsequently surrendered to them.  
The second Rebel commando was captured by Maj. P.A. Vermaas at Onderstedoorns which 
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effectively ended rebel activity in the area.  Maritz skirmished with Government scouting parties 
outside Keimoes on 22 October 1914 and was defeated, but he managed to withdraw to Kakamas.  
On 24 October, Government forces attacked the Rebel force at Kakamas and again defeated 
them.  (See Figure 4.1:  Rebellion in North Western Cape.)  The Rebels retreated in the direction 
of Schuit Drift.  The Government captured a few Rebel prisoners, but Maritz escaped into German 
territory.290 
 
The Northern Free State was a hive of activity in late October, with Gen. De Wet, Rocco de Villiers 
and Nicolas Serfontein organising Rebel commandos.  They occupied Heilbron, Hoopstad and 
Winburg, while Harrismith was raided and Kroonstad and Bethlehem were surrounded.  The 
Rebels depended on raids to replenish their stores, ammunition, horses and rifles.  Many towns 
were looted as De Wet advanced towards Doornberg.  Growing in numbers his commando totalled 
1200 mounted men by the time he reached Lindley on 7 November 1914.  Commandant F.R. 
Cronjé commanded a loyal Government commando and intercepted De Wet’s force at Doornkop.  
The skirmish was brief and Cmdt. Cronje was defeated on 9 November 1914.  Cronje’s force was 
dispersed and De Wet occupied the town of Winburg the same day.  Looting continued and on 10 
November 1914 De Wet advanced in the direction of Clocolan.  Gen. Botha arrived by train at 
Winburg on 11 November 1914 and immediately proceeded to follow De Wet’s commando with the 
loyal Transvaal commando.  Gen. Botha advanced to make contact with the Rebel force at 
Hoenderkop on the morning of 12 November 1914 in the Mushroom Valley.  Botha launched a 
three-pronged attack on the Rebel forces, catching them off guard and defeating them decisively.  
De Wet managed to escape with 2000 men and during his retreat he attacked Government forces 
at Virginia station on 16 November 1914, thereafter moving into the Vryburg district in the 
Transvaal.  Government forces, transported by motorcar, pursued De Wet and the rest of his 
followers.  This innovative step ensured that the Government forces were quickly redeployed.  This 
method of transport was quicker and needed less logistical effort than cavalry deployments at the 
time.  De Wet was eventually captured on 2 December 1914 at Waterbury in the Kuruman 
district.291   
 
Cmdt. P. Delarey Swartz with 270 men was responsible for defending the railway lines situated in 
the disaffected areas of the Transvaal.  He opened fire on Gen. Beyers at Kingswood station on 5 
November 1914 as the Rebels crossed the railway and he continued to harass them until they 
reached the Vaal River, resulting in more skirmishes and casualties.  Gen. Beyers pushed on, but 
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was attacked on 16 November 1914 at Bultfontein.  His commando scattered and he managed to 
escape with a small following in the direction of Reitz.  Field Cornet P.H. de Necker tracked down 
and attacked Gen. Beyers in the vicinity of Hoopstad on 8 December 1914.  The Rebels withdrew 
that same day to a farm on the Free State side of the Vaal River, Greylings Request, and after a 
short battle 23 Rebels surrendered.  During the battle Gen. Beyers tried to ford the Vaal River, but 
drowned in the attempt.292 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2:  Rebellion in the Northern Free State.293 
 
Botha eroded Rebel support during his campaign to suppress the Rebellion with a promise of 
amnesty to any rebel who surrendered before 21 November 1914.  Support melted away in many 
districts as 2,056 surrendered.  However, skirmishes between Government forces and the Rebels 
continued in the Pretoria, Rustenburg and Waterberg districts but one by one the Rebel 
commandos surrendered.  Capt. J.J. Fourie fought a guerrilla type war and inflicted heavy 
casualties on Government troops.  He was finally tracked down where his commando had 
entrenched themselves in a dry river bed on the farm Nooitgedacht No. 4.  On 16 December 1914, 
Government forces encircled the entrenchment and suffered heavy casualties of 12 killed and 24 
wounded before Fourie surrendered with 53 men.  Fourie was found guilty of high treason, 
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because he had failed to resign as an officer of the UDF and he was subsequently executed on 20 
December 1914.294 
 
Maritz and Kemp held out in the North Western regions of the Cape, but eventually Kemp 
surrendered on 2 February 1915 with his and Maritz’s commandos.  Maritz fled to German South 
West Africa and later to Angola.  He stayed in Angola until 1916 and in Spain and Portugal until 
1920 when he left for Berlin.  In 1923 he moved to Lourenço Marques (Maputo, Mozambique) 
where he informed the Government of his intention of returning to South Africa.  He was arrested 
at the border and tried for high treason, but he served only three months of his three year 
sentence, before he was released by the new Pact Government, which came to power after the 
1924 elections.295 
 
4.2.3 IN THE WAKE OF THE REBELLION 
 
On the side of the Rebels only 190 were killed compared to the 132 of the Government forces.  
Casualties were expected, but both the Government and the Rebels were unwilling to cause 
unnecessary bloodshed.  Government forces had strict orders from Smuts himself not to fire unless 
fired upon.  The Rebels in turn did not want to fire on people of their own race.  Some Afrikaans 
and some English people in the government camp were of the opinion that the Rebels were treated 
too softly and in cases such as the Battle of Mushroom Valley more casualties were inflicted than 
intended by the officers in charge.  The political and social ramifications of too many casualties in 
the suppression of the Rebellion would have been devastating to the ruling party, the Afrikaner 
community and the White population of South Africa as a whole.296   
 
Fines of up to £2000 and imprisonment of up to 7 years were handed out to only 281 of the 11,472 
participants.  The Rebels were treated with compassion after their capture in order to prevent 
further rifts within the Afrikaner community or between the Afrikaner and English communities.  The 
animosities of the Second Anglo-Boer war resurfaced and the Government did well not to make 
more martyrs during the suppression of the Rebellion.  De la Rey, Beyers and Fourie were already 
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seen as martyrs by the Afrikaner Nationalists and their deaths were suspiciously seen as 
Government plots.  This increased the hate and suspicion some Afrikaners had for Botha and 
Smuts, whom they blamed.  By the end of 1916, all those imprisoned for participating in the 
Rebellion were released in an effort to show compassion and to limit political damage, but the 
resentment against the Government, especially Botha and Smuts, remained.  They were branded 
as British puppets and traitors to the Afrikaners.297 
 
4.3 THE REVIVAL OF THE AFRIKANER CULTURE AND POLITICAL DISPARITY 
 
The survival of the Afrikaner and his heritage was a paramount concern amongst the Afrikaners in 
the period between the two World Wars.  The revival of Afrikaner culture provided a platform to 
restore Afrikaner prestige and ensure the survival of the Afrikaner.  In an effort to promote 
Afrikaner interests the Broederbond (Brotherhood) was formed in 1918.  The Broederbond initiated 
many cultural organisations and the establishment of the Federasie vir Afrikaanse 
Kultuurverenigings (FAK) (Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Organisations) in 1929 and the 
Reddingsdaadbond (Society for the Act of Rescue) in 1939 characterised their efforts.  The FAK 
stimulated interest and pride in Afrikaans literature and art, education and business interests.  The 
Reddingsdaadbond focussed on alleviating the plight of poor whites in the urban environment.  
Other societies such as the Voortrekkers (counterpart to the Girl Guides and Boy Scouts) and the 
Noodhulpliga (counterpart to St. John Ambulance Association and the Red Cross) were 
encouraged and provided an environment where Afrikaner culture could flourish.298 
 
However, the unification of the Afrikaner at a cultural level was impaired by politics.  Anti-Smuts 
sentiments were connected to the anti-British feeling and Afrikaner prominence on the political field 
was hoped for when Gen. Hertzog won the 1924 elections with the help of the Labour Party 
(known as the Pact government).  This government supported the Afrikaans language struggle, 
and it became government policy after 1924 to enforce language equality.  Equity between 
English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans on a cultural, economic and political level 
was aimed for, but with rising economic issues, brought on by the Great Depression of 1931-1933, 
little was actually achieved.  The fusion of Hertzog’s National Party with Smuts’ South African Party 
in 1934 disillusioned many nationalist Afrikaners.  D.F. Malan broke away from the National Party 
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to form the “Purified” National Party and disparity reigned amongst Afrikaners regarding political 
issues.  The discord among the political parties was felt by all Afrikaners and divided them 
accordingly.299 
 
 
Figure 4.3:  Centennial Celebration of the “Great Trek” in 1938.300 
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During this political discord the Afrikaanse Taal- en Kultuurvereniging (ATKV) (Afrikaans Language 
and Culture Society) of the South African Railways and Harbours organised the centennial 
celebration of the “Great Trek” in 1938.  (See Figure 4.3:  Centennial Celebration.) This event 
sparked a wave of patriotism and the Afrikaner’s fight against indigenous tribes and British 
imperialism was reflected upon.  The centenary celebrations brought factious elements within 
Afrikaner society together and for a short time political rivalry was put aside.  Afrikaner nationalism 
flourished and in an effort to perpetuate the spirit of the celebrations the Ossewa-Brandwag (OB) 
(Ox Wagon Sentinels) was formed on 4 February 1939.301 
 
The OB, under the leadership of a UDF officer, Col. J.C.C. Laas, aimed to unite all Afrikaners who 
had national ardour.  The OB organised Afrikaner festivals, the building of memorials, wreath 
laying at monuments, maintenance of historic sites and other traditional Afrikaner activities.  The 
FAK feared the OB’s festivals might lead to a boycott of their own efforts, but a conscious effort by 
the OB to openly support FAK events and other cultural organisations prevented this.302   
 
The aims and policies of the OB during the tenure of Col. Laas were to perpetuate the “ox wagon” 
spirit in South Africa; maintain, extend and realise the traditions and principles of the Boer Nation; 
protect and promote the religious, cultural and material concerns of the Afrikaner and to cultivate 
love for the fatherland and a national spirit; incorporate and unite all Afrikaners, men as well as 
women, who endorsed these principles and ideals and who strived towards them.  The cultural 
demeanour of the OB changed when it actively opposed South Africa’s participation in the Second 
World War.303 
 
4.4 THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
 
4.4.1 SOUTH AFRICA ENTERS THE WAR INTERNALLY DIVIDED  
 
Hertzog’s cabinet was divided on the question of the Union’s participation in the Second World 
War, but on 4 September 1939 the General Assembly voted 80 to 67 in favour of going to war.  
Hertzog (See Figure 4.4: J.B.M. Hertzog.) resigned as Prime Minister and the Governor-General, 
Sir Patrick Duncan, requested Smuts to form a new Government.  The War Cabinet of Smuts 
included Walter Madeley and Col. C.F. Stallard of the Labour and Dominion Parties, respectively, 
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as well as remnants of the Fusion Party loyal to Smuts (See Figure 4.5:  Gen J.C. Smuts.).  Malan 
stepped down as leader of the opposition in favour of Hertzog and on 9 September 1939 at 
Monument Hill outside Pretoria, they laid the foundation of the new Herenigde Nasionale Party of 
Volksparty (HNP) (Re-United National Party or People’s Party).  The HNP struggled to merge the 
ideals of Hertzog and Malan and eventually Hertzog left the party in November 1940.  Malan 
assumed leadership of the HNP while other members, such as N.C. Havenga, broke away to form 
the Afrikaner Party and Oswald Pirow established the Nuwe Orde Party (New Order Party).  
Pirow’s New Order propagated Christian Republicanism and National Socialism, but its 
membership remained small.304 
 
       
 
Figure 4.4 (Left):  Gen. J.B.M. Hertzog.  
Figure 4.5 (Right):  Gen. J.C. Smuts.  
 
The white society of South Africa was polarised on the issue of support or opposition in terms of 
participation in the war.  Support for the war was forthcoming from Smuts supporters and from 
members of the Dominion and Labour Parties.  The HNP, the Afrikaner Party, the New Order Party 
and the OB were platforms from which opposition was voiced.  They held anti-British sentiments 
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and opposed participation in yet another of Britain’s wars.  Afrikaner society was further divided 
over a militant approach vis-à-vis a parliamentary approach to oppose the war.305 
 
Fear of open rebellion and a repetition of the 1914 Rebellion prompted the War Cabinet to take 
pre-emptive measures.  Proclamation No. 201 of 1939 and the War Measures Act of 1940 (Act 13 
of 1940) were passed, which provided the Government with arbitrary powers.  Suspects and 
enemy aliens were interned, privately licensed firearms and ammunition were confiscated under 
Proclamation No. 139 of 1940, white trade union activities were suspended to prevent industrial 
unrest and general supplies were controlled. The Government thereby removed the means by 
which groups could organise themselves militarily against the Government.306   
 
Proclamation No. 20 of 1941 forbade any subversive material and instructed the Criminal 
Investigation Department of the South African Police and Military Intelligence to investigate people 
and organisations, such as the OB, suspected of subversive activities.  Proclamation No. 20 of 
1941 prohibited any civil servant from participating in, representing or being a member of any 
subversive organisation.  In March 1941 circulars in the civil sector prohibited any state employee 
from being a member of the OB as stipulated by Proclamation No. 20 of 1941.307  The OB 
honourably discharged all the members who were not allowed in the organisation under the Act, 
subsequently retaining their support.  These members flocked to the banners of secret militant 
organisations, such as the Stormjaers (Stormtroopers) or Terreurgroep (Terror Group), to continue 
their resistance.  The Proclamation provided for the suppression of subversive organisations and 
declared them illegal if they presented a danger to the defence of the Union and the Mandated 
Territory (SWA), public safety and order and the conduct of war.308 
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4.4.2 ACTIVIST ELEMENTS AND THE OSSEWA BRANDWAG  
 
Pro-German feelings were prevalent in South Africa during the 1930s and activists from this era 
won support, before and during the war, from the broader Afrikaner society as the economic, social 
and later military successes of Germany were reported.  As metioned before, the Afrikaner affinity 
for Germany stemmed from the many who had German ancestry due to Germans settling in South 
Africa from the seventeenth century.  The Afrikaners had enjoyed German sympathy during both 
Anglo-Boer Wars and many were reluctant to fight against them in the First or Second World War.  
German-Afrikaner sympathies were further cemented by sharing a common enemy, namely 
Britain.309 
 
The German-Afrikaner connectivity became prevalent when organisations propagating Nazi ideals 
were established in South Africa with the advent of Hitler’s ascension to power.  Far right “shirt” 
movements like the Greyshirts, Blackshirts and the South African Fascists were founded with a 
European anti-Semitic programme instead of the traditional anti-Black programme.  The 
Greyshirts, founded by Louis Weichardt, was the main shirt movement and various splinter shirt 
movements stemmed from it.  These movements were the South African Fascists led by J.S. von 
Moltke, the Gentile Protection League led by J.H.H. de Waal Jr., the People’s Movement led by 
H.S. Terblanche and the South African National Democratic Party or Blackshirts led by M. 
Wessels, which in turn suffered from splintering when C. Havemann broke away to form Die 
Volksbeweging (The Peoples’ Movement).310 
 
The strategic location of South Africa was a determining factor in continued German interest and 
the Auslandorganisation in Berlin, which led and coordinated all Nazi party activities overseas, 
showed particular interest in the subcontinent of Africa before and during the Second World War.  
South African intelligence sources indicated that Bruno Stiller, the Nazi Party Leader in South 
Africa, was cultivating the shirt movements and the OB.  Nazi activity in Southern Africa had two 
dimensions.  The first dimension was to create a power base among naturalized South Africans of 
German descent assimilated into the Afrikaner population and German nationals.  The second 
dimension was to promote the Nazi cause especially amongst German nationals but also among 
non-Germans.  A torrent of propaganda flooded South Africa and Patrick Furlong suggests that this 
could have influenced people with a limited educational background living in the remote rural 
areas, the youth and the poor.311 
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Figure 4.6 (Left):  Symbol of the Ossewa-Brandwag.312 
Figure 4.7 (Right):  Dr. J.F.J. van Rensburg.313 
 
German propaganda by means of pamphlets, Zeesen Radio Station and German Missions fuelled 
anti-war sentiments and the OB became a structured platform from which to oppose the war.  The 
OB developed a political character under the leadership of Hans van Rensburg as it opposed 
participation in the war and propagated republicanism. (See Figures 4.6 and 4.7:  Symbol of the 
Ossewa-Brandwag and Dr. J.H.J. van Rensburg.)  Stephen Louw argues that the rise of National-
Socialism in Nazi Germany influenced the OB only in the power of unification and that the OB was 
not a National-Socialist tool, but a populist organisation that expected only commitment in support 
against the war and for the republican ideal.  Van Rensburg was a self-proclaimed National-
Socialist (albeit not publicly) and an admirer of Hitler’s new Germany.  This became apparent after 
Herr Dieckfoff, of the German Foreign Office, wrote a letter to the South African Government 
indicating their pleasure at meeting such an important person as Van Rensburg after his visit in 
1936.  Documents captured after the war implicated Van Rensburg in actively supporting German 
spy networks and proposing to stage a coup if Germany supplied the weapons.  He suggested that 
the weapons should be offloaded in South West Africa (West Plan) or on an airstrip in Southern 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) (North Plan).  Furlong argues that the plan was aborted due to a lack of 
grass-roots supporters willing to take up arms and the OB’s growing estrangement from Malan.  
The OB’s political character brought them into direct conflict with Malan and the HNP.  The 
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Cradock Agreement between Laas and Malan stated clearly that co-operation between the HNP 
and the OB would continue with the HNP focussing on the political sphere and the OB focussing 
on the cultural sphere.  Hans van Rensburg broke the agreement and lost the support of the HNP.  
The membership of the two organisations overlapped and Malan’s distancing himself from the OB 
led to an exodus of HNP members.314 
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Figure 4.8:  Organisational structure of a Stormjaer Brigade.315 
 
The OB executed its anti-war effort through the Stormjaers.  The Stormjaers were an elite group 
within the OB organisation.  They organised among the local jukskei clubs and were responsible 
for instilling discipline in the OB ranks.  They were initially a splinter group within the OB who, 
under the leadership of Abraham Spies, was more militantly inclined.  Col. Laas supported Spies in 
organising the Stormjaers and each OB Commando had to identify members for the Stormjaers.  
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Van Rensburg reorganised the Stormjaers and gave command to S. Hofmeyer.  The OB 
Commandos in the Transvaal and the Free State were earmarked to specifically provide members 
for the Stormjaers because they were militantly inclined, whereas the rest of the provinces were 
hesitant to use these tactics.  The OB commandos in the Cape, Natal and South West Africa (now 
Namibia) were therefore not specifically targeted for membership.316 
 
Van Rensburg was the Officer Commanding of the 4th Brigade and had intimate knowledge of the 
citizen force structure.  Hans van Rensburg and Steve Hofmeyer reorganised the rank and 
structure of the new Stormjaers to be similar to the citizen force structure of the UDF.  (See Figure 
4.8: Organisational structure of a Stormjaer Brigade.)  The leader of the Stormjaers was called the 
Owerste (Chief/Head), who was appointed by and responsible to the Commandant General.  
Official contact between the OB Council and the Stormjaers was frequent in the Laas period up to 
1941.  Stephen Louw argues that official contact was limited in the Van Rensburg period, because 
the Commandant General and the Owerste excluded the Council from the various militant actions 
by the Stormjaers.317 
 
Members of the Stormjaers were men who could be counted on to be trustworthy, dependable and 
to walk through fire if required.  They took their oath during a ceremony where the candidate had a 
gun or a knife held against his chest and his back, while the following oath was read in Afrikaans: 
 
“Of my free will I promise solemnly before the ALMIGHTY GOD that 
I will IMPLICITLY subject myself to the demands which my peoples’ 
divine call require of me.  My higher authority will find me obediently 
faithful, and all commands that I receive will be carried out promptly 
and kept secret.  May the Almighty grant that I shall be prepared to 
sacrifice my life for the freedom of my people, and may the thought 
of TREASON never occur to me, knowing that I will voluntarily 
become a prey to the vengeance of a Stormjaer.  May God grant 
that I will be able to call out with my comrades: 
If I advance, follow me. 
If I retreat, shoot me. 
If I die, avenge me. 
SO HELP ME GOD!”318 
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The Stormjaers’ aims went beyond disciplining the rank and file of the OB and also concentrated 
on threatening the internal security of the state in protest against the war.  Their strategic objective 
was to pin down as many troops as possible inside the borders of South Africa.  They engaged in 
acts of sabotage, which included the cutting of telephone wires and the bombing of installations, 
shops and power pylons.  (See Figure 4.9: Sabotage.)  Julian Visser and Hendrik van Blerk 
received a commuted sentence of life imprisonment when an innocent bystander was killed during 
the bombing of the Benoni Post Office in July 1942.  The Stormjaers helped internees who 
escaped by hiding them, moving them to safe locations and giving them supplies.  They acted as 
guards at rallies to prevent unwanted elements intervening or disturbing the rally. The families of 
interned OB members were supported with money and/or supplies that were stolen by the 
Stormjaers.  They sent false letters to soldiers and their wives containing allegations of infidelity 
and openly sullied the reputation of women in the UDF.319 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9:  Sabotage by Stormjaers in Boksburg, 1940.320 
 
Berlin initiated a daring plan to topple the pro-British Government in South Africa through Robey 
Leibbrandt, a South African Springbok boxer who had become a fervent Nazi.  He was dropped on 
the Namaqualand coast in June 1941 by a yacht, the Kyloe, with orders from Nazi Germany to 
contact Van Rensburg and investigate the possibility of joint action to assassinate Smuts and bring 
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about a coup d’état in South Africa.  This plan was code named “Operation Weissdorn”.  
Leibbrandt and Van Rensburg could not come to an agreement, after which Leibbrandt started his 
own group called the National Socialist Rebels.  Van Rensburg sent word to the Minister of Interior, 
Harry Lawrence, of Leibbrandt’s plans and Liebbrandt, together with a few Stormjaers, was 
arrested on Christmas Eve 1941.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment, which was commuted.321 
(See Figures 4.10 and 4.11.) 
 
        
 
 Figure 4.10 (Left): The route of the yacht Kyloe.322  
 Figure 4.11 (Right): Robey Leibbrandt after his release.323 
 
More activist elements were prevalent, but on a smaller scale.  The Tereurgroep consisted of 30 
members led by Chris Coetzee.  They wanted to strike terror into the hearts of government 
supporters in order to undermine the war effort.  They were separate from the OB, but provided 
weapons, ammunition and explosives to the Stormjaers.324  (See Figures 4.12 and 4.13.)  The X-
group was a splinter group that broke away from the Stormjaers under the leadership of Advocate 
Pat Jerling.  Jerling and a small number of Stormjaers were dissatisfied with Van Rensburg’s 
attempts to restrain their militant activities and went their own way.325 
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Figure 4.12:  Hand Grenades made by the Tereurgroep.326 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13:  Weapons made by Tereurgroep.327 
 
The OB, Stormjaers and other activist elements were deemed a clear and present danger to the 
security of the state.  Government Proclamation No. 20 of 1941 prohibiting subversive material as 
well as banning civil servants from subversive organisations aimed at reducing the risk, but 
bombings, cutting of telephone wires and violent actions were on the rise during 1941 and 1942. 
The arrest of 150 policemen and 60 Railway policemen on suspicion of belonging to the 
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Stormjaers was followed by a wave of sabotage nationwide.  These arrests swelled the number of 
internees.328 
 
4.4.3 CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
 
Smuts called for volunteers to take the so-called “Africa Oath” to serve outside the borders of 
South Africa.  They wore red shoulder tabs to show their commitment and were known as Rooi 
Lussies (Red Tabs), but to Nationalists and anti-war supporters they were Rooi Luissies (Red 
Lice).329  The UDF was unpopular among many in the Afrikaner community due to its deployment 
against whites and in particular Afrikaners in 1913-1915 and in 1922 as well as its British 
character.  The UDF retained a strong English character and efforts to recruit more Afrikaners had 
limited success.  Friction between soldiers and civilians was ever present and in many cases came 
to blows.  The press continuously commented on these incidents and contributed to the rising 
tension in civil-military relations.  The OB also acted as an agent of agitation and was suspected of 
inflaming tensions between civilians and soldiers.  Soldiers received anonymous letters containing 
threats, while civilians were on occasion the victims of harassment.  One such incident took place 
in Piet Retief during the performance of a play.  UDF soldiers barged into the theatre, occupied the 
hall and demanded the audience sing “God Save the King” and “Die Stem”.  The soldiers left the 
hall after UDF officers from the audience asked them to leave.  Undisciplined soldiers drinking 
heavily at a hotel in Oudtshoorn also strained civil-military relations.330 
 
In Potchefstroom a military camp was established a stone’s throw away from the University of 
Potchefstroom.  Many of the students were against the war and the close proximity of soldiers 
provided them with an outlet for their frustrations.  Violent actions were expected in the light of the 
tense relations existing between soldiers and students.  A few assault cases from both parties 
were reported, but a bioscope and flag incident in Potchefstroom created a lot of hostility.  Many 
students refused to sing or stand when “God Save the King” was played in the bioscope at the end 
of a show and many even walked out, which infuriated the soldiers present.  On occasion the 
students also hoisted the old Transvaal flag, the Vierkleur, while the Union Jack was wound around 
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the bottom of the pole.  A hostile atmosphere developed and any rumour circulating was taken for 
the truth.331 
 
On 7 August 1940, two rumours circulated in the military camp.  The first rumour was of an 
artilleryman’s leg that had been deliberately broken by students and the second was that two 
signallers had been assaulted and one had died.  There was no foundation for these rumours, but 
in the tense and hostile atmosphere it provoked the soldiers into action.  Approximately 400 men 
gathered outside the camp at 18:30 and marched in column towards the student’s hall inside the 
university campus where the students were gathered.  The windows of the hall, furniture and 
bicycles on the outside were damaged as the soldiers attacked the hall and later moved on to 
attack a men’s hostel.  Officers from the military camp stopped the soldiers from doing more 
damage and ordered the troops back to the base.  During the incident 20 students and 14 soldiers 
were injured.332 
 
Antiwar sentiments amongst students led to unrest on other traditional Afrikaans university 
campuses as well.  In Pretoria the University was closed a week before the end of the semester in 
June 1940 due to threats and mounting tension between students and the public.  Fears of 
damage to University property were paramount after the unrest at Potchefstroom University in 
August 1940.  Many students who opposed the war caused mischief off campus and in one 
incident students threw ink-filled eggs at the cinema screen during the traditional singing of “God 
Save the King”.  At the University of Stellenbosch pro- and anti-war factions were intolerant of each 
other and a group of anti-war supporters decided to oppose the daily two minute silence for the war 
at noon in Cape Town on 27 July 1940.  It was the custom to stand still for two minutes and pray 
for a British victory at the firing of the noon cannon.  The Stellenbosch students openly opposed 
this custom by continuing to walk, which led to several incidents of fighting between students and 
especially soldiers in Cape Town.  The fights were broken up by the police after a short period 
without serious casualties and the students returned to Stellenbosch.333 
 
In Johannesburg some soldiers were refused entry to the Wierda Club on 3 August 1940, where 
Boeredanse (Boer dances) were being held causing a disturbance which led to all soldiers being 
banned from the premises.  Conflict arose on 10 August as soldiers once again tried to gain entry 
and the SAP had to intervene.  On 31 January 1941 a concert in the Johannesburg City Hall set 
the stage for serious confrontation between civilians, agitated by the OB, and soldiers.  A sailor 
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was denied entrance to the City Hall, where the concert was to be followed by a speech by the 
OB’s new Commandant-General, Dr. J.F.J. (Hans) van Rensburg.  This sparked off a clash 
between the soldiers in the vicinity, OB supporters controlling entrance to the Hall, and civilians on 
the street.  Sporadic fighting between anti-war and pro-war supporters followed for two days.  
Unarmed soldiers were attacked with sticks, lead piping, batons, knives and anything else that 
could be used as a weapon.   Soldiers retaliated and attacked the buildings of the anti-war 
newspapers, Die Transvaler and Die Vaderland.  The SAP and military police restored order with 
batons and teargas.  One man died of wounds caused by a baton, while 150 were hospitalised.  
The Cape Town Highlanders and the 2nd Battalion of the Transvaal Scottish suspended training to 
assist the police in restoring order in Johannesburg.  They produced a show of force by means of 
visible patrolling.334 
 
4.4.4 INTERNMENT AND THE INTERNAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE UDF TO SUPPRESS 
INTERNAL UNREST 
 
South Africa sent two divisions, 1 SA Div and 2 SA Div, to campaign in East and North Africa.  
Under the command of Maj. Gen. H.N.W. Botha, 3 SA Division remained behind for home defence 
and as a reserve to supply replacements to 1 and 2 SA Divisions.  Anti-Government actions and 
the threat of sabotage prompted the Government to utilise the UDF, SA Police, SAR & H, and 
other volunteer organisations to safeguard Government buildings and strategic civilian installations 
such as power-generating facilities and communication lines.  The training of replacements and 
volunteers for home defence as well as for garrison duties was the responsibility of 3 SA Division.  
The defence of South Africa was divided into the Inland Area and the Coastal Area.  Deployment in 
the Inland Area consisted of guard duties at the internment camps, guarding key points and 
suppressing internal unrest.335 
 
On 22 May 1940, the Imperial Light Horse, Royal Durban Light Infantry and the Rand Light Infantry 
were concentrated at Pietermaritzburg, while their second battalions were concentrated at 
Johannesburg to counter subversion.  The Cape Town Highlanders deployed a company, under 
the command of Maj. J.A. Cartwright, to Oudtshoorn in November 1940 to establish calm in the 
area after a new training camp was established.  They remained in the area for a few days, 
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guarding the aerodromes at Oudtshoorn and George, until they departed for Pollsmoor in Cape 
Town on 12 November 1940.336 
 
Men between the ages of 18 and 45 with B and C medical classifications were drafted into the First 
Reserve Brigade (FRB), which was formed on 29 February 1940.  It consisted of 12 battalions and 
was primarily responsible for guarding aerodromes throughout the Union.  The FRB was 
incorporated into the Commando National Reserve Volunteers (CNRV) on 7 April 1942 and was 
disbanded in 1943.  The CNRV was formed on 16 October 1940 along the same lines as the FRB.  
Supplementing the ranks of the home defence forces was the Special Service Battalion, formed on 
1 May 1933 and reorganised on 16 September 1939 into three battalions to form the Special 
Service Brigade.  The National Volunteer Brigade, which was formed on 1 October 1940, consisted 
of Police Reservists and Civic Guards.  The Railway and Harbour Brigade, was reformed on 1 April 
1940 after it was disbanded in 1928 and the Essential Services Protection Corps (ESPC), which 
was formed on 24 October 1939, consisted of men over the age of 45.  These volunteer units 
executed a multitude of home defence tasks.  The SAR & H and the ESPC worked in close co-
operation to guard railway property and bridges.  All the bridges over the Vaal, Klip, Pongola, 
Umtamvuna and Orange Rivers, the bridge over the Umzimkulu River between Natal and East-
Griqualand and the Telle Bridge between South Africa and Basutoland (now Lesotho) had to be 
protected.  A chronic shortage of fighting men also led to the Civilian Protective Services (CPS) 
taking over certain guard duties from the National Volunteer Brigade.  The CPS, with its 10,000-
strong Civilian Guard, resorted under the Department of the Interior and assisted local authorities 
and municipalities with the co-ordination, preparation and execution of civilian protection.  This 
enabled the National Volunteer Brigade to release more men for military training.337 
 
Women and men of colour were pressed into service to assist with home defence in an effort to 
free more white men for frontline duty.  The Cape Corps was trained as coastal artillery gunners 
and the women from the South African Woman’s Auxiliary Service (SAWAS) ensured that visiting 
troops received entertainment, hospitality and refreshments, but they were also utilised as auxiliary 
nurses, for motor transport, secretarial services, civic services, crèche and welfare services, 
hospital requisite services, canteen services and other general and specialised services.  Women 
also joined the armed forces through the South African Woman’s Auxiliary Defence Corps 
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(SAWADC) and were utilised in home defence tasks such as manning coastal batteries and 
harbour defences.338 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Map of Internment Camps.339 
 
Union citizens suspected of contravening the War Measures Act were held without trial and faced 
internment along with enemy spies and foreign nationals who were suspected of subversive acts.  
They were held at six internment camps, namely Baviaanspoort, Leeukop, Andalusia, Ganspan, 
Sonderwater and Koffiefontein during the war. (See Figure 4.14:  Internment Camps.) German and 
Italian POWs were held at Sonderwater and Koffiefontein respectively, while citizens of the Union 
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were held at the other camps.  Col. E.G. Malherbe, Director of Military Intelligence, noted in his 
biography that 6636 persons were interned during the war.340 
 
The responsibility of guarding these camps was delegated to the UDF.  Various units deployed for 
Home Defence were involved in guarding the various camps on a rotation basis.  The Cape Town 
Highlanders stopped their training at Pollsmoor and departed for guard duty on 14 November 
1940.  They came under the administrative command of 9 South African Infantry Brigade, 
commanded by Col. A.A. Hayton, and the operational command of the Directorate of Internments.  
They set up Headquarters at Sonderwater and guarded the Andalusia, Ganspan, Koffiefontein, 
Leeukop and Baviaanspoort camps until relieved on 6 January 1941.341   
 
Die Middelandse Regiment (The Midlands Regiment) and the 2nd Rand Light Infantry stopped their 
training to relieve the Cape Town Highlanders and guarded the camps at Leeukop, Ganspan, 
Andalusia and Koffiefontein from 6 January to 14 February 1941, after which they resumed their 
training.  Guard duty had a demoralising effect on the troops.  They were under the impression that 
they were an inactive unit to be used only for guard duty.  The disappointment at their apparent 
misfortune of not going to war led to many men requesting transfers to the SAAF and other active 
units.342 
 
The internment camps embittered Afrikaners, because many families had relatives in these camps.  
Advocate J.G. Strijdom compared the use of camps by Smuts to Kitchener’s concentration camps 
during the Second Anglo-Boer War.  The emotional reaction to Smuts’ internment camps was the 
same hate and embitterment experienced by Kitcheners’ concentration camps.  The conditions 
were not as appalling as those of the concentration camps at all.  Capt. G.H.F. Strydom, an 
Opposition M.P., visited Koffiefontein and found the conditions satisfactory.  However, anti-Smuts 
and anti-British feelings were inflamed and the tension between pro- and anti-war supporters was 
reaching breaking point.343 
 
4.4.5 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 
 
The first UDF Director of Intelligence, Col. B.W. Thwaites, was appointed on 25 September 1939 
and was responsible for civil security, local censorship and propaganda.  This organisation was 
known as Internal Security.  A second intelligence organisation, known as Military Intelligence, was 
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established during February 1940 in an effort to focus on more military related intelligence tasks, 
which included security of the armed forces and military intelligence.  Lt. Col. H.T. Newman was 
appointed as Deputy Director of Military Intelligence (DDMI) and he was responsible for censorship 
and propaganda in East Africa, North Africa, Italy and the Middle East when the UDF went on 
active service. (See Figure 4.15:  The Military Intelligence Structure)344 
 
Chief of General Staff
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General Operations
(Col. P. de Waal)
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Operations Military Intelligence Coastal Defence
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(Lt. Col. H.T. Newman)
Military Intelligence Military Security Military Censure 
 
 
Figure 4.15:  The Military Intelligence Structure in February 1940.345 
 
The Union Government was fighting a war on two fronts, North Africa and internally.  Thousands of 
troops were tied down guarding key points and internment camps and Directorates, such as 
Military Intelligence, were sorely pressed to provide a service for both.  South Africa lacked a well-
established counter-intelligence service to combat the internal threat from pro-Nazi, anti-British and 
right-wing Afrikaner groups such as the OB.  Proper training and especially funding were major 
obstacles, which were rectified when Smuts took over the reigns as Prime Minister, Minister of 
                                                
344  K. Fedorowich:  ‘German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence in South Africa and 
Mozambique, 1939-1944’, pp.212-213; I.J. van der Waag: A History of Military Intelligence in South 
Africa, 1912–1968, pp.11-12. 
345  M.C. van Deventer:  Die Ontwikkeling van ‘n Militere Inligtingsvermoe vir die Unieverdedigingsmag, 
p.B-1. 
 
 120
Defence and External Affairs.  Shortly after his appointment he allocated £1,250 on the defence 
budget for ‘Miscellaneous and Incidental Expenditure’ to pay for agents to collect information for 
military purposes.  Military Intelligence waged a silent war against pro-German and anti-
Government supporters as well as German spies in co-operation with Allied intelligence agencies.  
Military Intelligence staff rendered support to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the 
police.  Military Intelligence staff were obliged to pass on any information regarding subversive 
activities to the police in conjunction with their own reports submitted to higher HQ.346 
 
The sharing of information was an integral cog in the wheel of maintenance of internal security.  
There were several important reasons why military intelligence was utilised domestically.  Firstly, a 
Government at war facing internal unrest directly related to the war had to utilise all the information 
services at its disposal to gain strategic, operational and tactical knowledge internationally and 
domestically.  The use of military intelligence enabled the Government to collect information, 
process it through evaluation, collation and interpretation and then disseminate it to all relevant 
parties to be acted on.  The second reason was that without military intelligence domestic law 
enforcement would not have information about foreign activities influencing domestic situations and 
cases being investigated by the police, and, by sharing information, this was provided.  Thirdly, the 
information provided would enable pro-active measures to prevent illegal or subversive activities.  
The fourth reason was to provide law enforcement with the necessary background information 
when cases were investigated.347 
 
The collection of information was critical to form a credible intelligence picture and the intelligence 
staff worked diligently to keep tabs on many people suspected of subversive activities.  Vigilance 
committees were established in areas where German-speakers were concentrated, with the aim of 
providing a rapid system of communication between the rural areas and the central Government.  
Consisting of no less than three and no more than five people these committees performed four 
functions.  They firstly watched for espionage, sabotage and hostile action by groups.  Secondly 
they reported cases of intimidation, tampering with the indigenous population, subversive 
speeches or actions and watched for possible parachutists.  The third function was to report cases 
of hardship affecting the wives and families of those away on service, investigate the hardship and, 
where necessary, redress them.  The fourth function was to observe and report any movement or 
action that may tend to impair security.  These committees, intelligence agents and other security 
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services provided ample information, but the processing and dissemination thereof was initially 
hampered due to the lack of a central co-ordinating agency.  The Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Native Affairs, Denys Reitz, suggested an Intelligence Clearance Bureau (ICB)348 to act 
as a central reception point.349 
 
The ICB was operational by the end of 1940; under the command of Brig. H.J. Lenton, who was 
also the Controller of Censorship.  It did not interfere with the functions and responsibilities of the 
DDMI.  It provided information of military value from sources otherwise not tapped by Military 
Intelligence.  The ICB held weekly meetings with senior representatives from the SA Police, 
Railway Police, Military Intelligence, Commissioner of Immigration, Commissioner of Customs and 
the Treasury.  The ICB ensured proper dissemination of Internal Security reports and the 
maintenance of a complete set of intelligence records. It ensured proper co-ordination between 
departments, facilitated inter-departmental arrangements and submitted regulations and 
recommendations to the Minister of Interior, H.G. Lawrence.350   
 
 
 
Figure 4.16:  Military Intelligence Structure in 1943.351 
 
Prof. E.G. Malherbe headed the Army Education Scheme (Renamed Army Information Services), 
commissioned after the outbreak of hostilities, with the aim of training men to “educate” troops 
during war.  These men were known as Information Officers.  Malherbe was asked by Smuts to 
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take over the responsibilities of the Military Intelligence Directorate and was given a commission as 
Lt. Col. He was thus Director of Military Intelligence and Director of the Army Education Scheme.  
Maj. L. Marquard was his Deputy Director of the Army Education Scheme and Chief Education 
Officer.  Maj. C. Powell was his Deputy Director Military Intelligence.  Malherbe found the 
combination of an Information Officer and Intelligence Officer very useful during the campaigns.  
These men were better trained than ordinary military intelligence officers and due to their role as 
censorship officers they could gauge the morale of the troops quickly.  This made them invaluable 
to commanding officers in the field.  In August 1943, Military Intelligence was finalised with 
Information, Security and Censure sections as well as a broader intelligence capability with the 
Intelligence Corps, Education Officers, the UDF Film Unit and the Historical Records and War 
Museum.  (See Figure 4.16:  Military Intelligence Structure in 1943.)352 
 
Intelligence Officers employed inside the borders of South Africa taped council meetings of the 
Afrikaner Broederbond and many members of the Ossewa Brandwag were under constant 
surveillance.  Prof. Malherbe’s opinion of the above-mentioned organisations was that they 
presented the greatest security risk to South Africa.  It is evident from the fortnightly Intelligence 
Report that the Afrikaner Broederbond and the Ossewa-Brandwag were closely watched.  Smuts 
branded the OB a poisonous abscess during his speech at the opening of the Transvaal Congress 
of the United Party on 20 November 1940.  During this speech, he issued a warning to the OB that 
the Government would keep an eye on them and action would follow without hesitation if deemed 
necessary.  Military Intelligence diligently included reports of the OB in their fortnightly Intelligence 
Report.  Paid informants, such as Baron Otto von Strahl, worked for the Allies and provided 
valuable information about German activities in Africa.  He had been in the German diplomatic 
service since 1918 and served in Durban, South Africa, from 1936, but his anti-Nazi standpoint led 
to his dismissal in 1937.  Prisoners of War and internees had to be questioned and the morale of 
the troops in North Africa had to be upheld.  It is therefore not surprising that Intelligence 
expenditure rose considerably during the war. (See Figure 4.17: Military Intelligence 
Expenditure.)353 
 
Military Intelligence had to counter the activities of German spies, German intelligence networks in 
Mozambique and effective pro-German propaganda from Radio Zeesen.  The German deputy 
consul in Lourenço Marques (Maputo, Mozambique), Luitpold Werz, was in charge of the whole 
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German spy network in southern Africa.  He was fluent in Afrikaans, English, French and 
Portuguese, as well as acquainted with Italian.  He provided intelligence on Allied shipping from 
sources in Mozambique and South Africa.  His network was supplemented by the Italian consul, 
Umberto Campini, who had his own effective intelligence networks in Lourenço Marques and in 
South Africa.354 
 
Financial Year Expenditure 
1939-1940 £ 698-01-05 
1940-1941 £ 4 716-10-06 
1941-1942 £ 3 006-18-01 
1942-1943 £ 5 824-15-11 
1943-1944 £ 10 725-13-00 
1944-1945 £ 13 711-13-00 
 
Figure 4.17:  Military Intelligence Expenditure during the Second World War.355 
 
The Union Government subjected political opponents and suspects to imprisonment, private letters 
were confiscated and telephones were tapped.  Prisoners were detained and many suspects were 
confined without trial under the War Measures Act.  B.J. (John) Vorster, later Prime Minister of 
South Africa, was an OB-General and was interned in 1942.  Vorster’s internment was preceded 
by a confinement of three-and-a-half months in jail.  The official reasons given for his detainment 
and later internment were his position as OB General, that he was anti-British and anti-war, aided 
criminals and was seen as a serious threat to the state.  He commented on his internment by 
saying, “…I was an Afrikaner standing up for the rights of my people.”356  Vorster and many 
Afrikaners like him were rounded up by the police and questioned at leisure.  The Afrikaners who 
opposed the war loathed intelligence officers, informants and the police who investigated possible 
suspects and called them kakieridders (khaki knights).  They were regarded as traitors to the 
Afrikaner cause and thus just as bad as the Afrikaners who joined the British during the Second 
Anglo-Boer War.357 
 
Support for the Stormjaers, the Tereurgroep and other militant groups waned as Allied victories 
continued, and the end of the war in favour of the Allies also meant the end of these organisations.  
Furlong is of the opinion that the change in the war with Allied victories assisted not only Smuts’ 
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victory at the polls in 1943, but Malan’s as well.  Power balancing took place at the polls and not 
through violent revolution.  The OB was weakened when many members left after the split 
between the HNP and the OB, and ceased being a determining factor in Afrikaner politics.358 
 
The UDF overcame serious challenges and did a fine job of participating in the war and 
safeguarding internal security.  Afrikaner dissidents during the 1914-15 Rebellion and the industrial 
strike of 1922 were harshly dealt with and quickly suppressed by Smuts.  However, he changed his 
methods during the Second World War by being more lenient and less violent.  South Africa’s 
participation in the Second World War came at a price for Smuts in terms of his career in South 
African politics.  Animosity amongst Afrikaners was rife, but at the end of the war many Afrikaners 
were united in their support for Malan and the National Party (NP).  Malan provided Afrikaners with 
an alternative to Smuts, without the need to resort to violence.  Afrikaners flocked to the NP banner 
seeking political survival, economic prosperity, racial protection and cultural autonomy and the NP 
became the ruling party after their victory in the 1948 election.359 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The colonisation of the African continent by predominantly European powers instituted white 
dominance over indigenous African and Arab populations by the end of the nineteenth century.  
The technological advantage and the superior military organisation of the European settlers 
ensured military victory in the long run when it was pitted against inferior indigenous weapons and 
tactics.  Britain, France and Germany were three prominent powers participating in the colonisation 
process and resistance by local populations against their colonial governments was severely 
suppressed.  Each colonial power had its own style and theory regarding the pacification and 
policing of their colonial possessions.  The British style of policing a colony was prominent in South 
Africa, and later became entwined with the Dutch style present in South Africa before the British 
arrived.   
 
As a Dutch Colony, the indigenous population of South Africa was policed with the use of mounted 
commandos.  Britain supplied the more rigid regimental system of permanent garrison forces and 
the associated volunteer forces.  Both these styles remained prominent in South Africa and 
eventually provided the backbone of the Union Defence Force which was still to be formed.  A 
constant fear of black uprisings troubled white settler communities and the task of ensuring peace 
in the rural areas of South Africa fell upon the shoulders of the civil police, paramilitary and military 
units.  They were responsible for suppressing unrest and policing race relations, which included 
not only white and black relations, but Afrikaner and British relations as well.  The British style of 
colonial policing remained paramount.  Local unrest against the governing structures was 
suppressed and the indigenous population policed to ensure peace. 
 
The new Union Defence Force continued this policing style from its inception in 1912.  British 
military influence provided the Permanent Force of the Union Defence Force, the SAMR, with a 
specific role when it was not preparing to fight a conventional battle.  It was to be applied as a 
mounted policing body in the rural areas. The pre-Union feature of military policing still prevailed in 
South Africa.  The role and application of the Union Defence Force was a continuation of the 
military policing of the colonial regime.  The Union Government wielded a prominent force capable 
of ensuring white dominance over the majority black population in South Africa.  It also provided 
the Government with the means to suppress popular uprisings against government rule, whether 
black or white.  It was subsequently put to the test in its peacetime role with the suppression of 
industrial unrest in 1913-1914 and 1922, indigenous uprisings in South Africa and South West 
Africa, the Rebellion of 1914-15 and the maintenance of law and order at the Home Front during 
the Second World War.   
 
 126
The UDF faced three categories of internal unrest which they had to suppress, namely, white 
industrial unrest, indigenous unrest and Afrikaner unrest.  A white, Afrikaner dominated 
Government faced more criticism and political risks in suppressing whites and especially Afrikaners 
with military force than suppressing indigenous tribes.  Strained racial relations and political 
pressure were the dominant factors influencing the Union Government and the UDF’s approach to 
suppressing the unrests.   
 
Although the Government elicited sharp criticism for its use of military force in the suppression of 
industrial unrest, it was a necessary step.  The SA Police were not able to suppress the unrest and 
the use of military force was needed to ensure the protection of state structures and to restore and 
maintain law and order.  A pattern of military reaction to white labour disputes emerged from the 
1907 strike.  The foundation was laid for more intervention in disputes deemed as a threat to the 
state.  The Union lacked sufficient forces during the 1913 strike and Imperial troops were used to 
suppress the industrial unrest.  It is apparent that Gen. Smuts anticipated another strike and 
foresaw that the military would be used again.   
 
The pre-emptive move by Gen. Smuts, in mobilising the UDF in early February 1914 for immediate 
deployment to suppress the industrial strike was, in military terms, well executed and provided the 
Government with tactical success.  However, the public did not accept the use of military force 
based on the fear that the police would be unable to control the upcoming strike.  Resentment 
against the Government, and especially Gen. Smuts, was harboured.  The hearts and minds of 
many white South Africans at grass roots level, particularly Afrikaners, were turned against him. 
 
In military terms, the young UDF showed that it was capable of defending the authority of the state 
and maintaining law and order, with relatively low casualties, during the suppression of both the 
1914 and 1922 strikes.  The 1914 industrial unrest provided good lessons to the UDF and gave it 
the necessary experience to effectively suppress the 1922 industrial unrest without incurring heavy 
casualties on both sides. 
 
The military successes of the Government forces during the 1914 and 1922 strikes can be 
attributed, mainly, to six factors. The foresight of government officials at the end of 1913, thus 
ensuring the operational readiness of the UDF for a possible deployment against industrial 
upheaval, was important.  Another factor was the quick arrest of many strike leaders when the 
1914 strike commenced, which exacerbated the lack of co-ordination and co-operation between 
strikers in the different centres.  The quick and efficient mobilisation and deployment of the UDF in 
both strikes was the third factor, because it prohibited the strikers from consolidating their positions 
and digging in properly.  The fourth factor contributing to success was the maintenance of mobility 
throughout the strikes through the protection of the railway lines and assembly points, which 
ensured the rapid deployment of Government troops.  
 127
 
The successful utilisation of airpower during the 1922 strike, not only in reconnaissance, but also in 
dispersing illegal gatherings and the bombing of fortified positions, contributed to successful 
ground operations.  The sixth factor was the co-ordination of attacks with overwhelming firepower – 
small arms fire, artillery barrages and air bombardments.  The utilisation of artillery fire to suppress 
sniper fire was very effective and played an important role in keeping the casualties of the 
government forces to a minimum, especially during the final assault on the fortified positions of the 
strikers at Fordsburg.   
 
The utilisation of artillery and aeroplanes in the suppression of the 1922 industrial unrest was 
extreme compared to the 1914 strike, but its use was an effective means of limiting casualties and 
ending the unrest quickly.  Without it, the battles most certainly would have lasted much longer and 
the casualties on both sides would have been much higher.  Under the circumstances the use of 
these weapons can be regarded as ‘acceptable’ and was deemed appropriate for the conflict on 
the Witwatersrand.  Government forces took steps to prevent the public from being caught in the 
crossfire through proclamations, statements in the local newspapers and through the dropping of 
pamphlets from aeroplanes.  It was impossible, as in all military confrontations, to completely avoid 
civilian casualties in spite of all the precautions. 
 
The use of military force elicited sharp criticism from the public and opposition parties alike.  Martial 
law was unpopular and the use of military firepower, especially aeroplanes, exacerbated the 
already negative attitude of the public towards the deployment of Government forces.  Military 
firepower quickly ended the strikes, but failed to address the basic grievances underlying the 
strikes.  The opposition parties used these anti-Government sentiments to good effect.  Most 
criticism was aimed at Gen. Smuts and contributed to his political demise in the 1924 election. 
 
The Israelites of Bulhoek in 1921, the Bondelswarts in 1922, the Rehoboth Basters in 1925 and the 
Ukuhambi tribe in 1932 staged uprisings against the ruling regime, yet the military actions against 
these uprisings are noted in history as victories in suppressing recalcitrant indigenous tribes.  In 
the period 1921 to 1932 indigenous tribes in South Africa, as well as South West Africa, were 
subjected to the laws of the Union Government.  Obedience of the police and racial policies was 
expected.  Inevitably conflicts arose when the Bondelswarts and the Rehoboth questioned policy 
regarding livestock and segregation.  Chief Ipumbu, however, did not only contravene Union laws, 
but tribal laws too.  The contravention of laws governing livestock, taxes and his defiance against 
the Government placed the SWA Administrators and the Union under pressure to resolve the 
problem quickly.  Disobedience of these laws required that action be taken.  The failure of 
negotiations led to punitive measures, which was a practiced and accepted way of dealing with 
recalcitrants at the time. 
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Traditional punitive forces consisted of mounted or foot soldiers, but the advent of the aeroplane 
supplemented this force structure.  Joint air-ground operations were executed with success against 
tribes in South West Africa and the aeroplane and armoured cars were instrumental in their 
successes.  The aeroplane was a force multiplier and was quickly mobilised when immediate 
action was necessary and it provided the authorities with the element of surprise when they used it 
against tribes armed with rifles who had the home ground advantage.  Its use against the 
Rehoboth Basters and Chief Ipumbu ensured a quick resolution of the situation and limited 
casualties all round.  The exception to this was the Bondelswarts and the subsequent criticism was 
instrumental in the more careful approach with the Rehoboth Basters and the Ukuambi.  The 
armoured car in use against the Ukuambi achieved limited tactical successes, but prevented the 
prolonged exposure of UDF soldiers to possible enemy attacks.  Its use indicated the extent to 
which Government would go to minimise losses regardless of criticism of how it applied force 
against indigenous polupations. 
 
The punitive measures against the tribes received criticism of varying degrees.  The Bondelswarts 
affair received serious international criticism and was labelled as a betrayal of the sacred mandate 
trust.  The Permanent Mandates Commission criticised Hofmeyer’s actions and Smuts 
encountered political criticism in Parliament, led by the opposition leader, Hertzog.  Yet Hertzog, as 
the new Prime Minister after the 1924 election, sanctioned expeditions against the Rehoboth 
Basters and Chief Ipumbu.  The use of the aeroplane contributed to the quick resolution of these 
situations without loss of life.   
 
Unrest in the white communities of South Africa was suppressed when the 1914-1915 Rebellion 
occurred and during the Second World War when many Afrikaners opposed South Africa’s 
involvement in the war.  Afrikaners during the first half of the 20th century were embittered by their 
defeat in the Second Anglo-Boer War. Their culture and language was dwindling and many were 
impoverished as industrialisation and urbanisation encroached on their rural way of life.  British 
imperialism was blamed for the Afrikaner’s plight and many Afrikaners hated anything British.  
Animosities between Afrikaners were omnipresent, which in conjunction with their hate for 
everything British led to the polarisation of their community over the question of support or 
opposition to the British Crown during the First and Second World Wars.  Prominent members of 
the UDF resigned their commissions in protest against fighting for the British in the First World War 
and a Rebellion followed.  The Rebels were outnumbered, ill-equipped and poorly armed 
compared to the government forces of Gen. Botha.  The use of the railway infrastructure and 
motorcars provided government forces with more mobility, which they employed effectively to 
outmanoeuvre the Rebel forces. 
 
The Rebellion was the most sensitive political and social issue that the Government had to deal 
with.  In an effort to prevent a social schism between the Afrikaner and English communities and 
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amongst Afrikaners during the Rebellion, the government used mostly Afrikaner ACF units and 
ordered no shooting unless shot upon to prevent unnecessary bloodshed.  The Rebels were 
compassionately handled after their capture and fines and imprisonment were only given to 281 of 
the 11,472 participants.  Those imprisoned were released in 1916 to show compassion and to 
prevent further political damage, but the Afrikaner community still resented the government. 
 
Memories of the Second Anglo-Boer War and the 1914-1915 Rebellion were relived when South 
Africa entered the Second World War.  The period between the World Wars is characterised by the 
division of English and Afrikaners as well as internal division amongst the Afrikaners due to 
differing social, economic and political views.  Smuts was desperate to prevent further division 
amongst the white communities at the outbreak of hostilities in 1939.  The suppression of the 
Rebellion and industrial strikes taught Smuts valuable lessons, which he employed against 
opposition groups during the Second World War.  These measures were the passing of the War 
Measures Act by Parliament in 1940 and other proclamations that removed the means whereby 
groups could organise themselves militarily against the Government.  Private weapons and 
ammunition were confiscated and prominent figures who opposed the war policy were watched 
openly or discreetly.  Members of suspect organisations were confined, the police and Military 
Intelligence co-ordinated on all levels to pre-empt militant actions and internment was sanctioned 
to separate suspects from the broader community.   
 
Many Afrikaner families were polarised on the issue of supporting Britain, many took the Africa 
Oath to fight for the Commonwealth while others worked hard at preventing them from going to 
war.  National-Socialism and German victories had an influence on Afrikaner actions, but the 
attempts of the Greyshirts and the New Order had little success in instilling National-Socialism.  
Those Afrikaners who resisted the war effort were driven by their tradition of being anti-British and 
out of sympathy for the Germans who shared the same enemy.  Among the Afrikaners who 
opposed the war many expressed their outrage through political action, but the few militants 
flocked to activist elements to express their anger through sabotage.   
 
Afrikaner unrest during the Second World War was not an open rebellion, but a subversive and 
clandestine action aimed at disrupting the South African war effort through bombings, sabotage 
and intimidation.  As with the First World War, the Second World War enticed strong anti-British 
feelings and organisations such as the OB, capitalised on them.  The cultural revival within the 
Afrikaner community provided fertile ground for the OB to sow its seeds of dissension and reap the 
harvest quickly.  Hans van Rensburg’s anti-government opinion did not land him in an internment 
camp, as it did John Vorster, but it did make him a prime suspect of encouraging the many 
subversive activities that occurred.  The secret Stormjaers within the OB were responsible for 
many of these actions of sabotage, but other groups, like the Tereurgroep, the X-Group and the 
National Socialist Rebels, also participated. 
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The suppression of Afrikaner unrest was a necessity.  The home front had to be secured to ensure 
a steady supply of war material and personnel to the front, because an unstable home front 
creates low morale and a weak support base.  The UDF, SA Police, SAR & H, Military Intelligence 
and volunteer organisations provided an invaluable service in assisting the Government in keeping 
the home front subdued.  Criticism of Smuts was forthcoming from the opposition and the anti-war 
activists.  Spying, confinement and internment characterised government actions and was 
answered with more sabotage and intimidation.  The war ended in favour of Britain and its Allies 
and this eroded the anti-war group’s power base preventing them from recruiting more members to 
their cause or finding support amongst the population to continue with their actions.  Afrikaners 
turned their attention to parliamentary actions and their support for the NP ensured a victory during 
the 1948 elections. 
 
Civilian reaction to the suppression of internal unrest through military means will always illicit 
strong negative reaction against the government of the day.  The politicians and military officers in 
charge suffer the consequences of their actions in the aftermath.  However, in spite of the 
consequences, a country’s defence force has the responsibility of protecting such country against 
enemies of a foreign or a domestic nature and assisting the local police force in maintaining law 
and order.  These unpopular actions are a necessity when the country’s safety, security, stability 
and in some cases, survival is at stake as indicated by the historical examples discussed in this 
thesis. 
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